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THE CHINA QUARTERLY

Communist China and Nuclear Warfare

Alice Langley Hsieh

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Communist China and Nuclear Warfare

By ALICE LANGLEY HSIEH

On March 8, an Indian M.P. announced that China would explode an atomic weapon with Russia's assistance on the morning of March 28. He turned out to be wrong; but there can be no doubt that China intends to get nuclear weapons. This determination may well have an important effect on the forthcoming summit meeting; for Peking has stated that it will not be bound by any disarmament agreement it has not signed. (See p. 75.) In this article, the distillation of a longer study, Mrs. Hsieh traces the development of thinking on nuclear warfare among Chinese military leaders.

THE Chinese Communists, on coming to power, were confronted with a set of strategic problems totally new to them. No longer a mobile force operating from the countryside, they were after 1949 in control of cities, and were rapidly developing a vested interest in industrial complexes, communication centres, and transportation facilities. Although the Korean War awakened them to the importance of modernised, regular forces, the problem of decision-making in the field of military affairs was exacerbated and complicated by the revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking that had occurred outside China in the very period during which the Chinese Communists were gaining and consolidating their power.

In this article we shall explore the nature of the Chinese response to this revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking; the divisive effect that a growing appreciation of the implications of nuclear warfare had on Chinese military circles and on relations between the Party and the Army; and the significance of the evolving Chinese attitudes for the Sino-Soviet strategic relationship.¹

Not until the beginning of 1955 did nuclear weapons, suddenly and almost dramatically, become the subject of public discussion in Communist China. Before that time, such discussions, especially speculations on the impact of nuclear weapons on modern military

¹ This article was prepared on the basis of research undertaken as a staff member of the RAND Corporation. I wish to express my appreciation for the many helpful suggestions received from A. M. Halpern and H. S. Dinerstein.

operations and strategic concepts, had been virtually taboo. Such statements as had been allowed to appear were uniformly disparaging of the significance of nuclear weapons.

This pattern of silence-plus-disparagement was no doubt a useful propaganda technique. But several factors in the particular situation give grounds for concluding that for many years the Chinese Communists simply did not develop any genuine understanding of the meaning of nuclear weapons for modern warfare. Soviet military leaders, on whom the Chinese may be presumed to depend, were slow to evolve a doctrine on the subject.² Moreover, such new strategic concepts as the Russians did develop were difficult to reconcile with the traditional Chinese Communist doctrine as embodied in Mao Tse-tung's military thinking, with its emphasis on protracted war, strategic withdrawal, and the subordination of purely military considerations to the political-military-economic objectives of the revolution. The men who had been schooled in these principles and were experienced in their successful application were bound to be reluctant to accept and assert the new Soviet concepts—based on purely military considerations—that the armed conflict was the crucial aspect of warfare, that the laws of war applied to both sides, and that, given the use of nuclear weapons, the first phase of a war could determine its outcome.

Though the year 1955 marked the end of a policy of strict censorship on nuclear subjects, it is possible, with the knowledge we now have of the debate on military thinking initiated in the Soviet Union in late 1953, to see the year 1954 as a watershed in China's approach not only to foreign affairs but also to issues of strategic concern. A review of both the Indo-China campaign and the 1954 operation in the Formosa Strait suggests that the Chinese decision to end the war in Indo-China short of complete control of the country, and the manner in which both the Chinese and the Russians calculated the risks inherent in the Formosa Strait operation, may have been related to the Communist bloc's overall estimate of the existing balance of power, which recognised the superiority, at least for the time being, of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and delivery capability.

It is reasonable to speculate that China's acquiescence in a policy of caution, in particular with respect to her Formosa objective, must have been based on some degree of genuine understanding of the issues involved in such an estimate—the intermediate state of Soviet weapons development, Soviet estimates of the U.S. strategic posture, and the still unresolved debate in the Soviet Union over the implications of thermo-nuclear warfare for military science. This indirect evidence

² See H. S. Dinerstein, *War and the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959).

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tentatively points to September-October 1954 as the latest possible date when the Chinese began to appreciate at least some of the significant revisions in Soviet thinking.

Beginning in January 1955, there was an unprecedented volume of comment on nuclear matters, with emphasis centring on four major themes: (1) the adoption of the Khrushchev position rejecting the validity of mutual deterrence and insisting that a future war would mean the end of capitalism but not of socialism; (2) a new image of the war threat—the U.S. planning to use atomic weapons to prevent the Chinese people from liberating Formosa; (3) the assertion of a nuclear posture toward Japan which contrasted sharply with the reticent position taken the year before at the time of the "Fukuryu Maru" incident; and (4) reassurances about the dangers of atomic weapons for the benefit of the domestic audience. Much of what the Chinese said about atomic weapons at that time was essentially only what they had said earlier; in particular, they stayed away from any direct reference to the doctrinal implications of nuclear warfare. Statements and, more important still, omissions in the period before the Bandung Conference may have been governed by the diplomatic tactics employed in feeling out U.S. intentions in the Formosa Strait.

Yet a new awareness and understanding of China's vulnerability to nuclear attack would help to explain why Peking, following the threat of U.S. atomic retaliation implicit in Secretary of State Dulles' statement of March 8, 1955, decided to drop the operation in the Formosa Strait and to use the Bandung Conference, on April 23, to call for negotiations with America. This military-political decision bespeaks at least some degree of realism in Chinese estimates of atomic warfare.

By July 1955, it was increasingly evident, particularly from the speeches on the Military Service Law at the second session of the First National People's Congress, that the implications of the revisions in Soviet military thinking were no longer barred from discussion and that a fundamental reassessment of China's security position in an era of thermo-nuclear weapons was in progress among certain Chinese military leaders. For example, Marshal Liu Po-ch'eng, who had been appointed head of the Military Training Department of the General Staff in November 1954, observed:

With the emergence of atomic weapons and jet weapons, military science has registered a new development. It is anticipated that war in the future will be a combined operation by the land forces, naval forces, air forces, parachutists, and air defence units carried out on the land, at sea, and in the air. The extent of the fronts, the size of the armies, and the use of material supplies will all be greater than heretofore. . . . We must have high vigilance against the plots of the imperialist aggressive bloc for starting a new war, we must be prepared for the

suddenness of war launched by the imperialists; therefore we must be materially and spiritually alert. . . .³

A similar concern over the implications of "sudden attack" was voiced by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, Director of the Inspectorate of the Armed Forces of the General Staff.⁴

This willingness on the part of certain Chinese military leaders to acknowledge, in mid-1955, at least some of the main doctrinal implications of thermo-nuclear war appears to have been related to a debate then current within Chinese military circles as to the defensive measures that could, or should, be adopted in response to the threat of thermo-nuclear war. Though the picture is complex, two schools of strategic thought can be identified: that represented by the Ministry of National Defence and that of the more professionally oriented officers on the General Staff.

The position of the Ministry of National Defence, as voiced by its Minister, Marshal P'eng Teh-huai, in his speech of July 16, appeared to envisage the war of the future as one whose outcome would depend on what manpower and resources could be mobilised after the outbreak of hostilities—the old concept of an extended war or long war of attrition.⁵ On the other hand, those members of the General Staff who had expressed concern over the implications of surprise attack inclined toward a strategic approach based on a well-trained and well-equipped standing army, a strong air force, and an adequate air defence system, in short, on a concept of forces-in-being and a military posture that would tend to reduce China's vulnerability to a first blow. Yeh Chien-ying went so far as to say that "pending the full establishment of our industry, within certain limits it is necessary for us to resort to the expedient measure of placing orders with foreign countries."

This cleavage within the Chinese military was further reflected in the formation of clusters of attitudes on related issues. That school of military thought which sought to rely on the mobilisation of manpower and resources subsequent to attack also subscribed to a reduction in defence expenditures (through reduction of the standing army and dependence on trained reserves); to priority of economic over defence construction; to greater Party control over the People's Liberation Army (PLA); and to the Army's mobilisation in the interest of economic

³ Liu Po-ch'eng, speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 21, 1955, in *Current Background*, No. 347, August 23, 1955. Hereafter, publications of the U.S. Consulate General, Hongkong, will be cited as CB (*Current Background*) and SCMP (*Survey of the China Mainland Press*).

⁴ Yeh Chien-ying, speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 27, 1955, in CB, No. 347, August 23, 1955.

⁵ P'eng Teh-huai, speech delivered to the second session of the First National People's Congress, July 16, 1955, in CB, No. 337, July 20, 1955.

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construction. Moreover, there are indications that this group tended to have a high estimate of Soviet deterrent capabilities.

The "professional" element in the military, which, in effect, favoured a quasi-independent Chinese defence posture, was silent on the proposal for reducing military expenditures and the standing army, and de-emphasised the strategic role of the reserves. Furthermore, these officers argued for the "co-ordination" of economic and national defence construction⁶; tended to minimise the role of the Party in the PLA; questioned the use of the PLA in economic construction; and may have had some doubts about the reliability of the Soviet deterrent or the nature of the Soviet commitment to China.

This debate touched on the most basic of decisions to be made in Peking: the definition of revolutionary objectives, the allocation of scarce resources, and the relationship between the Party and the military. The issues involved were to be spelled out more clearly in mid-1958. At that time, Chu Teh attacked those with an exclusively military viewpoint who looked down on politics and whose attention was centred on national defence, without regard for the significance of economic construction to defence.⁷ The *Liberation Army Newspaper*, in the summer of 1958, admitted that some officers, who placed a one-sided stress on the suddenness and complexity of modern warfare, had openly opposed the Party's leadership of the PLA on the grounds that it impeded the essential concentration of command⁸; and the same paper branded as an "erroneous tendency" the one-sided stress on the role of atomic weapons and modern military techniques.⁹

Between mid-1955 and mid-1957, several major developments had affected the course of the debate and, consequently, the nature of China's military structure. The large-scale Soviet hydrogen bomb tests in late 1955 must have reinforced the position of that group which placed its confidence in the Soviet deterrent capabilities. In 1956 a high level internal decision reaffirmed the policy based on the premise that economic construction remained the critical issue, no doubt on the grounds that the measures advocated by the General Staff were unrealistic in view of China's low economic level. On the other hand,

⁶ Yeh Chien-ying had not hesitated to complain about people who "consider that it is now only necessary to concentrate all forces for socialist economic construction, and there is no need for attaching such great importance to national defence construction. They do not realise that while it is true that national defence construction must rely on the industrialisation of the state, simultaneously with the promotion of socialist economic construction we must maintain a sufficient national defence force or we shall be placed in a weak position."

⁷ Chu Teh, "People's Army, People's War," NCNA, Peking, July 31, 1958, in CB, No. 514, August 6, 1958.

⁸ *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (*Liberation Army Newspaper*), July 1, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1881, October 24, 1958.

⁹ August 1, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1881, October 24, 1958.

between late 1956 and early 1957 there was new evidence of a growing appreciation of the importance of scientific research and development and its applicability to the armed forces. However, this period also marked the reassertion of the Party as leader of the PLA and the beginning of a process by which Ministry of National Defence personnel eventually took over most of the leading posts on the General Staff.

The contradictions inherent in these developments caused the state of Chinese military thinking still to be confused in mid-1957. P'eng, in his Army Day statement, reiterated his earlier views.¹⁰ Senior Gen. Su Yü, Chief of the General Staff, on the other hand, placed greater emphasis than P'eng on quality, training, and the promotion of combat capabilities in the armed forces. Moreover, he did not underestimate the destructive power of nuclear weapons nor the impact of a first blow, though he did not admit that such a blow could effect the outcome of a war; rather, he took the position that nuclear weapons could not achieve the objectives of occupation and subjugation and that, therefore, the infantry remained the deciding factor. In a sense, Su Yü was combining the concept of broken-back warfare with that of Mao's extended war. But in stressing the need for highly trained, well-equipped forces-in-being, a strong air force, and adequate air defence and civil defence systems, he was subtly underlining the lacunae in China's strategic posture and indirectly challenging the decision-makers in Peking.¹¹

Whether one looked at China's security posture in the period from 1954 to mid-1957 from the viewpoint of the Ministry of National Defence, with its implied reliance on Soviet deterrent capabilities, or from that of the General Staff, with its presumed demands on the Soviet Union for fighter aircraft, petroleum supplies, radar and other modern equipment, there was no denying the increased Chinese military dependence on the Soviet Union. The corollary to this dependence was the greater ability of Moscow to control the nature of China's military moves and the development of China's military structure. Because Soviet weapons development at that time had not yet entered an advanced stage, it is probable that various issues of broad strategic significance between the Soviet Union and China had to be muted.

With the Soviet Union's technological military break-through in the second half of 1957 it became not only possible but necessary for the two partners to consider basic issues of strategic significance.¹² The Soviet

¹⁰ NCNA, Peking, July 31, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1584, August 6, 1957.

¹¹ *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), August 1, 1957, in SCMP, No. 1596, August 22, 1957.

¹² On August 26, 1957, TASS announced that the Soviet Union had successfully tested "an inter-continental multi-stage ballistic rocket." On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first earth satellite. Significantly, the Chinese emphasized the military aspects of these developments.

advance suggested to the Chinese new avenues of manoeuvrability, both political and military, within the shield of Soviet nuclear retaliatory power; at the same time, however, it further underlined for them the extent of their military dependence on Moscow. The Chinese thus found themselves in the paradoxical position of being more dependent on the Soviet Union within a stronger bloc. The Soviet Union, because of its new level of weapons' development, could now afford to discuss these questions. It was in its interest, also, to co-ordinate the overall strategy of the Communist bloc.

A review of overall bloc strategy in all probability took place during the Mao-Khrushchev discussions in Moscow, in November 1957. At the very least, Mao must have asked Khrushchev to agree to Chinese exploitation of the political, cold-war potentialities of Soviet technological developments. More than likely, he also sought a clarification of China's strategic role within the Socialist camp. China's more bellicose posture after the meeting suggests that there had been no difficulty on the first score. However, it is less certain that Mao received the desired clarification of China's strategic role, at least in terms satisfactory to the Chinese. It is extremely unlikely that Khrushchev was prepared to place the Soviet deterrent power at the service of Chinese military ambitions.

No doubt, however, some understanding was reached, if only because Khrushchev was anxious to minimise the possibilities of miscalculations on the part of Peking. The question of renewed Chinese action against the off-shore islands may have been discussed within this context. If China asked for atomic weapons from the Soviet Union, the Russians may have countered the request with the suggestion of an atom-free zone in Asia. Some compromise may have been reached on the question of China's future manufacture of atomic weapons, with Moscow agreeing to assist China more liberally in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Mao's failure to realise some of China's immediate aspirations may explain why, from December 1957 to late May 1958, the Chinese appeared to be in the process of adjusting their strategic thinking to the decisions reached in Moscow. This was the period of overt Chinese support for the concept of an Asian atom-free zone, culminating on May 10, in Chen Yi's oddly contradictory interview with two German correspondents, in which he both endorsed the proposal and predicted that China would have atomic weapons in the future. (Thereafter, Chinese support for an Asian atom-free zone was dropped, until after the idea had been revived by Khrushchev at the Soviet Communist Party's Twenty-first Congress.) More important, it was on May 23, 1958, that Liu Ya-lou, Commander of the PLA Air Force, wrote in the *Liberation Army Newspaper*:

.... China's working class and scientists will certainly be able to make

the most up-to-date aircraft and atomic bombs in the not distant future. By that time, in addition to the political factor in which we always occupy an absolutely predominant position, we can use atomic weapons and rockets . . . in coping with the enemies who dare to invade our country and undermine world peace. By that time, another new turning-point will probably be reached in the international situation.¹³

This identification of China's future production of atomic weapons with "another new turning-point" suggests that the Chinese, at that time, were not relying on the Soviet Union to grant them atomic weapons but had perhaps decided that, if they were to have them, they would have to make their own. Liu's statement, which dealt with future capabilities, would suggest also that the Chinese had reconciled themselves to a transitional strategy—one which recognised China's relative military weakness until the day she herself could manufacture atomic weapons and which, in the meantime, called for limited military objectives, and continued reliance on the Soviet Union's deterrent posture. This recognition of a continued, though temporary, weakness in China's military power was easily obscured, however, by the emphasis which Liu and others were to place on the study of Mao's military thinking and the man-over-weapons theme. During the next few months, professionally-orientated officers, who might have been expected to challenge a transitional approach in China's strategic thinking, came under severe criticism, in the course of which the basic issues that separated these persons from the Party were publicly admitted.

In the weeks from late May through July 1958, the discussion of strategy appeared to move from the level of theory to that of concrete planning for immediate military operations. Mao and Khrushchev, at their meeting in late July and early August, probably arrived at some further decisions. Thus, the course of the off-shore islands crisis in the summer and fall of 1958 provides several clues as to the nature of Chinese strategic thinking and operational decisions, as well as to existing understandings in the Sino-Soviet military relationship.

The crisis was designed to test U.S. responses in the area in the light of the changes in security calculations that had occurred since mid-1957. China's intent was to take the off-shore islands if this could be done without undue risk. In a larger sense, it was to be determined whether the new Soviet strategic posture could prevent the United States from considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons, to the advantage of China's conventional forces. In view of the fact that Chinese military operations in 1958 never passed the point where they could have elicited a U.S. nuclear response, it seems likely (a) that the Chinese were not prepared

¹³ Liu Ya-lou, "Seriously Study Mao Tse-tung's Military Thinking," *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (Liberation Army Newspaper), May 23, 1958, in SCMP, No. 1900, November 24, 1958.

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to accept the cost risks involved in taking the islands, and (b) that Moscow was unwilling to let a situation develop which might have compelled the Soviets to invoke their deterrent shield—a decision over which Moscow clearly retained sole control.

In sum, the 1958 Formosa Strait action, in so far as it remained at a low level of violence, gave every impression of being a subordinate phase in China's long-haul approach toward her political, economic, and military objectives. With the publication, in late October, of Mao Tse-tung's "Imperialists and All Reactionaries are Paper Tigers," and in particular with the revival of Mao's prognosis for the future—that the enemy should be strategically despised but tactically respected—Peking not only rationalised its failure in the Formosa Strait in the eyes of the Chinese people, but also, and more important, dramatically reaffirmed this long-haul approach. There was a strong suggestion, furthermore, that the Chinese were modifying their earlier assumptions about Western weakness.

During late 1958 and early 1959, there was no indication that other than transitional strategic concepts dominated Chinese military thinking. In fact, as the commune movement picked up speed, the PLA was increasingly mobilised in the service of internal economic construction. The "professional" element in the military, which might have questioned the wisdom of so dissipating the strength of the PLA, was further curbed. Party assertion of leadership over the Army could be seen also in the "generals-to-the-ranks" programme, which was vigorously implemented.¹⁴ And the subordination of the General Staff to the Ministry of National Defence was strikingly affirmed with the dismissal, in mid-October, of Su Yü as Chief of the General Staff and his replacement by Huang K'o-ch'eng, a strong Party man (he was a member of the Party Secretariat) and a Vice-Minister of National Defence.

These developments took place within a Sino-Soviet strategic relationship which still did not appear to have been fully defined. Continued friction, stemming perhaps from continuing Chinese pressures for a stronger Soviet commitment, could be detected in the ambivalent, sporadic support which the Chinese lent to Khrushchev's revived proposal for an atom-free zone in the Far East and the Pacific, in January 1959, and in the subtle undertones in Khrushchev's statement to Harriman in June 1959. Khrushchev, it will be recalled, told Harriman that Russia had shipped numerous rockets to China and would lend military assistance should the Chinese decide to take Taiwan. His remarks, however, did not suggest that the Soviet Union was now prepared to share its nuclear capabilities with the Chinese, nor that the manipulation of the

¹⁴ Under a directive of the Army's Political Department, published September 20, 1958, all officers had to serve a month in the ranks.

Soviet deterrent was controlled by any country but the Soviet Union. Rather, the statement seemed designed to create the impression that the U.S. strategic posture in the Far East had been neutralised, and thereby to introduce a new element of uncertainty into U.S. planning. Such intent would point to a policy conceived in terms of a long-range political pay-off rather than with a view to imminent military aggression.

These earlier hints of friction were substantiated in the second half of 1959, when there was increasing evidence of a serious divergence of views between the Chinese and the Soviets on the correct tactical approach to the West. China's reluctance to accede to a reduction in international tension and her undisguised preference for a more aggressive posture toward the West were characteristic of a stage of development marked by political and military weakness. Militarily, the Chinese were still dependent on a Soviet nuclear deterrent, and it was as yet far from clear to what extent Moscow would use this deterrent to forward China's political objectives. By themselves, the Chinese were in no position to assert even a minimal military posture based on well-trained, well-equipped forces-in-being, as was demonstrated by the poor performance of the Chinese Air Force during the 1958 Formosa Strait crisis.

By mid-1959, this discrepancy between China's political objectives and her military means must have awakened the leadership to the harmful effects of the divisions within the Chinese military. These divisions came under two major headings. On the one hand was the conflict between the professional military and the Party. Communication, which had begun to deteriorate in 1954, had broken down almost completely in mid-1958, when professional thinking was curbed still more severely in the effort to ensure acceptance of a transitional strategy; many of the "professionals" (among them perhaps Su Yü, who was subsequently dismissed) not only were dissatisfied with the poor showing of Chinese forces during the Formosa Strait crisis, but also, perhaps, questioned the wisdom of initiating hostilities in the area altogether; many of them opposed the dissipation of the PLA in economic construction work to the detriment of the training programmes they believed necessary; and they had been further demoralised by the "generals-to-the-ranks" movement and by the role assigned the militia in the commune programme. On the other hand, there was a growing problem between the Party and the PLA rank and file. The latter, who were primarily of peasant origin, were betraying a latent antagonism to the commune programme, and were thus questioning one of Communist China's basic revolutionary objectives.

Any reconciliation of these divisive tendencies was beyond the power of the Minister of National Defence, P'eng Teh-huai, who over the years had strongly committed himself to the position which subordinated

China's immediate strategic posture and military structure to the demands of China's industrialisation. It is against this background that we must see the appointment of Marshal Lin Piao on September 17, 1959, to succeed P'eng as Minister of National Defence at the same time as Lo Jui-ch'ing replaced Huang K'o-ch'eng as Chief of the General Staff.

Lin's absence due to illness from the political scene from late 1950 to May 1958, when he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (the only military man, aside from Chu Teh, to hold such a post), saved him from being publicly identified with either side in the debate on military affairs. Because of his strong Party position and his established reputation as a battle strategist and logistics man, Lin was in a position to restore two-way communication between the Party and the professionals, and thus to bring back into play the type of skills and knowledge that even the Communist Party cannot dispense with for long. This was essential if the PLA was to be so revitalised as to eliminate any possibility of another poor showing such as the one in the Formosa Strait. At the same time, Lin's mentality was better suited than P'eng's guerrilla outlook to directing China's military course in a period when China might join the nuclear club, if only as a nominal member, and might be prepared to gamble for high stakes in the Far East. Lin's reputed acceptability to the Soviet Union may have been another of his assets.¹⁵

While Lin's appointment may thus be understood in terms of the need to reconcile political objectives with military means and the aspirations of the Party with the views of the professionals, the appointment of Lo Jui-ch'ing, former Minister of Public Security and head of the Public Security Forces, to the post of Chief of the General Staff would seem to reflect a desire to eliminate divergences between the attitude of the rank and file and the revolutionary aims of the leadership.

Lin's article of September 29, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the People's Republic of China,¹⁶ demonstrated to what extent his task was that of synthesising divisive elements. As he directed himself to both rank and file and officers he left no question that politics would continue to govern. He criticised as incorrect the attitude of officers and men towards the communes. The PLA, he said, was to participate in mass movements, in economic construction, and in the generals-to-the-ranks programme. He acknowledged the role of the militia. Man

¹⁵ In his *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing House, 1951), p. 30, Lt.-Col. Robert B. Rigg raised the possibility that while Lin Piao was in the Soviet Union from 1938 to 1942 for medical treatment, he also did some military training. He also believes that Lin was not casually selected in 1945 for his assignment in Soviet-occupied Manchuria, adding that Lin's "strong point has been considered to be his liaison and orientation."

¹⁶ NCNA, Peking, September 29, 1959, in CB No. 596, October 7, 1959. See documentation below.

remained the important factor in modern warfare. But at the same time Lin placed equal emphasis on the modernisation of the PLA, on the importance of a standing army possessed of modern technical equipment, on training, and on the system of command, centralisation, and discipline. He implied that the development of the national economy and the strengthening of national defence would proceed together. And he called for the liberation of Formosa.

After praising the Party and Mao Tse-tung for having correctly solved significant military problems, Lin cited Mao's "The Question of War and Strategy" to the effect that "the armed forces constitute an essential part of the political power of a state" and that "our principle is to have the Party directing the guns." Lin did not actually quote the other pertinent passage from Mao's work, his contention that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," but its intimation was clear. Though Lin did not challenge past Party decisions and practices with respect to military affairs, his article conveys the impression that, hereafter, Peking's policy will tend toward closing the gap between political objectives and military means, and its insistence on Party leadership over the army will be modified by the demand that it be Party leadership over a *strong* army.

Documentation: Lin Piao on the Army

In the past ten years our country has been undergoing a great change—the transition from the thorough victory of the democratic revolution to the carrying out of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. Militarily, our army has advanced from a single arm to a modern combined force of different arms; this is also a big leap forward. In these circumstances, we are confronted with a series of vital problems concerning the building up of the army. The main problem is: Is it still important for politics to be in command in the stage of the modernization of the army? Concretely speaking, what place has political and ideological work? What attitude should the members of the armed forces adopt towards the country's economic construction and the mass movements? What is the correct way to handle intra-army relations and to strengthen still further the Party's leadership in the army? . . .

Within our army, the two opposing classes, the bourgeoisie and the working class, do not exist, but the struggle between bourgeois and working-class ideology does exist. This ideological struggle is a reflection of the struggle between the two roads, socialist and capitalist, in the transition period. . . . None of the work of our army, including its modernization, can be divorced from this ideological struggle. . . .

In waging the struggle on the political and ideological fronts, we always maintain that as far as the overwhelming majority of comrades are concerned

DOCUMENTATION: LIN PIAO ON THE ARMY

this is mainly a question of education and raising their level. The officers and men of our army ardently love socialism, fight for it resolutely and can withstand tests of great stress. Those who insist on taking the road of capitalism and are deliberately against socialism are merely a handful of individuals from alien classes who have sneaked into the army. However, since the overwhelming majority of the officers and men of our army come from the peasantry, unavoidably some comrades sometimes consider questions from the temporary, partial interests of small producers and do not clearly understand certain questions of socialist change; unavoidably, too, a small number of comrades are affected, in the great stress of socialist revolution, by bourgeois and petty-bourgeois, and especially well-to-do middle peasant, ideological influences and reveal an insufficiently resolute standpoint. This is the situation and, if allowed to develop, bourgeois ideology would spread in our army. Therefore, we must not slacken ideological work for a moment. These ideological questions belong to the category of contradictions among the people and cannot be solved by methods which are proper for contradictions between ourselves and the enemy or by coercive, high-handed methods; they can only be solved by democratic methods, the method of discussion, criticism, persuasion and education. . . .

In building up our army into a modernized army, we pay very much attention, of course, to improving equipment and mastering technique. But we must at the same time pay attention to the other side, which is indeed the predominant side, that is, we must not forget politics, we must emphasize politics. Our army is an army in the service of politics, in the service of socialism, and we must guide the military and day-to-day work with politics. Politics is the most fundamental thing; if political and ideological work is not done well, everything else is out of the question. . . .

After the liberation of the mainland, the major task of our army shifted from fighting to training; instead of living scattered in villages as before, it moved into regular barracks and had less opportunity for direct contact with the masses. At that time some comrades held that since there was a division of labour between economic construction and the building up of national defence and that since army training was very heavy work, it appeared as if there were no need for the army to take part in the revolutionary struggles of the masses of the people or in national economic construction, no need to take part in "civilian" business. We criticised this wrong view and firmly corrected it in time. We have continued to develop our army's long-standing, glorious tradition of simultaneously carrying out the three great tasks of fighting, mass work and production, and we have launched various activities in support of the mass movements in line with the requirements of different stages of socialist transformation and socialist construction. . . .

Participating directly in the mass movement, the officers and men of the People's Liberation Army see, above all, the tremendous endeavours and magnificent successes of hundreds of millions of people. This is the main current, the essence of the mass movement. In the people's communes, for example, we see not only the powerful vitality and unparalleled superiority of this new-born social organization and the important role it plays in developing the national economy and culture and in raising the living standards of the people; we also come to realize that in the event of a war of aggression launched by imperialism against our country, the people's

communes, in which township administration and commune management are merged into one and industry, agriculture, trade, education and military affairs are integrated into one, are the mighty prop for the task of turning the whole population into fighting men, of supporting the front, of defending the country and overwhelming the aggressors. Seeing this revolutionary creation of the masses of people which can accelerate the advance of the socialist cause and at the same time promote the building of national defence, what else can anyone who genuinely desires a prosperous and powerful motherland do but support it wholeheartedly and praise it with deep emotion? . . .

Some years ago there were comrades who regarded it as an extra burden for the army to participate in mass movements and assist the people in production. They held that only drilling and lectures constituted training while participation in practical socialist struggles was not training but an obstruction to training which would bring "more loss than gain." Such a viewpoint is utterly wrong.

In building a modernized army, when the technical equipment of our army is being constantly improved and the mastery of technique and the raising of the technical level of our army are more important than ever before, is man still the decisive factor? Some comrades take the view that modern warfare differs from warfare in the past, that since the weapons and equipment available to our army in the past were inferior we had to emphasize dependence on man, on his bravery and wisdom, in order to win victories. They say that modern warfare is a war of technique, of steel and machinery, and that in the face of these things, man's role has to be relegated to a secondary place. They attach importance only to machinery and want to turn revolutionary soldiers into robots without revolutionary initiative. Contrary to these people, we believe that although equipment and technique are important, the human factor is even more important. Technique also has to be mastered by man. Men and materiel must form a unity and men must be made the leading factor. What we have to consider constantly is how to mobilize all positive factors still better and bring the initiative of the mass of officers and men into full play. That is why in building up the army during the past ten years, we have paid special attention to creating close relations between the officers and men and between the men at the higher and lower echelons, and to applying the mass line thoroughly in all work. . . .

In 1958, our army responded to the call of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and began to put into practice the system of officers going down to the companies and serving as rank and file soldiers for a period of a month each year. Our comrade generals who are commanding officers and political commissars of the various military areas, services and arms, took the lead in putting this into effect. The officers who join the companies as ordinary soldiers drill, do manual labour, live and spend their recreation time together with the rank and file. They do whatever the squad leaders order; what they do not know they learn from the squad leaders and the rank and file like pupils in school. Very soon they are united with the soldiers as one and become their bosom friends. . . .

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has always attached great importance to the development of democratic life. He has instructed us many times on this. He has said that the army should practise a certain degree of democracy. . . . In the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the rank and file are the ones

DOCUMENTATION: LIN BIAO ON THE ARMY

to be governed and led, yet at the same time they are entitled to take part in the conduct of affairs, contribute their ideas and recommend ways and means in the course of the work. The cadres are the ones who govern and lead, yet at the same time they are subject to the supervision of the masses, depend on the masses and mobilize them in work. Where contradictions arise, the democratic method of persuasion and education is used to adjust them according to the unity-criticism-unity formula. In this way unity is strengthened, morale is raised, discipline is consolidated and the initiative and creative energy of the mass of officers and rank and file are developed. . . . Should any people with ulterior motives try to use democracy to undermine our army, neither would the leadership at all levels tolerate them, nor would the mass of officers and men ever let them get away with it.

The Party's absolute leadership in the armed forces and the staunch Party character of the host of cadres of our army are the best guarantee for victory in the field of national defence in our country's socialist construction. . . .

The Party should be obeyed absolutely; no personal ambitions are permissible. Discipline should be strictly observed; in all circumstances importance should be attached to the unity of the Party and nothing should be done behind the back of the Party; one should be just, selfless and honest, and not chase fame hypocritically; modest and not conceited; courageous in accepting criticism and advice and active in combating all wrong tendencies, not rejecting criticism and persisting in mistakes. In short, individualism is the source of all evils. As soon as it sprouts, it must be criticized to the full and overcome by every effort, not a single bit of it must be allowed to get by. . . .

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DEBATE: Part 2

The Legend of "Maoism" (concluded)

By KARL A. WITTFOGEL

The second part of our debate on the originality of Mao Tse-tung contains the conclusion of Prof. Wittfogel's The Legend of "Maoism," including a documentary annex, and Prof. Schwartz's reply, The Legend of the "Legend of 'Maoism.'"

- In the first part of this article I argued that the "Maoist" thesis is a "Maoist" legend. It is so because it is based on a false concept of
- ① Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. And it is so also for two other reasons. Contrary to "Maoist" assertions, Mao in his Hunan Report did not
 - ② outline a concept for a Communist-led peasant-supported revolution; and he did not, in 1940, present himself as an original top-ranking
 - ③ Marxist-Leninist theoretician.

The study of Mao's behaviour during and immediately after the first Kuomintang-Communist United Front is valuable for an understanding of Communist ways of exploiting national revolutionary (anti-imperialist) movements. In the mid-twenties Mao, a vigorous young Communist, "unhindered" by a deep knowledge of Marxism-Leninism,⁹² occupied several high posts in the Kuomintang, which from 1923 on the Communists were permitted to join, not *en bloc*, but as individuals. In 1925 Mao was the editor of the K.M.T. magazine, *Political Weekly*,⁹³ and from 1925 to 1926 he was acting head of the propaganda department of the K.M.T.⁹⁴ At that time he was also an alternate in the Central Committees of both parties. And while in his autobiographical account he depicts himself early in 1927 as essentially combating the timid agrarian policy of the Communist Party,⁹⁵ he continued to work actively in and with

⁹² His later statement that from 1924 the Chinese Communists "only vaguely" understood the theory of the peculiarities of the Chinese revolution (Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, 4 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1954), Vol. III, p. 112 [hereafter cited as Mao, SW]), did not do justice to such mature Communists as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, but it was probably true enough of the young Mao.

⁹³ Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 143 (hereafter cited as Snow 1938).

⁹⁴ See *Protocol of the Second National Congress of the K.M.T. (Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti erh tz'u ch'uan-kuo tai-piao-hua hui chi-lu)* (Canton, 1926), p. 43. As acting head, Mao obviously ran the department. Hence he was substantially correct when, in his account to Snow, he claimed to have been "chief of the Agitprop department of the Kuomintang" (Snow 1938, p. 143).

⁹⁵ Snow 1938, p. 144.

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the Kuomintang. A photograph in the *People's Tribune*, Hankow, of March 18, 1927, reveals that Mao participated in the Third Enlarged Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the K.M.T. This conference got under way on March 10; that is, little more than a week after Mao completed his Hunan Report.²²

Forgoing in this context a detailed analysis of the textual history and the political substance of Mao's Report,²³ I shall deal primarily with facts that have a direct bearing on the "Maoist" argument.

The text of Mao's Hunan Report as presented in the *Documentary History* is based on a Chinese edition, dated 1944²⁴: it comprises only the first section of the document—Chapters I and II. The second section—Chapter III, entitled "The Fourteen Great Deeds"—is more than twice as long. Its fate during the time of the first civil war and the Sino-Japanese War is obscure, but it appeared again at the end of 1947.²⁵ The post-1947 editions generally give both sections, including several pages of statistics in the second. In 1951 there began to appear in Chinese an official edition of Mao's *Selected Works* revised—and often substantially revised—by Mao himself. Volume I of this edition, dated 1951, gives both sections of the Hunan Report without the statistics, which are politically irrelevant, but with certain textual changes, which have considerable political significance.

Since the "Maoist" thesis is largely based on an interpretation of the first section of the Hunan Report, I shall discuss its "Maoist" (or non-"Maoist") character essentially with reference to this section. When I cite the second section (more exactly: the earliest pre-1951 version of this section at my disposal) or the official 1951 version of both sections, I shall say so.

²² On February 28, according to *Hsiang-tao chou-pao*, March 12, 1927, p. 2063.

²³ For a fuller political analysis, see *Short History*, Chap. V, A, 3. In the not too distant future I hope to give a detailed account of the various versions of the Hunan Report I have located during a search that I began in the early fifties.

²⁴ *Documentary History*, p. 495.

²⁵ An edition of the Report dated August 1946 published in Luan-nan Hsien (N.-E. Hopei) does not contain the second section. Two 1947 editions of Mao's *Selected Works* are equally deficient, as is a third published in March 1947 by the Chin-ch'a-chi Central Bureau of the C.C.P. But a supplement to this last collection dated December 1947 gives the full text. An undated edition of the Hunan Report by the Chi-tung branch of the Hsin-hua Book Company included Chap. III with an editorial note on the last page stating that this section had "very recently" been "recopied" (from an unidentified source, perhaps the just-mentioned December 1947 Supplement), but that the original text had "not yet been found."

The rediscovered text of December 1947 contains several passages which by Communist standards are embarrassing and which have been deleted in the official version of 1951. See Mao's story that as a student he had considered the peasants "stupid and hateful people" and his remark that the revolutionary cadres were riding in sedan chairs perpetuating for themselves the privileges denied to others (Mao Tse-tung, *Hsian-chi* [Chin-ch'a-chi, ed., no place, 1947], Supplement I, pp. 37 and 33 [hereafter cited as Mao 1947]). I therefore believe that the 1947 text of the second section substantially reproduced the peculiarities of the original piece.

The basic features of the alleged "Maoist" policy are stress on Communist leadership—or struggle for leadership—in the national revolution and emphasis on the peasantry as the main force of this revolution which, as the executor of the agrarian revolution, is organised and led by the Communists. In his Hunan Report Mao entirely disregards the first issue, and he avoids discussing the agrarian revolution, which is the core of the second. These omissions are easily understood if we remember the curbs the Chinese Communist Party imposed on itself to keep its United Front with the Kuomintang intact.

From the moment the United Front was established, and in conformity with Moscow's directives, the Chinese Communists accepted the K.M.T. as the leading party. And although by the close of 1926 the Communist position in the mass organisations was quite strong, Stalin hesitated to urge a change that might endanger the alliance. At an Enlarged Plenary Session of the Communist International in November of that year, he insisted that, for the time being, "the Chinese Communists ought to remain in the Kuo Min Tang and intensify their work in it."¹ And while pointing to the leadership of the Communist Party as a future goal, he made it clear that this was not the issue then. Designating the Chinese youth—students, young workers and peasants—as a force of the greatest importance, he declared that it "might drive the revolution forward with giant strides, if the young people were brought under the ideological and political influence of the Kuo Min Tang."²

This background goes far to explain why Mao in his Hunan Report does not raise the issue of Communist leadership. In the first section of the pre-1951 version, the Communist Party is not even mentioned. One reference to "the Party"³ manifestly pertains to the Kuomintang.⁴ In the second section one passage mentions both parties, but the Kuomintang is placed before the Communist Party.⁵

Nine years later Mao claimed that he wrote his Report for the "Central Committee,"⁶ probably meaning the Central Committee of the C.C.P. But whoever the official recipient was, Mao obviously did not intend it to be read exclusively by the C.C.P. since the account stresses political aims shared by the Communists and the Left Kuomintang.

¹ *Inprecor* 1926, p. 1583.

² *Inprecor* 1926, p. 1584.

³ Mao Tse-tung, "Hu-nan nung-min yün-tung k'ao-ch'a (Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan)," *Hsiang-tao chou-pao* 1927, p. 2067 (hereafter cited as Mao 1927); cf. *Documentary History*, p. 89.

⁴ This is confirmed by a footnote to this passage in the official 1951 edition (Mao Tse-tung, *Hsüan-chi* [Peking: Jen-min ch'u-p'an shih, 1951], p. 46 [hereafter cited as Mao, HC]; Mao, SW I, p. 302).

⁵ Mao 1947, p. 30; Mao, SW I, p. 48.

⁶ Snow 1938, p. 144.

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Moreover, in the first sections Mao exhorts "all revolutionary parties" to face up to the leadership test presented by the rising peasant movement. And in the same context he gives advice on how to improve the peasant policy of "the revolutionary régime,"⁷ a designation which the authors of the *Documentary History* quite correctly interpret as connoting "the Wuhan government"⁸—that is, the national-revolutionary régime in Wuhan run by the Left Kuomintang and supported by the Communists. In a passage in the second section Mao addresses himself directly to "the revolutionary authorities in Hunan."⁹

Mao's attitude was that of a Communist leader who, as a high-ranking functionary in the Kuomintang, was closely co-operating with the Wuhan government and its principal provincial units. Quite appropriately, he was more cautious in his Report than the Comintern strategists had been at the November session (there the goal of Communist leadership in the Chinese revolution was proclaimed not only by Stalin, but also by the Chinese delegate, T'an P'ing-shan).¹⁰ Quite appropriately also, after the first section of the Hunan Report had appeared on March 12 in the C.C.P. Weekly, a condensed version including details from the second section appeared on March 15 in *Chinese Correspondence*, "Weekly Organ of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang."¹¹

But in the vicissitudes of a shifting Communist line the correct policy of today may be rejected as "rightist" tomorrow. When Mao prepared the official version of his *Works*, he obviously felt that in February 1927 he should have raised the leadership issue. Hence the original omission is mended in the 1951 version of the Hunan Report. We find there one direct reference to Communist leadership in the first section,¹² and one equally direct and a few oblique references in the second section.¹³ Thus a basic feature of "Maoist" policy appeared in Mao's Hunan Report twenty-four years after it was written.

A position that did not involve a Communist drive for leadership on the basis of peasant support did not have to appeal to the peasants by proclaiming an economic revolution, especially the redistribution of the land. When discussing the rural revolution, Mao confined himself primarily to its political aspects. He set no limits on violence in advocating the political attacks against the traditional rural élite (the "village bullies [*fu-hao*] and the bad gentry"); but in doing so he

⁷ Mao 1927, p. 2063; Mao, SW I, p. 21.

⁸ *Documentary History*, p. 80.

⁹ Mao 1947, p. 26; Mao SW I, p. 42.

¹⁰ *Inprecor* 1926, p. 1591.

¹¹ *Chinese Correspondence*, Vol. II, No. 8 (May 15), p. 10 *et seq.*

¹² Mao, SW I, p. 31.

¹³ Mao, SW I, p. 50; *cf.* p. 44.

was on firm ground, since their overthrow had been requested in January by the C.C.P.¹⁴ (it was requested by the Kuomintang in March).¹⁵ His demand that the peasants be armed¹⁶ was a left deviation in terms of the position taken by the head of the C.C.P. in January¹⁷; but it was in line with policies recommended by the Comintern¹⁸ and the Left K.M.T. in March.¹⁹

Mao's comments on the revolutionary potential of the peasants oscillated between a propagandistic extremism (calling the poor peasants the "vanguard" of the anti-feudal revolution)²⁰ and a certain reserve (ascribing only 70 per cent. of the accomplishments in the national revolution to the peasants).²¹ The "vanguard" formula followed a demagogic pattern invoked by Lenin, Zinoviev and Bela Kun; and the 70 per cent. formula was more cautious than a preceding Comintern appraisal that designated the peasants "the most important and decisive factor of the Chinese national-liberation movement."²² It was notably more cautious than Mao's later remark that the Chinese revolution was "virtually the peasants' revolution."²³

But however Mao may have wavered in his estimate of the peasants' revolutionary potential, he never asked in the Report that it be unleashed through a furtherance of the agrarian revolution. As noted above, the Comintern leaders feared to initiate a course that might shake the C.C.P.'s alliance with the Kuomintang.²⁴ And in December 1926, a month after the above-mentioned meeting of the Communist International, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the C.C.P. passed a resolution on the peasant question which, according to a Comintern observer, contained "not a word . . . on an agrarian programme."²⁵ Mao certainly was aware of this reticence when he was studying the Hunan peasant movement. His Report also contained not a word on the core of the agrarian revolution: the land question.

¹⁴ Political Report of the Central Committee of the C.C.P., dated January 26, 1927 (C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, *Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China 1918-27*, edited with Introductory Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 433.)

¹⁵ Declaration to the Peasants by the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the K.M.T., March 1927 (*Chinese Correspondence*, Vol. II, No. 7 (1927), p. 9).

¹⁶ This demand was made in the second section of the Hunan Report (Mao 1947, p. 25; cf. Mao, SW I, p. 41 *et seq.*).

¹⁷ N. Nassonov, N. Fokine, A. Albrecht, "The Letter from Shanghai," in Leon Trotsky, *Problems of the Chinese Revolution*, translated by Max Shachtman (New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1932), p. 418 (hereafter cited as Nassonov 1932).

¹⁸ Stalin, W X, p. 21.

¹⁹ *Chinese Correspondence*, Vol. II, No. 7 (1927), p. 9.

²⁰ Mao 1927, p. 2066; *Documentary History*, p. 88.

²¹ Mao, 1927, p. 2065; *Documentary History*, p. 83.

²² *Inprecor* 1926, p. 649.

²³ Mao, SW III, p. 137. Italics mine. As his authority Mao cited Stalin.

²⁴ See Stalin W VIII, p. 384 *et seq.*; X, p. 18; cf. *Inprecor* 1926, pp. 1478 and 1548.

²⁵ Nassonov 1932, p. 418.

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The Comintern later condemned this attitude toward the agrarian revolution as "opportunistic," and Mao probably remembered this criticism when he was revising his Hunan Report. An altered sentence in the second section reads as follows: "An economic struggle should also be started immediately in order that the *land problem and other* economic problems of the poor peasants can be completely solved."²⁶ The italicised words were inserted in 1951.

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These, however, were *curae posteriores*. When Mao's Hunan Report first appeared, his Communist readers were not at all disturbed by the absence of "Maoist" demands that were not then the order of the day. The authors of the *Documentary History*, who present the Report as a manifestation of incipient "Maoism" and basically at odds with the Comintern line, could not help noticing that it was reproduced in Communist publications. In an attempt to explain this fact, they assert that the Communists printed Mao's Report "without comment."²⁷ Was this indeed the case?

At the Eighth Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (May 18-30, 1927)²⁸ the problem of the Chinese revolution played a crucial role in the fight between the leading Stalin faction and the Trotsky opposition. During this session Bukharin, then Stalin's close ally and chairman of the Comintern, mentioned in his discussion of the Chinese question a document to which apparently top-ranking members of the Comintern had access: "Perhaps some comrades have read the report in which one of our agitators describes his trip in Hunan Province."²⁹ Bukharin spoke of the document as "an excellent and interesting description"; and his comments on the Chinese peasant movement and particularly the one passage which he cited verbatim³⁰ indicate that the account to which he was referring was Mao's Hunan Report.

A document distinguished by the unqualified praise of the chairman of the Comintern was bound to be widely distributed in the Communist world. A Russian translation of the first section of Mao's Report appeared under his name some time in 1927 in *Revolutionnyi Vostok*³¹; and an English translation appeared on June 15, 1927, in the *Communist International*.³² The editors of this magazine, the "Official Organ of

²⁶ Mao, SW I, p. 47. ²⁷ *Documentary History*, p. 78. ²⁸ *Inprecor* 1927, p. 706.

²⁹ *Die Chinesische Frage*. Auf dem 8. Plenum der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale Mai 1927 (Hamburg/Berlin, 1928), p. 12 (hereafter cited as DCF).

³⁰ DCF, p. 13; cf. Mao 1927, p. 2063; *Documentary History*, p. 81.

³¹ No. 2, pp. 107-122. No date.

³² Excerpts from the Hunan Report were published in *Inprecor* 1927, p. 760 et seq., and the Comintern official, Asiaticus, included a German translation of the *Chinese Correspondence* version in his book, *Von Kanton bis Shanghai* (Wien-Berlin, 1928), pp. 273-276.

the Executive Committee of the Communist International," made some textual changes, but they faithfully retained Mao's designation of the poor peasants as the revolutionary "vanguard" (which all later versions also do) and his cautious 70 per cent. formula (which the official 1951 edition omits). On the front page they proudly described Mao's story as "the most revealing report on conditions in the Chinese villages yet published in English."

11

Moscow's wish to avoid a premature break with the Left Kuomintang accounts decisively for the caution with which the C.C.P. leaders approached the agrarian revolution. It influenced Mao when he wrote his Hunan Report; and it shaped his attitude as director of the All-China Peasant Federation (sometimes called "Union"), an organisation set up by the Central Committee and the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang on March 27,³³ ten days after the conclusion of the Third Plenary Session of the Kuomintang's Central Committee. In this position, Mao co-operated closely with the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang and the Wuhan government.

The All-China Peasant Federation called for patience when the Hunan peasant and labour organisations were being harshly suppressed by the Wuhan régime.³⁴ It asked the revolutionary peasant organisations "to conduct the movement in such a way as not to disturb or hamper the interest of other classes who are on the same battle front with the peasants."³⁵ Like the C.C.P. and Left Kuomintang, the Federation advocated the confiscation of the land of the "local rowdies, bad gentry and great landowners"; but it also urged the peasants "to place full confidence in the government which has our confidence," and it recommended a system of village self-government,³⁶ which the Comintern-directed emergency conference of the C.C.P. on August 7 branded as "harmful to the revolution."³⁷

This policy, which Mao implemented, does not fit the "Maoist" pattern. The authors of the *Documentary History* who recognise this fact explain Mao's un-"Maoist" behaviour as a manifestation of his "good Party discipline" and his skill in "sham compromise."³⁸ Quite so. Mao, who had manifested his Party discipline in February when he wrote the Hunan Report, continued to do so in May and June when he headed the Peasant Federation.

³³ *People's Tribune*, March 31, 1927.

³⁴ *People's Tribune*, May 28.

³⁵ *People's Tribune*, June 9.

³⁶ *People's Tribune*, June 11.

³⁷ *Documentary History*, p. 112.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 100.

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Harold Isaacs, in discussing the latter period, was wrong when he said that Mao then was "the head of the Peasant Department of the Kuomintang," but he was right in claiming that Mao "carried out the policy of keeping the peasants in check while the counter-revolution advanced upon them."³⁹ M. N. Roy, who had headed a Comintern delegation to China in the spring of 1927, stated retrospectively: "The chairman of the Federation of Peasant Unions, Mao Tse-tung, in the critical days of 1927, represented the extreme right-wing view in the leadership of the Communist Party."⁴⁰

Yet Mao cannot be written off simply as a "right-winger." Early in 1926 he stressed socio-economic differences within the peasantry—prematurely from the standpoint of Comintern policy, but probably with a radical intent. And in the Hunan Report he revealed his readiness to promote the political revolution in the villages by military means that, whatever their tactical rationale, can hardly be termed moderate. Mao's "leftist" trends found limited expression in a situation that demanded continual adjustments to the Kuomintang and outright "counter-revolutionary" concessions in the spring and early summer of 1927. It was this kind of operation that the emergency conference of the C.C.P. on August 7 labelled "opportunistic."

12

Mao's autobiographical account of 1936 is a first major attempt to remove this stain on his record. Being then the supreme leader of the Party, Mao claimed that he had advocated "a radical land policy and vigorous organisation of the peasantry under the Communist Party" in his article "An Analysis of the Different Classes of Chinese Society."⁴¹ An examination of this article reveals no such suggestions.⁴² He also claimed that prior to the Fifth Congress of the C.C.P. in March–April 1927 he had made "recommendations for a widespread redistribution of land."⁴³ Unfortunately not even the official Party historians offer any evidence to support this allegation.

However, in September 1927, and perhaps because of the August 7 criticism, Mao did pursue a markedly different policy. Professor Schwartz sees this policy as expressing his view that "a judicious co-ordination of military organisation with local peasant uprisings would provide the formula for a country-wide agrarian insurrection."⁴⁴ In

³⁹ Isaacs 1938, p. 397.

⁴⁰ M. N. Roy, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Calcutta: Renaissance Publishers, 1946), p. 615.

⁴¹ Snow 1938, p. 143 *et seq.*

⁴² *Chung-kuo nung-min*, March 1926, pp. 1–13.

⁴³ Snow 1938, p. 144.

⁴⁴ Schwartz 1951, p. 100 *et seq.*

essence this is Mao's *post-festum* interpretation of his behaviour. But again history has it otherwise.

According to a resolution passed by the Enlarged Plenary Session of the new (provisional) Politburo of the Central Committee of the C.C.P. in November 1927, the August 7 conference had ordered the Party "to execute the programme of the agrarian revolution and lead the peasants of the four provinces of Hunan, Hupei, Kiangsi and Kwangtung to rise at the time of the autumn harvest and thus to carry on the struggle for the agrarian revolution."⁴⁵ [See Document No. 2, appended to this article.] Mao was delegated to carry out this programme in his home province, Hunan, and in preparing for his task he outlined five policy points, which included the "confiscation of property of small and middle, as well as great, landlords" and the "organisation of soviets." Commenting on these points, Mao told Snow that the organisation of soviets "at that time was opposed by the Comintern, and not till later did it advance it as a slogan."⁴⁶ He also told Snow that after the campaign collapsed he was dismissed from the Politburo "because the programme of the Autumn Crop Uprising had not been sanctioned by the Central Committee, because also the First Army had suffered some severe losses, and from the angle of the cities the movement appeared doomed to failure."⁴⁷ This statement, which Schwartz takes at face value,⁴⁸ misrepresents both the Soviet position and the reasons for Mao's demotion by the Enlarged Plenary Conference of the Central Committee of the C.C.P. on November 14, 1927.

The Comintern raised the slogan of soviets for China not after but before the September uprisings, to be precise on August 9.⁴⁹ And while Mao demanded the organisation of soviets before the Comintern did,⁵⁰ he did so apparently in terms of the October Revolution—that is, in terms of a proletarian revolution.⁵¹ Thus, if Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai's statement of these events is correct—and the Party historians indirectly confirm it by avoiding the issue—then Mao failed to give his plan for setting up soviets the specific "Maoist" orientation which the Party, under the guidance of the Comintern representative, requested. At this time the Comintern leaders saw the only chance for immediate success in China, not in an October-like, but in a rural insurrection. It was the organisation of rural soviets that Stalin in a somewhat involved argument sanctioned on September 27.⁵²

⁴⁵ Kuo-wen Chou-pao 1928, No. 3, p. 5.

⁴⁶ Snow 1938, p. 149. Italics mine.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 151.

⁴⁸ Schwartz 1951, p. 101.

⁴⁹ Inprecor 1927, p. 1075 et seq.

⁵⁰ Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai, *Chung-kuo ko-ming yü kung-ch'ian-tang* (the Chinese Revolution and the Communist Party) (no place, 1928), p. 127 (hereafter cited as Ch'ü 1928).

⁵¹ Ch'ü 1928, p. 127.

⁵² Speech on the Political Complexion of the Russian Opposition (Stalin, W X, p. 163). Cf. also Pravda of September 30 (Inprecor 1927, p. 12379).

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On November 14, 1927, the Enlarged Plenary Session of the Politburo stressed the desirability of establishing soviet governments in the future in large areas including cities and industrial centres⁵³; and it warned against making the city workers mere appendages of the peasant movements.⁵⁴ But it declared that peasant soviets should be established whenever the rising guerrilla forces in the countryside "can obtain victory and hold out in certain areas."⁵⁵

Under these circumstances the new leaders of the C.C.P. would have been justified technically if they had censured Mao for organising soviets before the Comintern did. But such a course was inadvisable because of the delicacy of the underlying international issue: Stalin's previous reluctance to proclaim soviets in China and Trotsky's denunciation of this policy. Hence the November session concentrated its fire on a mistake which Mao had committed together with a number of other Party functionaries and which the Comintern considered especially grave in the new phase of Chinese Communist strategy: the neglect of the agrarian revolution.

The permanent head of the Hunan Provincial Committee was the Party secretary, P'eng Kung-ta. P'eng therefore was the first target of the part of the November decisions dealing with Hunan. But the ultimate responsibility rested with the commissioner, who, in the Communist chain of command, exercised supreme authority. And this commissioner was Mao.

In the November Resolution on Party Discipline the Politburo stated that it had admonished P'eng Kung-ta to avoid "military opportunism" (meaning: one-sided concentration on military action) and to "make the peasant masses the main force of the insurrection." But this was not done. Because of this improper guidance "the insurrection of the Hunan peasants turned into a failure of pure military opportunism."⁵⁶

Having dealt with the provincial leaders generally and with P'eng Kung-ta particularly, the Resolution proceeded to lay the main blame on Mao Tse-tung as the agent of the Central Committee in Hunan and dismissed him from the Politburo.⁵⁷

We need not accept out of hand the stereotyped Party judgment that Mao was an opportunist. But if in September 1927 he did one-sidedly concentrate on the military aspect of his assignment—and the Party historians offer no evidence to the contrary—we can come to only one conclusion: Mao, who failed to proclaim the so-called "Maoist" strategy in his Hunan Report and who failed to promote this strategy

⁵³ Kuo-wen Chou-pao 1928, No. 2, p. 7.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* p. 6.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* p. 7.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.* No. 3, p. 6.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.* No. 3, p. 7.

as director of the All-China Peasant Federation, implemented in the Autumn Crop Uprisings only one of its two major features: Communist leadership. The other—appealing to the peasants by promising them land—he neglected.

From the standpoint of Leninist strategy his behaviour in September was immature, but not unorthodox. He became more mature and more conspicuously orthodox when, from 1928 on, he rose to ever higher positions and finally to supreme leadership in the Communist Party of China.

13

Limitation of space prevents me from demonstrating in detail that Mao during the period of the rural soviets did not lose sight of the long-range goal: return to the cities. Late in 1928 he complained of "an acute sense of loneliness." He yearned for an extension of the revolution "all over the country."⁸⁸ In 1929 he drafted plans for seizing Kiangsi, Fukien and Chekiang,⁸⁹ and in a passage written in April 1929, but deleted in 1951, he proposed that within a year "the foundations should be laid for the proletarian struggle in Shanghai, Wusih, Ningpo, Hangchow, Fuchow and Amoy," with the aim "to lead the peasant struggle in the three provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsi and Fukien. The Provincial Committee of Kiangsi must be sound, and workers' bases must be vigorously established at Nanchang, Kiukiang, Sian and the Nanchang-Kiukiang Railroad."⁹⁰ Mao's protracted stay in the rural areas, first in Central China and then in the North-west, was due not to any peculiar theory of the revolution, but to the limited strength of the Communist forces.

Manifestly then Mao did not "in act" demonstrate his strategic originality when from the winter of 1927-28 on he organised Communist-controlled rural power bases. Nor did he, as the authors of the *> Documentary History* suggest, claim theoretical originality when he commented on the peculiarity of the Chinese revolution in his pamphlet, *On New Democracy*, published in Yen-an at the beginning of 1940.

Mao wrote *On New Democracy* in the middle phase of the Sino-Japanese war, after the conclusion of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, which got the European war going and greatly strengthened Moscow. At that time the Chinese Communists were under less pressure to make concessions to the Chinese Nationalists than in the pre-Pact period. In accordance with Moscow's desire to protect its eastern flank, Mao continued to maintain the anti-Japanese alliance with the Kuomintang, but he

⁸⁸ Mao, SW I, p. 99.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* p. 126 *et seq.*

⁹⁰ Mao 1947, Supplement IV, p. 98.

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felt free to discuss the future development of China in terms of a not-yet-completed revolution. The second stage of this development was the socialist revolution, but the first and immediately significant stage was the bourgeois-democratic revolution, which looked to the establishment of a democracy. Challenging the political ideas of his Kuomintang allies, Mao stated that the to-be-created order would be a "new" democracy, which would come into being through a new type of bourgeois-democratic revolution. Instead of being led by the bourgeoisie, this new bourgeois-democratic revolution would be led by the proletariat and, being part of the proletarian and socialist world revolution, it would evolve into socialism. [See Document No. 3, appended to this article.]

As noted above, these ideas were initiated by Lenin as early as 1905; and after the Bolshevik Revolution they were further developed by Lenin and Stalin. Both men stressed two important features: (1) the relation between the bourgeois-democratic revolution, Leninist style, and the proletarian world revolution; and (2) the supreme significance of bourgeois-democratic revolutions, Leninist style, for the colonial and semi-colonial countries of the East, including, of course, India and China.

The authors of the *Documentary History* are aware of the Leninist-Stalinist origin of the theory of the new bourgeois-democratic revolution and democracy⁶¹; but they claim that in *On New Democracy* "it is presented to us . . . as a genuinely new contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory—a contribution which had originated in China and which presumably placed its author, Mao Tse-tung, in the ranks of the great theoreticians of Marxism." Presented by whom? "*The presumption is . . . legitimate that the gesture to create a new theory re-emphasising 'the historic peculiarities of the Chinese revolution' originated with Mao Tse-tung himself. It was a gesture with profound implications. It suggested that innovations within the Marxist-Leninist tradition could originate not only in Moscow but in other sectors of the world Communist movement as well; that the tradition is still capable of further 'original' developments which rank in importance with those of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.*"⁶²

I agree with Messrs. Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank that a claim by Mao to theoretical originality, however unjustified, would have profound implications. But did Mao really make such a claim? Did he deny or hide the Soviet root of his concept of the peculiarities of China's new bourgeois-democratic revolution? An examination of Mao's *On New Democracy* shows that he did nothing of the kind.

In this work Mao describes the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution as part of the proletarian world revolution, and he continues:

⁶¹ *Documentary History*, p. 261.

⁶² *Ibid.* p. 260 et seq. Italics mine.

→ this "correct thesis" of the Chinese revolution was already being propounded in China between 1924 and 1927, but "at that time the meaning of this theoretical proposition was not yet fully expounded, and consequently it was only vaguely understood."⁴³ Thus Mao does not claim that he created this theory in 1940 or that the Chinese Communists, who were "vaguely" familiar with it since the twenties, created it then. Instead he states: "*This correct thesis [of the Chinese revolution] propounded by the Chinese Communists is based on Stalin's theory.*"⁴⁴ And to make his point crystal-clear he reproduced two long Stalin quotations, the second tracing the key argument back to Lenin. In a concluding sentence, "From this, it can be seen that there are two kinds of world revolution,"⁴⁵ Mao once more acknowledges that he received his "correct thesis" of the new democratic revolution and the new democracy from Stalin and Lenin.

→ The avowed purpose of the *Documentary History* is to provide textual documentation for the major developments of Chinese Communism. How then do its authors deal with these passages that are crucial for establishing Mao's alleged claim to theoretical originality? Very simply indeed. They omit them. After presenting Mao's exposition of the "correct thesis," they skip over his remark that it was poorly understood by the Chinese Communists in 1924-27 and over his decisive statement that it was "based on Stalin's theory." They also skip over Mao's quotations from Stalin. The passage they then reproduce begins with the words: "From the above it is clear" (The official translation, as given above, is "From this, it can be seen . . ."). No reader would know from this arrangement that the summarising phrase refers, not to Mao's presentation of the "correct thesis," but to its acknowledged Soviet source.

→ It may be argued that *On New Democracy* is a long pamphlet and that therefore a selective reproduction is entirely legitimate. This is true with one obvious qualification: The selected passages should indicate the major points of the text. And if the introductory note stresses the importance of a certain thesis, then the editors are in honour bound not to omit passages that are crucial to its validity. Anyone may reproduce whatever he wants from Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, but if he claims that Hitler was not really an anti-Semite and then omits passages that prove the contrary, he would violate fundamental rules of scholarship. And he would distort history as well.

14

The authors of the *Documentary History*, who created the "Maoist" myth in 1951-52, had ample opportunity in subsequent studies of Chinese

⁴³ Mao, SW III, p. 112.⁴⁴ Mao, SW III, p. 112. *Italics mine.*⁴⁵ *Ibid.* p. 114.

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thought to correct their errors. But instead of doing so, they kept repeating their key conclusions, which, as we have seen, are based on an inadequate reproduction of Lenin's ideas of 1920 and on the misrepresentation of Mao's behaviour in 1927 and 1940.

In a review article of Mao's *Selected Works*, written in 1955, Schwartz comments on the three first volumes of the official edition with particular reference to "the much-discussed question of Mao Tse-tung's 'originality' or lack thereof."⁶⁶ In "a spot comparison of the Chinese, Russian and English texts" he finds nothing to "suggest any tampering via translation," but "evidence of some tampering with the texts of the various items themselves. At least one deletion of an unhappy phrase has been noted and a detailed comparison of these texts with some of the older butcher-paper editions of Yen-an days may yield more."⁶⁷

In view of the fact that the "Maoist" thesis is predominantly based on the Hunan Report and—in a supplementary way—on the pamphlet *On New Democracy*, it is surprising that Schwartz's "spot comparison" yielded nothing worth mentioning except the deletion of an unspecified "unhappy phrase."⁶⁸ Did Professor Schwartz not notice that what the *Documentary History* offers as Mao's Hunan Report is actually less than one-third of the original document? Did he not notice that two key features of the "Maoist" strategy—Communist leadership and the appeal to the peasants by means of the agrarian revolution—were inserted by Mao only in 1951? Did he not notice that Mao knew the concept of the Chinese bourgeois-democratic revolution as a Comintern concept at least as early as 1928?⁶⁹ And did not a rereading of the text of *On New Democracy* convince him that whatever else Mao did in this pamphlet, he did not present himself as an original theoretician on the Chinese revolution?

Uninfluenced by the new evidence, Schwartz in 1955 still speaks of "the Maoist strategy" as meaning the "concentration on the peasantry, the establishment of rural bases and the build-up of a peasant-based Red Army"⁷⁰; and he also speaks of "Mao's exclusive obsession with peasant bases and guerrilla warfare."⁷¹

⁶⁶ Benjamin Schwartz, "On the 'Originality' of Mao Tse-tung," *Foreign Affairs* XXXIV, No. 1 (October 1955), p. 68 (hereafter cited as Schwartz 1955).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.* p. 67 *et seq.*

⁶⁸ Could this be the 70 per cent. formula that Schwartz and his colleagues consider one of the manifestations of a "Maoist" bent in the Hunan Report? Robert North noted its deletion in 1953 (Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists* [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953], p. 171), as did Brandt recently (see below, footnote 72).

⁶⁹ See Mao, SW I, p. 99; *cf.* pp. 172, 278.

⁷⁰ Schwartz 1955, p. 70.

⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 71.

★ In 1958 a second member of the group, Conrad Brandt, shows a similar unconcern with the mounting evidence. In a monograph on the first period of the Chinese revolution he repeats the claim that in the Hunan Report Mao "put himself on record with a view that conflicted? sharply with Moscow's."⁷² In the same year, the senior member of the group, John K. Fairbank, in a revised edition of *The United States and China*, reiterated the two key theses of the "Maoist" school. According to him, Mao in 1927 asserted the vanguard role of the poor peasants "heretically"⁷³; and in *On New Democracy* Mao "put himself on the level of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin as an original contributor to Communist theory."⁷⁴

In 1951-52 the Western world had many illusions—and relatively few data—about the Chinese Communists. However, developments in the last years have made it abundantly clear that Chinese Communism, like its Soviet root and counterpart, is a very complex phenomenon. What are the relations of Chinese Communism to China's traditional society and to the U.S.S.R.? What is the meaning of the recent conflicts between the Chinese Communists and Moscow?⁷⁵

For a variety of reasons the study of the Chinese segment of the totalitarian revolution has been particularly unsatisfactory. Circumstances require that this deficiency be repaired. They require the co-operation of all persons of good will, whatever their previous differences may have been.

The errors of yesterday can prepare us for the insights of tomorrow. They can—if we approach the doctrine and strategy of the totalitarian revolution with the utmost seriousness. Engels once said, "With the

⁷² Conrad Brandt, *Stalin's Failure in China 1924-27* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 107. Brandt views the omission of the 70 per cent. formula as a confirmation of the "Maoist" thesis. He tells us: "Mao's mathematics . . . revealed with mathematical clearness how sharply his view of the struggle in China differed from that of Stalin. They revealed more, in any case, than he cared to show to the public once he was in power." Hence, the new editions of Mao's Report "omit the formula which conveyed its meaning too clearly" (*op. cit.* p. 109 *et seq.*).

In a footnote Brandt also states that "an English translation of Mao's report" appears in the *Documentary History* (*op. cit.* p. 209). Thus as late as 1958 he still shows no awareness of the fact that the piece he, Schwartz and Fairbank included in the *History* was not "Mao's report," but less than one-third of it.

⁷³ John King Fairbank, *The United States and China*. New edition. Completely revised and enlarged (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 231; *cf.* p. 240 *et seq.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.* p. 243.

⁷⁵ On a number of occasions and frequently in connection with the problem of Chinese "Titoism" I have discussed these conflicts (see Karl A. Wittfogel, "How to Checkmate Stalin in Asia," *Commentary* [October 1950], p. 338 *et seq.*; Wittfogel 1951, p. 30; Wittfogel, 1954; and *idem.*, "A Stronger Oriental Despotism," *The China Quarterly*, 1960, No. 1).

insurrection one must not play." ⁷⁸ We may well add: With the theory of insurrection one must not play either.

⁷⁸ This famous statement of Engels appeared in one of the articles that were first printed in the *New York Daily Tribune* and later published as *Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany*, in both cases under Marx's name (*Marx-Engels Lenin-Stalin. Zur Deutschen Geschichte*, Vol. II [Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1954], p. 448). The correspondence between Marx and Engels shows that the series was actually written by Engels (MEGA III, 1, pp. 229, 236, 241, 242, 244, 259, 261, and *passim*). The article with the rules for insurrection is probably the one mentioned in Engels' letter of August 2, 1852 (*op. cit.* p. 365). Lenin, who from 1913 was thoroughly familiar with the Marx-Engels correspondence, disregarded Engels' authorship and ascribed the insurrection formula to Marx (see his article of October 21 (8), 1917, in *Lenin*, SWG XXI, p. 407 *et seq.*).

Documentation: (1) Lenin on the role of the peasantry in the East

The Russian revolution was an example of how the proletarians, having defeated capitalism and united with the vast diffuse mass of peasant toilers, rose up victoriously against mediaeval oppression. Now our Soviet Republic has to group around it all the awakening peoples of the East and, together with them, wage a struggle against international imperialism.

Here you are confronted with a task which until now did not confront the Communists anywhere in the world: relying upon the general theory and practice of Communism, you must adapt yourselves to peculiar conditions which do not exist in the European countries and be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is to wage a struggle not against capitalism but against mediaeval survivals. That is a difficult and unique task, but a very thankful one, because those masses are being drawn into the struggle which until now have taken no part in it, and, on the other hand, because the organisation of Communist units in the East gives you the opportunity to maintain the closest contact with the Third International. You must find specific forms for this alliance of the foremost proletarians of the world with the toiling and exploited masses of the East whose conditions are in many cases mediaeval. We have accomplished on a small scale in our country that which you will accomplish on a big scale in big countries. And that latter task you will, I hope, perform with success. Thanks to the Communist organisations in the East, of which you here are the representatives, you have contact with the advanced revolutionary proletariat. Your task is to continue to see to it that Communist propaganda is carried on in every country in the language intelligible to its people.

It is self-evident that final victory can be won only by the proletariat of all the advanced countries of the world, and we, the Russians, are beginning the work which the British, the French or the German proletariat will seal. But we see that they will not be victorious without the aid of the toiling masses of all the oppressed colonial peoples, and of the Eastern

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peoples in the first place. We must realise that the transition to Communism cannot be accomplished by the vanguard alone. The task is to arouse the toiling masses to revolutionary activity, to independent action and organisation, regardless of the level on which they may happen to be; to translate the true Communist doctrine, which was intended for the Communists of the more advanced countries, into the language of every people; to carry out those practical tasks which must be carried out immediately, and to merge with the proletarians of other countries in a common struggle. . . .

[Address to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, November 22, 1919. "Izvestia" of the C. C. R.C.P.(B) No. 9, December 20, 1919.—From V. I. Lenin. "The National-Liberation Movement in the East." (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), pp. 234-235. This speech is referred to in the first half of Prof. Wittfogel's article. See *The China Quarterly*, No. 1, p. 78.]

(2) Excerpts from the C.C.P. Politburo Resolution on Political Discipline (November 14, 1927)

(1) The Fifth National Congress of our Party treated political discipline within the Party as a matter of great importance. Only by a most rigorous political discipline can the fighting strength of a proletarian class party be augmented. This is the minimum requirement every community party must fulfil.

(2) Since the August incident this year [the Chinese Communist Party] publicly announced its withdrawal from the National Government and decided that its previous policy of compromise with the leaders of the petty bourgeoisie must be abandoned and that it must resolutely lead the masses of the workers and peasants to rise in armed insurrection. The Conference of August 7 pointed out in greater detail that our Party, having previously committed errors of opportunism, from now on should without the slightest hesitation rely on the strength of the masses and thoroughly execute the program of the agrarian revolution and decide to lead the peasants of the four provinces of Hunan, Hupei, Kiangsi, and Kwangtung to rise at the time of the autumn crop, thus to carry out the struggle of the agrarian revolution.

At this time there should not have been the slightest hesitation in pursuing our policy. However, in the course of the insurrection in the various provinces the leading organs of our Party and the responsible comrades committed many serious mistakes in violation of the strategy. . . .

C. In guiding the uprising of the peasants the Hunan Provincial Committee violated the strategy of the Central Committee even more seriously [than the Kwangtung Provincial Committee]. The Central Committee had pointed out repeatedly that the insurrection in Hunan should rely chiefly on the peasant masses, and it openly reprimanded Comrade P'eng Kung-ta, the Secretary of the Provincial Committee, for having committed the mistake of military opportunism. It asked the Provincial Committee to rectify this mistake and rely on the peasant masses as the main force in the uprising, and to make practical preparations in accordance with the Central Committee's plan for insurrection in Hunan and Hupei. At that

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time, after the argument had gone back and forth, and although in the end Comrade Kung-ta reluctantly agreed, the Provincial Committee, in directing the uprising, still did not rectify its old mistake of military opportunism.

(1) Kung-ta violated the Central Committee's instruction and regarded the uprising as a purely military operation. He made contact only with bandits and troops of various colors without getting the broad peasant masses to rise. Consequently, at the beginning of the uprising only the workers of An-yuan bravely participated in the struggle; the peasant masses of the different regions did not participate at all.

(2) In areas of insurrection there was no agrarian revolution and no [setting up of] political power. Hence the peasants only thought the Communist Party wanted to make trouble, and even the Provincial Committee doubted whether the peasants wanted land. Instead [the Committee] launched the slogan for an eight-hour day.

(3) In areas through which the Peasants' and Workers' Army passed the policy of butchering the local bullies and the bad gentry was not carried out. Hence the peasants regarded it as a guest army on the move. Because of these mistakes in guidance and their problematic results, the peasant insurrection in Hunan was a failure of purely military opportunism. . . .

5. The Enlarged Conference of the Provisional Political Bureau of the Central Committee decides that the above-listed Party organs, which carried out the policy wrongly, and the responsible comrades be punished as follows. . . .

F. The Provincial Committeemen, P'eng Kung-ta, Mao Tse-tung, Yi Li-jung, and Hsia Ming-han, should be deprived of their membership of the Hunan Provincial Committee. Comrade P'eng Kung-ta should be deprived of his alternate membership in the Central Political Bureau and placed on probation in the Party for one year. The Central Committee sent Comrade Mao Tse-tung to Hunan after the August 7 Emergency Conference as Special Commissioner to reorganise the Provincial Committee and carry out the Autumn Uprising policy of the Central Committee. He was in fact the core of the Hunan Provincial Committee. Therefore Comrade Mao should shoulder the most serious responsibility for the mistakes made by the Hunan Provincial Committee. He should be dismissed from his position as alternate member of the Provisional Political Bureau of the Central Committee. . . .

I. Comrade Wang Jo-fei should be reprimanded for the mistakes in leadership he committed on the Party and national levels. . . .

[*Kuo-wen Chou-pao*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Jan. 15, 1928), pp. 5-7. The above Resolution of the Enlarged Provisional Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party is one of several documents which the Wuhan garrison of the National Army seized in a raid on December 5, 1927. Soon afterwards the garrison released this and two other resolutions of the November meeting, one concerned with the political situation and one with organisational matters. The *Kuo-wen Chou-pao*, a serious independent weekly, published the three documents on January 8 and 15, 1928, respectively. An introductory note shows that the editors considered the Resolution authentic. Internal and external evidence supports this assumption.

The passages printed above deal with the political goal of the "Autumn Crop Uprisings" and the way in which this goal was accomplished—or disregarded—at the Hunan sector of the campaign, for which Mao Tse-tung, as special commissioner of the Central Committee, was primarily responsible. The document has been translated by Mr. Chao Chen-sung, research assistant of the Chinese History Project.]

(3) Mao's "On New Democracy"

The correct thesis that "the Chinese revolution is part of the world revolution" was propounded as early as 1924-27, during the period of China's First Great Revolution. It was propounded by the Chinese Communists and approved by all who participated in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle of the time. But at that time the meaning of this theoretical proposition was not yet fully expounded, and consequently it was only vaguely understood.

This "world revolution" refers no longer to the old world revolution—for the old bourgeois world revolution has long become a thing of the past—but to a new world revolution, the Socialist world revolution. Similarly, to form "part" of the world revolution means to form no longer a part of the old bourgeois revolution but of the new Socialist revolution. This is an exceedingly great change unparalleled in the history of China and of the world.

This correct thesis propounded by the Chinese Communists is based on Stalin's theory. . . .

Since writing this article [commemorating the first anniversary of the October Revolution], Stalin has again and again expounded the theoretical proposition that revolutions in colonies and semi-colonies have already departed from the old category and become part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. The article that gives the clearest and most precise explanation was published on June 30, 1925, in which Stalin carried on a controversy with the Yugoslav nationalists of that time. This article, entitled "The National Question Once Again," is included in a book translated by Chang Chung-shih, published under the title *Stalin on the National Question*. It contains the following passage:

"Semich refers to a passage in Stalin's pamphlet *Marxism and the National Question*, written at the end of 1912. It is stated there that 'the national struggle under the conditions of rising capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves.' By this he is evidently trying to hint that his own formula defining the social meaning of the national movement in present historical conditions is correct. But Stalin's pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, at a time when the national question in the eyes of Marxists had not yet assumed world significance, and when the basic demand of the Marxists, the right to self-determination, was judged to be not a part of the proletarian revolution but a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It would be absurd to ignore the fact that the international situation has radically changed since that time, that the war on the one hand and the October Revolution in Russia on the other have converted the national question from a part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part of the proletarian-socialist revolution. . . . In view of all this, what interpretation can be placed on Comrade Semich's reference. . . . The only interpretation that can be placed on it is that . . . he is . . . failing to take account of the fact that what is correct in one historical situation may prove incorrect in another historical situation." . . .

[On New Democracy. "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung." (London: Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., 1954.) Vol. 3. pp. 112-114.]

The Legend of the "Legend of 'Maoism'"

By BENJAMIN SCHWARTZ

THE following remarks (which I hope will be my last on Prof. Wittfogel's "The Legend of 'Maoism'") will hardly bear the appearance of a coherent essay. They are simply a collection of fragmentary replies to his own fragmentary points of attack.¹ For some years now Prof. Wittfogel has been obsessed with the view that Fairbank, Schwartz and Brandt (an indivisible entity) have committed an "error" (not an accidental error!) which has led to incalculably evil results in our struggle with world Communism.

Before proceeding to consider some of the more specific points of indictment, I should like to point to the enormous initial distortion involved in the whole legend of the legend of "Maoism." According to Prof. Wittfogel, the *Documentary History of Chinese Communism*² and my own book³ attempt to prove that the whole development of Communism in China is "based on" a "peculiar theory of revolution" devised by Mao Tse-tung. Having devised "Maoism," Mao then proceeded to shape the Chinese revolution in accordance with its dictates. The fact is that I believe this no more than I believe that the whole Soviet development was derived from set "theories" of Stalin or even of Lenin. On the contrary, in the case of all three, it is my conviction that new "theory" evolved in the context of power struggles and in the course of efforts to cope with situations not provided for by the pre-existent doctrine. It represents an effort to cope with a new situation and yet fit it into the Procrustean bed of the older doctrine. This does not mean that elements of the older doctrine do not themselves continue to shape the course of events. Actually both the *Documentary History* and my own book constantly emphasise the abiding elements of Leninism in Chinese Communism.⁴ It does, however, imply a rejection of Prof.

[For a consideration of some of Professor Wittfogel's own implicit assumptions see my article in the *New Leader*, April 4, 1960.

² Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952) (hereafter cited as *Documentary History*).

³ Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism & the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951) (hereafter cited as Schwartz 1951).

⁴ e.g., see Schwartz 1951, pp. 201-204.

Wittfogel's conception of Marxism-Leninism as a "doctrine and strategy of totalitarian revolution," as a ready-made science of power with established recipes for dealing with all situations—a science which is never surprised by new contingencies.

One of the first objectives of my book was to examine the process by which Mao Tse-tung rose to a position of power within the Chinese Communist movement, and the process by which the Maoist strategy became the dominant line of development within that movement. While I have committed errors in this area, I remain convinced that neither the strategy nor the rise of Mao to power were planned in Moscow on the basis of Stalin's "operational code." Nowhere is it contended that Mao began with a theory. On the contrary, it is expressly stated that until 1940 Mao was content to operate within the framework of the theories provided by Moscow.⁵

However, a second objective of the book was to examine the implications of the Maoist strategy for Marxism-Leninism as it had existed up to that point. I nowhere contend that Mao made these implications explicit. I do not even contend that he made them explicit in his *On New Democracy*.

What then are the legitimate uses of the word "Maoism" as I conceive them? In the first place I would assign the "ism" in Maoism neither more nor less semantic weight than I would assign to the "ism" in Stalinism: (1) It may be taken in the first instance to refer to the strategies and policies of Mao and Stalin. (2) It may be taken to refer to the claims made for Stalin and Mao as great theoretical innovators to the "storehouse of Marxism-Leninism" whether these claims are justified or not. (3) Finally, it may refer to genuine departures from previous doctrine which are presented by the Communists as "extensions and enrichments," but which have always seemed to me to represent a decomposition of previous doctrine. Actually, some of the most interesting questions which can be raised under categories (2) and (3) involve the period subsequent to 1940. The claims made for Mao as an innovator have tended to multiply. There is even some room for maintaining that some of his later "contributions" such as "cheng feng," "thought reform," "The Socialist transformation of the bourgeoisie," the theory of the communes, etc., do indeed represent explicit departures from previous dogma in a much more significant sense than *On New Democracy*. If "Maoism" is taken to refer to developments under all these headings, the end of the story is not yet in sight.

Again, it must be pointed out that the "Commentary" on the *On New Democracy* on page 260 of the *Documentary History* actually denies

⁵ Schwartz 1951, p. 200.

(perhaps too categorically*) that the pamphlet contains any theoretical innovation. Far from suppressing Stalin's role, it actually attributes large parts of the theory to Stalin. It does, however, state that *On New Democracy* is presented as a theoretical contribution; that it asserts Mao's claim "as a theoretical innovator in the line of Marx, Lenin and Stalin."

Prof. Wittfogel denies these claims on the following grounds: (1) Mao nowhere states that he is an innovator; (2) All his writings base themselves on the authority of citations from Marx, Lenin and Stalin. [See pp. 27, 28 of this issue.] The first argument is most ingenuous. Has Prof. Wittfogel found anywhere in Stalin's writings the statement "I am an innovator," "I have made creative contributions," etc.? Does he therefore think that the claims made for him by party ideologists were made against his will? Actually, if one were to gather all the Chinese party literature since 1940 which makes this claim for Mao one could fill a substantial library.⁷

The second argument completely overlooks the process by which claims to innovation are made within the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Does one ever claim that one has made contributions which run counter to the tradition? As is well known, Lenin, Stalin (and Mao) are always presented as men who "enriched," "extended" and "applied creatively" the pre-existent truths to new situations. It is never implied that such contributions imply a breach with orthodoxy. On the contrary, one seeks every possible textual support. Stalin never moves a step without a supposedly apt citation from Lenin, without in any way diminishing the cult of his own theoretical originality. The same is true of Mao's citations of Lenin and Stalin.

To turn now to some of Prof. Wittfogel's substantive points:

(1) I have never stated that Marx and Engels denied the peasants any role in human history. [See pp. 74-76 of the Jan.-March issue of *The China Quarterly*, hereafter cited as Issue 1.] I am fully aware of Engels' writings on the subject. I have stated that "Marxism in its pre-Leninist form did not regard the peasantry as an independent creative force in human history."⁸ The words "independent" and "creative" are used in the specific Marxist sense, that is, as a denial that the peasantry as a class can transform the old mode of production or create a state which would represent its own interests as a class. Since Wittfogel himself admits that Lenin introduced innovations on this score, I fail to see the difference between us.

* John Kautsky in his *Maoism and the Communist Party of India* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Technology Press, 1956) argues that this denial is too sweeping.

⁷ To cite one text at random: see Hu Ch'iao-mu's *Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1951) which still represents the present orthodox line.

⁸ Schwartz 1951, p. 117.

(2) The fact that Lenin shifted his land policy in 1906 in order to make it more attractive to the peasantry in line with his theory of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry" does not bear on the central point at issue—i.e., whether he felt that a proletarian party could exist quite apart from a proletarian base. [See Issue 1, pp. 77-78.] On the contrary, he insisted during this whole period that the social democratic party have its own urban proletarian base. In 1917 he was quite convinced that his party was wholly based on the proletariat of Moscow and Leningrad and at least professed to believe that the proletarian revolution was imminent in the heartland of capitalism.

(3) This brings us again to the claim that the whole "Maoist" development of Chinese Communism is outlined in Lenin's "directives" at the Second Congress of the Comintern. [See Issue 1, pp. 78-80.] In his "Report on the National and Colonial Question" Lenin stated that the Russian experience with Central Asian peasant Soviets may be applicable to other "backward" areas of the world. How does he conceive of the Russian experience in Central Asia? In brief, he argues that "peasant Soviets" can be established in these areas because the *Russian Communist Party* basing itself firmly on the *Russian* proletariat and the *Russian Red Army* has assumed a leading role. He never denies the leading role of the *Russian Communist Party* even though he occasionally deplors the "Great Russian chauvinism" displayed by some members of the Party. He does not call for separate national Communist parties since "in these countries [such as Turkestan] there can be no talk of a purely proletarian movement. In these countries there is no industrial proletariat."⁹ One may cynically observe that the demands of theory and the desire to reassert Russian hegemony here go hand in hand, but it is important to note what the theory is.¹⁰ Elsewhere, he raises the question whether proletarian parties "can indeed arise in such countries" [where no proletariat exists]. He does, it is true, speak of the "formation of independent cadres and party organizations" in such areas, but studiously avoids the term "Communist parties." He even indicates at the end of his report that some of these cadres might be made up of the disaffected troops of imperialist countries in colonial areas and scolds the British proletariat for failing to support the anti-colonial revolutions. Otherwise, such cadres may be conceived of as made up of native elements who act as the local outposts of the proletariat of the metropolitan areas and not as independent parties

⁹ Lenin, *Oeuvres Completes*, Vol. XXV, p. 420.

¹⁰ As a matter of fact, it is known that the Russian proletariat in the cities of Asia used such theories to dominate the surrounding "natives." Thus Broido in 1923 speaks of a "*smychka* of the Russian town with the native backward village, the great Russian proletariat with the Uzbek village, etc." Park, *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-27* (New York: Columbia University, 1957), p. 172.

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based on native proletariats. What the Russian experience thus suggests is that Communist parties of metropolitan areas follow the example of the Russian "proletariat" in creating "peasant Soviets" in backward areas.

It would be foolish to maintain that Lenin would not have been capable of adjusting "flexibly" to the situation which fell to Mao just as he might well have adjusted himself to the notion of Socialism in one country. [See Issue 1, p. 83.] It was certainly Lenin's conception of the relations of party and class which opened the door to the Maoist development. At the time of his death, however, Lenin had not yet marched through all the doors which he had opened. It would be a gross oversimplification to think that Lenin gratuitously gave up elements of his doctrine. He gave them up only when he had to. He had come to Marxism with a burning faith in the messianic mission of the urban proletariat. Even after he had decided that the class must be led by a "general staff," an enormous amount of his energy still was devoted to the question of proper relations with the labour movement both in Russia and abroad. To the day of his death he was still straining every nerve to discern signs of the proletarian revolution in the West.

It is not true, incidentally, that Lenin insisted after 1920 that the Comintern must establish "peasant Soviets"¹¹ in Asia and that he renounced all other strategies. Even in the "Report" itself, he speaks only of "carrying on propaganda in favour of organising Soviets." He still contemplates the possibility of working with the "democratic bourgeoisie," which means any well disposed nationalist force in Asia. Both before and after the Congress, his government continued to collaborate with Kemal Pasha in Turkey. Between 1920 and his death, the Soviet government continued to flirt with any "bourgeois" political movement which was willing to work with it. This tendency was particularly marked at the Fourth Comintern Congress held in 1922.

What is more important, neither Stalin, Trotsky nor the Chinese Communists after 1921 drew any "Maoist" conclusions from Lenin's "Report." In all their hairsplitting discussions of Lenin's texts, neither Stalin nor Trotsky conceived them to mean what Wittfogel would have them mean. Stalin, as a matter of fact, drew a sharp distinction between the strategy used toward the Soviet East and the strategy to be employed in Asian countries. The Chinese Communists have never explained the Maoist development in terms of the "Report" and have certainly never mentioned that the C.C.P. is simply an outpost of the World Proletariat in China. They have never claimed that their model has been the Soviet experience in Central Asia.

¹¹ The only reason he did not mention "workers' Soviets" as well as "peasant Soviets" is because he did not believe that a working class existed in these areas.

(4) I do not have available the stenographic materials on the Baku Congress—a Congress made up of a motley army of all sorts of Asian “revolutionaries.” [See Issue 1, pp. 81–82.] Nothing cited by Professor Wittfogel suggests anything more than the concept of peasant revolutions led by the “proletariat of the West” as outlined above. So vague was Zinoviev on the question of who represented the peasants that at one point he introduced Enver Pasha as the great representative of the national revolutionary movement in Turkey. Shortly thereafter, he was to become one of the ardent advocates of the view that the Kuomintang represented the Chinese peasantry. The notion of “peasant Soviets” was by no means clearly demarcated in his mind from the notion that the peasants ought to be led by political groups other than Communist parties.

(5) Because I have maintained that Trotsky's view of the relations of party to class was based on the “solid ground of orthodoxy,” Prof. Wittfogel must prove that Trotsky was never a genuine Communist. [See Issue 1, pp. 85–86.] We are referred to the well-known fact that in 1904 he was a Menshevik who acutely criticised Lenin's views of party organisation. It is also known that in 1917 he became a fanatical convert to Bolshevism and the Leninist conception of party organisation. Not only did Trotsky not criticise Lenin's conception of “peasant Soviets” in Asia; he actually based his whole critique of Stalin's alliance with the bourgeoisie on the “Report.” He simply saw no “Maoist” implications in the “Report” and took quite literally the view that “peasant Soviets” would be established by the international proletariat and the genuine proletarian parties of Asia. In 1926 he had every reason to feel that the Chinese Communist Party had a proletarian base. Lenin might have been more flexible than Trotsky. This does not prove that Trotsky did not understand Leninist orthodoxy as it existed at the time of Lenin's death.

(6) Prof. Wittfogel has suddenly seized upon Mao's “Hunan Report” as the key document in the whole polemic. “The ‘Maoist’ thesis,” he states, “is largely based on an interpretation of the first section of the Hunan Report.” [See p. 17 of this issue.] This is simply not true. The Maoist strategy only took full form at the end of 1927 and the Hunan Report and the Autumn Harvest Uprisings are treated in my book only as landmarks in Mao's groping toward the strategy. The main significance of Mao's Hunan Report is the evidence it furnishes of Mao's realisation of the political potential of the peasant discontent. It does not contain the whole of the Maoist strategy since parts of the strategy represent a response to a situation which did not exist at the time. While Mao makes every effort to put the “Report” into the framework of current party lines, no one who reads the “Report” in its full text will

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be much convinced by the assertion that Mao's comments on the revolutionary potential of the peasants display "a certain reserve." [See p. 20 of this issue.] The assertion that Mao's ascription of 70 per cent. of the merit in the national revolution to the peasants and 30 per cent. to urban dwellers is evidence of such reserve is utterly fantastic. Finally, while the language of the Hunan Report is that of the United Front strategy, there is every reason to think of it as the report of a Communist peasant organiser to his own Communist Party.

(7) The other item of empirical evidence involves Mao's role in the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Here again, as in most such cases, the first and principal cause of Mao's fall from grace was the fact that he had failed. The 1927 November Plenum of the CCP represents a typical effort on the part of the Central Committee to pass responsibility for failure on to the shoulders of subordinates in the field. [See p. 24 of this issue.] Professor Wittfogel, however, is suddenly very eager to accept the Central Committee's accusations against Mao (at least those accusations which fit his thesis). Suddenly the resolutions of the Central Committee become the voice of "history." Mao, we are told, "neglected the agrarian revolution" because of one-sided concentration on "military action." Now the fact is that the Kremlin itself had in the late summer and early fall of 1927 called for both armed uprisings and the use of whatever military units were willing to go over to the new "Red Army" banner. It enthusiastically supported all the military activities of this period and was by no means loath to see local uprisings supported by military units. The sharp distinction between an insurrection and an insurrection supported by military units was not made anywhere until all such efforts had failed. I do not know what the phrase "neglect of the agrarian revolution" can mean when all efforts of the Autumn Harvest Uprising were directed precisely at fomenting agrarian uprising. In fact, I can find nothing in this involved polemic which would undermine the basic proposition that the Hunan Report and the Autumn Harvest Uprisings both represent stages in the groping of Mao and others toward the emergence of what was to be the crystallised Maoist strategy. It is again necessary to emphasise that all my references to the Maoist strategy refer to the period after December 1927. In fact, the phrase "heresy in act" refers to the full development of the strategy after the 1933-34 period when the Party had become almost fully cut off from its urban bases. To refer the phrase back to Mao's activities in 1927 is representative of a certain type of "scholarship."

(8) I entirely agree that Mao did not lose sight of the long range goal—the return to the cities. [See p. 26 of this issue.] In fact, the following statement appears in my book: "It would be a grave error to assume that once having achieved power, the aspirations and intentions

of the Communist leaders would necessarily be determined by the interests of the peasantry. On the contrary, we have every reason to believe that these men had thoroughly absorbed the Leninist abhorrence of 'backwardness' as well as the extravagant Marxist-Leninist belief in the potentialities of industrialisation even when circumstances forced them to lurk in the hinterlands."¹² None of this proves, however, that the strategy which involves means and not goals and which dominates a period stretching from the early thirties to the late forties does not represent a new departure and does not have implications for Marxist-Leninist doctrine. I find it rather interesting that in his search for "empirical evidence" Prof. Wittfogel now concentrates wholly on the year 1927 and completely neglects the whole question of relations between Mao Tse-tung and the Central Committee during the much more vital period 1928-35.

In dealing with the obscure history of Chinese Communism, we have all committed errors. Prof. Wittfogel's evidence will have to "mount" much higher than it has till now, however, before I become convinced that I have committed the particular errors which he ascribed to me. It is in fact high time that Prof. Wittfogel overcame the illusion that his particular experiences and his particular "theories" vouchsafe for him some peculiar access to an understanding of Communism not available to the rest of us. His views of Communist history may be right or wrong. They do not stem from any higher source than the views of the rest of us.

¹² Schwartz 1951, p. 199

The Russian and Chinese Revolutions

By HUGH SETON-WATSON

One of our objectives in this Journal is to examine Communist China in the light of the Soviet experience. With this in mind, we have asked Prof. Seton-Watson to set down his thoughts on the Russian and Chinese revolutions as a postscript to our survey of Communist China's first decade.

THE comparison of the revolutionary movements, the seizure of power by the Communists, and the establishment and evolution of totalitarian régimes in Russia and China is a vast field of study in which little work has yet been achieved. The obvious obstacle is of course the scarcity of scholars in the non-Communist world who are familiar with the language, culture and history of both Russia and China. A truly formidable intellectual equipment is required. Dr. Karl Wittfogel and Dr. Benjamin Schwarz are outstanding among the few who possess it. One hopes that among the rising generations of the western nations the necessary combination of knowledge will become more frequent. Meanwhile those of us who have specialised in the Russian or East European field must learn what we can of China from secondary works and from those original documents which are available in translation. Well aware of the inadequacy of our understanding of Chinese affairs, we can only put to our Sinological colleagues problems which have arisen in the history of the Soviet or European Communist movements or régimes, and ask their opinions on the relevance of these problems, or on the reasons why they are not relevant, to China. It is in this spirit that the following observations are offered, as a contribution not to knowledge but to discussion. The points which I wish to raise are mainly concerned with the relationship of the Communist movement to social classes during its rise to power.

In both countries the revolutionary movement started from the intelligentsia. It was the small secular intellectual élite, subjected to modern European influences, which first accepted modern revolutionary ideas and sought to put them into practice. Not only were the first revolutionary leaders intellectuals, but the first stage of revolutionary activity consisted of intellectual discussion groups. This stage in Russian history is known as *Kruzhkovshchina* (from *Kruzhok*, "a little circle"). However, the stage at which specifically Marxist ideas became dominant in

the revolutionary movement, and the stage at which revolution took place, were not the same in the two countries.

In Russia, *Kruzhkovshchina* developed into active conspiracy, and the conspirators attracted considerable mass support in several industrial centres, before Marxism became the main revolutionary doctrine. The People's Will of 1879-81 was an efficient revolutionary organisation, even if small in numbers. By the turn of the century the Marxists were gaining ground at the expense of the Populists. In 1905 Marxist revolutionaries, Menshevik and Bolshevik, the differences between whom were less clear within Russia than in the political articles of newspapers in exile, were able to lead large numbers of workers in strikes, demonstrations and even armed insurrection. After 1905 the relative importance of the intelligentsia in the revolutionary movement declined, while that of the working class increased. In the years 1906-17 the intelligentsia were losing their obsession with revolution, and becoming more interested in culture. However, the professional revolutionary, the type foreshadowed in Lenin's *What is to be done?* of 1900, was still an important element in the movement, and the chaotic conditions produced by military defeat and administrative collapse in 1917 reinforced his importance. The professional revolutionary was still recruited primarily from the intelligentsia, though the intellectual climate was less favourable to him and though recruits from the working class were beginning to be numerous too. In both the "February" and the "October" Revolutions, however, the working class of Petrograd played a decisive role. It was manipulated by Lenin, but without its mass support he could not have won. In the civil war which followed, the administrators and commissars and many of the military commanders on the Bolshevik side came from the skilled workers, and the support of the workers in those sections of industry and transport which still functioned behind the fronts was an important factor in the Bolshevik victory.

In China, Marxism does not seem to have been an important influence in the revolutionary intelligentsia until 1918, but then it seems to have made rapid progress. As in Russia, in China too the Marxists quickly won support among the workers, and the Chinese industrial proletariat was an important factor in the Communist movement of the early 1920s. But the Shanghai commune of 1927 proved a more tragic version of Russia's 1905, and there was no 1917 in any great Chinese city. During the 1930s Communist power was built up in remote provinces where the old state machine of the Manchu period had ceased to exist and where the new state machine of the post-1927 Kuomintang never established itself. In these areas the leading role was played by professional revolutionaries, of whom surely most came from the intelligentsia, even if there were some of worker origin from the 1920s, and others were recruited and

trained from the peasant masses. In the 1940s when the patriotic struggle against Japan took first place, the Communists won support both in Japanese-occupied territory and in the regions effectively ruled by the Kuomintang. In both areas it was among the intelligentsia that they were most successful, especially among the intellectual youth. Here the best parallel for China is to be found not in Russia but in Yugoslavia. The double appeal of heroic and successful patriotic guerrilla warfare and of a vaguely phrased programme of social regeneration was equally attractive to the educated youth of Japanese-ruled Peking and German-ruled Belgrade. This difference in the circumstances of the Russian and Chinese revolutionary movement and the fact that China was less industrialised than the Russia of 1917, may account for the continued importance of the intelligentsia in support of Communism in China in comparison with Russia. One may, however, wonder whether the traditional respect of Chinese society for intellectuals, arising from the Confucian tradition, was also an important factor in the difference between the development of the two Communist movements.

The relationship of the Communists to the peasants also suggests parallels with Yugoslavia. The Communists' armed struggle for power in China was much longer than in Russia or Yugoslavia. The first stage ended in disaster in 1927. In the second stage, which was decisive for the creation of the Communists' military and civil state machine, and which lasted from 1927 to 1945, conditions were basically very similar to those in Yugoslavia between 1941 and 1944. The revolutionary struggle was fought not at the urban centre (as in Petrograd in 1917) but at the rural periphery. Here the available manpower was peasant, and until they had found methods and policies which would recruit peasants the Chinese Communists were unsuccessful. The interpretation of Mao's 1927 *Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, as made available in the *Documentary History of Chinese Communism* edited by Fairbank, Schwarz and Brandt, is a matter of controversy on which the present writer cannot have an expert opinion. Some of the phrases used by Mao about the peasantry appear more candid than could be expected of any orthodox Comintern spokesman of that time. But of course the idea that peasants should be mobilised, for its own purposes, by the Communist Party, and that they should be promised—and even granted—such economic advantages as would attract them to the party's cause, was in no sense an original discovery by Mao. Lenin had always been extremely realistic on this problem, and one may well feel that if Lenin had been placed in Mao's position in the 1930s, he would have acted as Mao did, and that if he had been in Tito's place in 1943 he would have pursued Tito's policies. Essentially all three Communist revolutions used the peasants for their purposes with success. Lenin promised the

peasant soldiers peace in 1917; legalised the peasants' seizure of landlords' property in 1918; and induced peasants, partly by propaganda and partly by force, to fight in his Red Army in 1919 and 1920. His economic concessions to them in 1921 went further still. But at no time was there any question of the peasants having, or even sharing, *political power*. The Communist Party, with its classless cadres of professional revolutionaries, recruited from men who may have begun their active life as peasants or workers or middle-class intelligentsia but were now above and beyond the class from which they sprang, held a monopoly of political power. Tito fought his struggle in different conditions, beginning with small-scale guerrilla warfare in the mountains and extending it to a country-wide "liberation struggle" which was both a national and a civil war. He created armies from peasants, attracted by patriotic zeal and the hope of social justice, but it was his professional revolutionaries, cadres no less classless than their Bolshevik prototypes, which led and controlled the movement. In China, surely, the same was true. Mao's classless cadres ruled the Yen-an republic and the various anti-Japanese liberated areas, and after 1945 officered the larger armies of the civil war. The peasants served in their armies, but they never determined their policies.

Since 1949 the Chinese régime has moved more rapidly towards full totalitarianism than did the Russian. This may be partly because the Soviet model was there for the Chinese to study, to copy or to improve on as desired, whereas the Russians were pioneers. The shortness of the Chinese NEP is of course also largely due to the outbreak of the Korean War, and the consequent spy-mania and xenophobic hysteria. The phenomenon of "brain-washing" appears to have "peculiarly Chinese" features. Both Russians and Chinese have massacred their opponents (if anything, it seems to me that the Chinese have been more, rather than less, cruel than the Russians). But whereas the Bolsheviks were on the whole content, until the Yezhov Purge of 1937-39, to employ non-party "specialists" in subordinate positions, relying on a combination of incentives and terror to ensure their loyalty, the Chinese Communists appear to feel the necessity to "convert" them by the elaborate procedure of brain-washing. Is this explicable in terms of the Chinese past? Is the authority of the Chinese Communist leaders explicable in terms of the traditional prestige of the scholar-bureaucrat? How much of the psychology of the Communist élite can be explained by the formality of education in an ideographic language? Will the introduction of an alphabet have even more revolutionary effects on Chinese society than land reform or the collectivisation of agriculture? These are only a few of the questions which the inexpert but serious student would like to put to his Sinological colleagues.

Organisational Principles of the Chinese Communists

By H. F. SCHURMANN

THE countries of Asia and Africa have seen the rise of numerous and powerful socio-political movements during the past few decades, movements which have shaken existing orders and have launched these nations on the road of modernisation. Although these movements have almost always been nationalist in character during the early phases of revolution, subsequently leftist radical movements have arisen; most of these have been Communist.

Both the nationalists and the Communists have shown themselves capable of eliciting great collective response from the peoples on whom they have acted. But in regard to one essential mechanism of political action, the nationalists have shown themselves far weaker and less adept than the Communists. That mechanism is *organisation*.

Almost without exception, where the Communists have arisen, they have established disciplined, effective, structured movements, capable of quick and sustained political action, and, perhaps of even more importance, of moving in and mobilising inert masses of people. In those countries of Asia in which the Communists have seized power (China and her smaller neighbours, North Korea and North Vietnam), they have even further extended this propensity for organisation.

The case of Communist China is perhaps the most extraordinary of all. At the moment of victory, the Chinese Communists were in possession of a powerful, battle-tested army and a highly disciplined party. But they also faced a huge land area, wracked by almost a half-century of war, a poverty-stricken population, disorganised masses of people, and the total collapse of government. Within ten years, Communist China has become one of the most powerful nations on the globe. A programme of rapid industrialisation has been launched. Disorganised masses have been transformed into organised masses toiling at monumental construction projects. And, negatively speaking, there is not the slightest indication that the iron grip of the régime is seriously threatened by internal rifts or internal protest.

If one were asked for the magic key to this phenomenal feat, the answer would have to be *organisation*: the ordered mobilisation, control, and manipulation of people for certain ends. Not only organisation in a

limited sense, but *total organisation*: the spread of a tight web of organisation over a land of 650,000,000 people. In this article, we shall examine some of the central principles of organisation of the Chinese Communists, principles which might be termed a practical ideology of organisation.

Despite the massive nature and far-reaching extent of organisation in Communist China, there exists a remarkable uniformity in this great structure, a uniformity possible only in a totalitarian society. This uniformity results not only from the persistence of established structures, but through the operation of certain basic organisational principles. These organisational principles derive from the organisational theories and practices of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. However, there are elements in these principles that are distinctly Chinese, elements which were infused as a result of the concrete experiences of the Chinese Communists during the pre-1949 period when they were the leaders only of a revolutionary movement.

There are two elements which are central to the practical ideology of the Chinese Communists: (1) the theory of contradictions, and (2) the theory of democratic centralism. The theory of contradictions has been elevated to the level of supreme dogma in Communist China. It is regarded as the key to the proper understanding of all phenomena. Chinese Communist theoreticians lay more emphasis than their Russian colleagues on the all-pervasive nature of contradictions in the world. They see action and behaviour as the result of the resolution of these contradictions. The principle of democratic centralism is treated as a derivative of the theory of contradictions. It is the theory of the "contradictory" principles of democracy and centralism. The theory of democratic centralism finds direct expression in the organisational structure of Communist China. If the theory of contradictions represents what one might call a metaphysics of organisation, the theory of democratic centralism is the basic theory of organisation itself.

THE THEORY OF CONTRADICTIONS

The theory of contradictions has played a prominent part in the official ideology of the Chinese Communists since the publication of Mao Tse-tung's famous article *On Contradiction*.¹ This article became supremely important in Chinese Communist ideology after the publication of Mao Tse-tung's February 1957 speech *On the Correct Resolution of Contradictions among the People* [NCNA, June 18, 1957]. The reasons behind the original formulation of the theory of contradictions undoubtedly related to the real contradictions which the Communists faced during the early years of their nationalistic United Front policy—

¹ See his *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1954), Vol. II.

contradictions between the radical revolutionary aims and actions of the Party and the call for a class-transcending alliance against the Japanese.

However, as one reads the literature on organisation which began to appear in China during the Yen-an period, in particular the writings of Liu Shao-ch'i, who, much more than Mao himself, deals explicitly with the theory and practice of organisation, it emerges that the theory of contradictions gradually became a device—an ideological device—out of which a complex but highly practical theory of organisation was created.² This theory, in almost all essential respects, anticipates the definitive formulation of the theory in the February 1957 speech. There were definite practical considerations—the Hungarian Revolt and the need for a new “rectification” movement—which prompted Mao to make that speech then. But in essence the speech simply outlined in clear-cut terms a theory which had become deeply rooted in Chinese Communist thinking long before that.

Mao stated in the speech that there were two types of contradictions, antagonistic and non-antagonistic. The former are the classic contradictions of Marxist ideology, contradictions between hostile classes and hostile social systems, “the contradictions between the enemy and ourselves.” These contradictions cannot be resolved except by force; these contradictions are the very substance of the inexorable process of history.

But non-antagonistic contradictions are of a different sort. They occur within Socialist society. In fact, although this is not stated explicitly, they seem to be a part of the very fabric of Socialist society. For Stalin, the so-called non-antagonistic contradictions were basically technological in nature, contradictions which arose out of discrepancies between the “relations of production” and “the productive forces of society,” in other words contradictions due to the “advanced nature” of the Soviet social system and the “backward nature” of its economic structure.

However, the non-antagonistic contradictions of the Chinese Communists are much more than mere technological discrepancies. They are, as Mao puts it, “the contradictions between the interests of the nation and the collective on the one hand, and those of individuals on the other, the contradictions of democracy and centralism, the contradictions between leaders and led, between the bureaucratic tendencies of certain individuals who work in the bureaucracy and the masses.”

Contradictions, in the Hegelian-Marxian scheme, demand resolution, and the lineal progression of contradiction—resolution—contradiction makes up the process of history. The mode of resolution for each of

² Almost all of the known writings and speeches of Liu prior to 1949 deal with problems of organisation, discipline, training, etc.

these two contradictions is different. For the former—antagonistic—it is essentially violent. For the latter—non-antagonistic—it is essentially non-violent, through the process of “discussion, criticism, and education.”

There is no question that the timing and the substance of Mao's speech on contradictions related to certain practical problems which had arisen. As we now know, the Hungarian Revolt made a deep impression on the Chinese, particularly the intellectuals, and had led to serious questions being raised on the relations of the leadership to the masses in Communist society. Furthermore, the old, recurrent organisational enemy “bureaucratism” had again shown itself. The beginnings of a “rectification” movement were already apparent in the widespread movement for the decentralisation of cadres (the *hsia-fang*) movement—a movement to transfer urban cadres to rural areas.

But aside from the practical significance of the speech, it also had great theoretical importance, for it expressed formally a mode of thinking already basic to practice. This mode of thinking is perhaps nowhere more clearly expressed than in the writings of Liu Shao-ch'i. In a talk given some time between 1941 and 1945, Liu began a long and detailed explication of principles of organisation and discipline with the statements: “What is the organisational structure of the Party? As with other things, it is a contradictory structure, it is a contradictory unity. . . .” In this speech, Liu applies the dialectic to an analysis of the internal structure and functioning of the Party. The basic contradictory polarisation in Party organisation, he maintains, is that between “centralism” and “democracy,” between the leaders and the led. Correct resolution of the contradictions which therefore arise gives life and lineal development to the organisation. Incorrect resolutions—incorrect intra-party struggles, so to speak—would lead to its destruction.^a The theory of contradictions as applied to organisation thus presupposes a precarious structure in which the opposition of forces and counter-forces produces tension. The structure can only be maintained by a continuous process of correct resolution of the contradictions and removal of the tensions.

Mao Tse-tung entitled his speech *On the Correct Resolution of Contradictions among the People*. We have already spoken of contradictions and resolution, but the word “correct” must not be overlooked. For every contradiction, there can only be a single correct resolution, for the contradictions are objective and the laws of history are objective.

^a One of the most interesting discussions on organisation is this little-known speech by Liu given some time between 1941 and 1945. To my knowledge, this speech, entitled “Training in Organisation and Discipline,” *Tsu-chih-shang ho chi-lü-shang ti hsiu-yang*, was never published in China, but was printed and circulated by the Malayan Communists (publication date of April 5, 1952).

Of course, what seems correct today may, in the light of a more exact analysis of the laws of history, prove incorrect tomorrow.⁴ Such correctness not only springs out of metaphysical determinedness, but more specifically out of what Mao calls "the fundamental consensus as to the interests of the People." But what is this consensus? It is consciousness of the true interests of the People. Given the Leninist theory of the vanguard, to which the Chinese Communists undeviatingly adhere, it is the Party which emerges as the infallible and supremely competent interpreter of this consensus. The "correctness" of the resolution thus relates to the role of absolute and supreme authority held by the Party. It is natural for contradictions to seek resolution, but only the Party can guarantee correctness.

This syndrome of interacting and counteracting forces in a context of absolute authority is perhaps the most important aspect of the organisational model of the Chinese Communists. It is this syndrome which gives Chinese Communist organisation both flexibility and rigidity, which at times makes it appear monolithic and at other times dynamic. It is an organisational model which expects simultaneously abject submission from all echelons and along with this spontaneity and creativity. In its structure it is dialectical, for it is "contradictory," as Liu Shao-ch'i says. And as such it produces tensions, the benign contradictions of the "non-antagonistic" sort. These contradictions find resolution in the various rectifying actions instituted by the Absolute Authority: mass movements, criticism and self-criticism, "rectification" movements and so on. If in the above sections we have dealt with what may be called the ideology of organisation, we must now proceed to organisation itself. And here the two crucial principles are "democratic centralism." We say two because in the Chinese context "democratic centralism" becomes two nouns, "democracy and centralism," the two contradictory principles of democracy and centralism, as Liu Shao-ch'i says. We must further, in order to understand properly the operations of organisation here, completely lay aside any notions we have as to the meaning of the word "democracy." For the Chinese Communists, "democracy" has real and important meaning, albeit a meaning which has nothing to do with what is understood by this term in the West. For the Chinese Communists, all organisational structure and function must operate according to the principles of democracy and centralism. Let us first discuss centralism, familiar enough in its Soviet context.

⁴ In the talk "Training in Organisation and Discipline" Liu admits that it is possible even for the majority of the Central Committee to be wrong. As an example, he cites the Sian Incident, where "it was a minority of geniuses and far-sighted men who perceived the march of history" (p. 12).

CENTRALISM

The operation of the principle of centralism has seen the creation of a web of organisation with vertical chains of command which ultimately merge, like the apex of a pyramid, at the very top. Although at a few key points, a certain form of horizontal contact and communication can and does occur, for the most part commands move downward and information moves upward, all along vertical lines. Organisational charts give a graphic picture of the web of organisation for the country as a whole, but the actual operation of centralism may perhaps be seen most easily on the lowest level of organisation, at the point where organisation is in direct contact with the masses. For this purpose, let us consider the organisational structure and function of a "party primary group"—the most basic nucleus of party organisation—in an hypothetical factory. The Chinese Communists (like the Russians) place their nuclei of organisation in some existing organisation, whether social, economic, ecological or other, such as a factory, a school, a military unit, a village and so on. These are known as "primary units of production or territory." Thus in the case of our hypothetical factory, the party primary organisation (also so called in the U.S.S.R.) exists only in the factory; its members are drawn from the factory alone and its activities relate only to the factory. Aside from intra-unit communication, its only official contacts are with higher party echelons.

In a large industrial unit, the party primary group may consist of enough members so that there will be some structuring along echelon lines within the primary group. Such structuring will always follow the principle of centralism. Party branches will be set up in each of the "shops"—below the branches there will be the party small groups, the most basic of all organisational groups. A series of such shop branches will be under the control of a general branch. The cadres of the general branch form the members of the executive committee of the party primary group. Within the party organisation in the factory, supreme control rests in this committee, and ultimately in the hands of the party secretary. The only real decision-making power within the context of the party primary group rests with the executive committee. Party rules and organisational handbooks specify periodic delegate meetings at various higher levels. Although there is every reason to believe that no important decisions are made at these meetings, there is also every reason to believe that these meetings, like mass meetings in general, have other important organisational functions.

If hierarchical structuring is crucial to centralism at all levels, there is another dimension to centralism which is of great importance: leadership. Few organisational problems have been discussed more seriously in Chinese Communist literature than the problem of leadership. No

society can undergo rapid change without a great corps of leaders to direct and carry out changes. Leaders may be born, but the Chinese Communists operate with the conviction that they can be made. Leadership ability is one of the requisites for membership in the party. Prospective members and candidate members must have demonstrated not only absolute political loyalty, but leadership ability. They must be able to influence and lead the masses in practical tasks such as mass movements, propaganda and agitation, work brigades and so on. The term *kanpu*—cadre—means, in fact, a leader, an organiser, a person who holds command and authority in a given organisational setting. Liu Shao-ch'i has spoken and written at length on "training for leadership." In the specific context of our hypothetical party group, the principle of leadership demands that each party grouping, whatever small group or branch or committee at whatever level, be headed by a defined leader. There must be collective leadership, say the Communists, but there must also be individual responsibility. The group leader is the direct link in the chain between the group and higher echelons. It is from him that higher party directives are transmitted to the group members. As leader and as crucial link in the chain, the group leader possesses immense authority. It is through his authority and through the more "positive" elements around him that control from above extends downward. But, as we shall show, there is a control from below, control of a certain and limited type, of course.

During the early years, both before and after victory, cadres were divided into party and non-party cadres. A large segment of party membership consisted of peasants of low literacy and no technical competence. As a result, the régime was compelled to make wide use of individuals who possessed the requisite competence to act as organisational leaders, but who were not party members. However, through training and education, and through selective recruitment, the general qualitative level of party members has been considerably raised over the past ten years. Therefore, the ratio of non-party to party cadres has been declining. More and more of the top bureaucrats in industry are now party members. The tolerance of minority parties does not seem to involve tolerance of a vast non-party cadre group in the country, such as the technocratic group in the U.S.S.R.

Another example of the tendency to merge organisational cadre with party membership may be cited. When the communes were formed, instructions were issued to place party members in key cadre positions or to recruit leadership personnel into the party. However, this does not mean that in a factory, for example, the director is also head of the party unit. Judging from scattered information, the party secretary usually has a full-time job, and is usually distinct from

the directors, either of management or of the "trade union." However, inasmuch as the top people of management and the union are party members, they participate—and in a most important way—in party meetings. Thus, on the one hand, the party maintains an organisation separate from and parallel with the organisational lines of management (which are subordinate to the relevant ministry) and with the unions (which are linked with a given "industrial union"); but on the other hand, the frequency of what the Chinese Communists call "double roles" (holding party membership and at the same time some other position in organisation) has brought about an important meshing of the three organisational sectors of our hypothetical factory. It is in the party meeting that top party people, top management people, and top union people meet together. It is undoubtedly at such meetings that the most important decisions are made.

DEMOCRACY

If the operation of the principle of centralism has created hierarchical structurings with defined leadership at all levels—the skeletal framework of a totalitarian society—the dialectical opposite of centralism, "democracy," also has great organisational functions. As a whole, in the organisational handbooks, a straightforward definition of "democracy" is avoided in favour of a more elliptical treatment in terms of yet another duality of principles: "centralism on a democratic basis" and "democracy under centralised leadership." This, of course, avoids the obvious embarrassment of dealing with "freedom" without the qualification of "necessity." However, despite the tortuous road which the Communist ideologues follow in treating these principles, "democracy" plays an important part in Chinese Communist organisational thinking and practice.

In one organisational handbook, three important functions of active intra-party democracy are singled out. First, sufficiently broad intra-party democracy will permit individual party members and local party organisations to develop "positivism" and "creativity." The development of these qualities is important for they are requisites for leadership capacity. Secondly, the broad development of intra-party democracy will strengthen ties between the party and the masses. If the active participation of all party members in party life is assured, in particular if "criticism" of party cadres is permitted, then this will act to counter the tendencies of "subjectivism" and "bureaucratism." Furthermore, such close ties between party and masses will assure that the "opinions and demands" of the masses are "reflected" at all times to the party organisation. Thirdly, broadening of intra-party democracy permits regional party organisations to solve problems "according to the special

conditions in their own particular work areas." This independent problem-solving makes it possible to adapt party directives "to all kinds of dissimilar conditions of time, place, and circumstance."⁵

In a typically concise way, the organisational handbook has explained the three major functions of "democracy." Before going on to an analysis of the actual nature of "democracy," let us consider these three functions. "Positivism" and "creativity" are favourite terms in organisational literature. "Positivism" in many ways is the Chinese counterpart of the Soviet "*aktivnost*." However, there seem to be differences, which become more apparent when one considers the paired term "creativity." "Positivism" and "creativity" demand not only enthusiastic, absolute obedience from individuals, but demand what might be called creative obedience, the capacity to make decisions of an independent nature but absolutely in accord with the intent of a party resolution. In other words, initiative, spontaneity, willingness to make decisions are attributes of "positivism" and "creativity." Blind obedience, as Liu Shao-ch'i has stated, is not what the party expects from its members.

The second point stresses participation in party life and criticism of cadres as important mechanisms for combating "bureaucratism." In a sense, every one of the party's many "rectification" movements has been directed to the problem of "bureaucratism." Bureaucratism may be described as the over-perfect functioning of centralised control—excessive centralism as it has been described in the literature. The party bureaucrat functions in perfect accord with the directives of the party, but in the process his work becomes mere routine and he loses his ability to make independent decisions. He depends increasingly on his position of power and on the formal rules of his office to enforce his will.

In such situations, the party senses trouble: alienation of the party from the masses, stagnation of party work and so on. Through clever manipulation, a programme of "criticism and self-criticism" is launched against the offending bureaucrat. In the regularly scheduled party meetings, certain individuals will arise and commence the criticism. Usually, the target will know that the criticism has been arranged. He cannot fight it, not only because the party at higher echelons is immediately behind it, but because criticism and self-criticism are legitimate institutions within the system ("everybody is subject to criticism"). The process of criticism may proceed for a short or long period. Either the critics will be able to arouse their target from his bureaucratic stupor and reinvigorate him with the spirit of "positivism" and "creativity"; or the erring bureaucrat will be dismissed. Though

⁵ *Questions and Answers on the Program of the Chinese Communist Party (Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an-tang kang-ling wen-ta)* (Peking, 1957), pp. 80-84.

the Chinese Communists have never been involved in the bloody purges of party and bureaucracy which were instituted in the U.S.S.R. in the 1930s, in a sense a continuous purge goes on all the time. These are periodically interspersed with large-scale purge movements, the so-called "rectification" movements. Though rectification sometimes aims at cleaning out politically unreliable elements, more often its aim is to stir up bureaucracies become stagnant through routine.

The third point made by the handbook stresses the importance of "democracy" in allowing regional and local party organisations to make independent decisions in the framework of the particular problems which they encounter. Here again, not "blind obedience," but initiative, is demanded from party cadres.

One of the extraordinary characteristics of organisation in Communist China has been its flexibility, a flexibility apparently greater than that in the bureaucracies of the U.S.S.R. The source of this flexibility is "democracy," just as "centralism" is the source of rigidity. This flexibility manifests itself in the expectation of considerable independence on the part of local cadres, though, of course, on a basis of absolute commitment to the party. The Communists stress that "democracy" means the rights of individual organisation members to express their opinions, to criticise, to participate in party meetings, to take part in collective decision-making and so on. The common thread which runs through all these "rights" is the "right" to participate, to be present at all meetings. This is in fact the crucial requisite of "democracy." For it is through participation that the full effect of indoctrination, group pressure, involvement through work—all the various devices through which an individual can be bound behaviourally, ideationally, and emotionally to a group and a cause—exert their full force on the individual member. The Chinese Communists work on the assumption that if one can force a person to participate in some organised and controlled group, then, whatever the personal inclinations of the individual involved, the proper use of the techniques of "discussion, criticism, and education" will enable one to secure his commitment of one degree and kind or another.

Furthermore, the Chinese Communists never permit participation in group activity to be simply verbal. In most instances "study groups" and "work groups" are one, so that an individual subjected to verbal pressures in one group context will find himself being tested by his concrete work in that same group context. In other words, the party member not only engages verbally with his comrades, but finds himself sent out to do practical party work, like organising, lecturing, interviewing and so on. Both work and talk are forms of participation, and coming together they compound the pressures to involve an individual in the

"cause" or organisation in question. It is through the "broadening of democracy" that the party feels it can rely on local party people to make correct decisions, even when an explicit party directive is not forthcoming, or when a party directive is so loosely formulated that the situation explicitly calls for local adaptation. The operation of the latter procedure was seen clearly in the programme of commune-isation. The decree of August 29, 1958, in no way spelled out in minute detail how communes were to be established. Communes of different types and dimensions arose in various parts of the country. The format of each commune was more often than not the work of the local party cadres. Only in December was there introduced the programme of *Gleichschaltung* which gave the communes a more uniform appearance.

ORIGINS

One might ask what is the historical source of this flexible, "dialectical" organisational structure? An organisational history of the Chinese Communists has not yet been written, but there are strong indications that these practices, this mode of thinking, arose in the Yen-an period. One has direct indications of this in the writings of Mao Tse-tung on guerrilla warfare. One of the central problems which the Communists faced during that period was the control and manipulation of scattered bands of guerrilla fighters in an overall context of military co-ordination. Actual military conditions did not permit the transformation of these units into regular armies, but on the other hand there always remained the danger of "mountainism," the loosening of central control. Furthermore, both regular and guerrilla warfare had their positive functions. The problem posed itself in terms of "contradictions" and the practices which developed had a "contradictory," "dialectical" character. The intensive use of group pressures—the use of thought control—seems to have developed during the Yen-an period. And thought control inculcated the contradictory ideas of centralism and democracy, or, interpreted in military terms, absolute obedience to supreme command coupled with the maximum of independence in guerrilla action.⁶

Contradictions demand resolution, as the ideology of the Chinese Communists teaches. Therefore, one must ask: what are the institutionalised forms of the resolution of contradictions, of the management of intra-organisation tensions? On the everyday level, criticism and self-criticism, and denunciation are mechanisms for resolving intra-organisation tensions. As Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i have repeatedly stated, and as is quite simple to imagine, tensions are generated

⁶ Compare the very illuminating discussion by Boyd Compton on the organisational significance of the "rectification" movements of 1942-44; Boyd Compton, *Mao's China—Party Reform Documents, 1942-44* (University of Washington Press: Seattle, 1952), pp. xv-xxxiii.

in the typical organisational setting in which there is a person who leads and people who are led. These tensions have their positive aspects if they induce sufficient anxiety and insecurity in the individual to work out his tensions positively, in work, in study, and in struggle—all sanctioned forms of releasing tension in Communist China. On the other hand, the "contradictions" may begin to impede the orderly functioning of the organisation. Here the mechanisms of denunciation and criticism come in. A cadre is reported to the party through one or another channel. Such reporting is openly encouraged and in many instances denunciation has become a legitimate part of organisational life. Such denunciation will probably be followed by a criticism and self-criticism session in which the denounced becomes the target of criticism.

Aside from the day-to-day programmes of orderly "resolution of contradictions," periodic large-scale movements—"mass movements"—are launched. Mass movements can be launched for many purposes, to implement whatever internal policy the régime wishes carried out. But the "rectification" movements are aimed at solving intra-organisation "contradictions" on a grand scale. Mao's speech of February 1957 ushered in a "rectification" movement. The present, somewhat veiled campaign against rightists in the party seems to be directed against party members who opposed the radicalism of many of the local cadres in the great leap forward and in communisation. Here more is involved than simple elimination of intra-organisation tensions. However, whatever the specific aim of the mass movements, their consequences are usually manifold. In building the party (*chien-tang*), the Communists have always stressed the tremendous importance of participation in mass movements as a training ground for party work. Such participation increases the "democratic aspects" of the party, infuses life and dynamism into its members. In this sense, all mass movements tend to push the pendulum of the dialectic from "centralism" toward "democracy." There is considerable evidence that the present leadership intends to continue to emphasise the importance of "democracy." More than a year ago, voices which suggested the abolition of mass movements in advanced industrial sectors for the sake of rationalised, ordered production were severely attacked by the organs of the Central Committee. The present campaign against the rightists also seems to be directed against those who are calling for moderation or change in organisational methods. However, it seems that Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i are holding fast to those methods and practices of organisation which they helped bring into being during Yen-an times and with which they won China and have succeeded in transforming a prostrate, disorganised mass into one of the most powerful, organised, and dynamic countries in the world.

The Use of Radio in China

By HUGH HOWSE

THE very size of China has imposed on all who would rule it the twin problems of unification and control. Indeed the very first Chinese Emperor, as opposed to Kings among Kings, Ch'in Shih-huang (d. 210 B.C.) achieved the hegemony and his right to this title by being the first to solve these problems. Their continuing intractability in China, despite the mould of history and the unifying cement of the Chinese script, is reflected in Sun Yat-sen's description of the Chinese people more than 2,000 years later as "loose sand." Ch'in Shih-huang had the stern admonitions of the Legalists as his aid to unification and Sun Yat-sen revolutionary fervour as his. There is no doubt that both or, for that matter, any other would-be ruler in between these two ends of the time scale in China, would have seized on radio as an additional aid, had its potentialities been available to them. Given this basic Chinese problem of unification and control, the failure of the Kuomintang to exploit radio on any effective scale is therefore surprising. China's latest rulers, faced not only with this old problem but also with a new ideology to spread and a new orthodoxy to engender, have naturally sought to exploit it to the full.

Although a complete assessment of the new, wide use of radio in China today is not possible when one is perforce an outside observer and an external listener, enough can be gleaned about its development to rate it impressive, even allowing for the Chinese tendency to hyperbole. Similarly, a sufficient idea of content can be gained to feel that Mao Tse-tung's dictum, "a Party, like a man, needs differing sounds at its ears,"¹ is worthy of careful consideration by China's Broadcasting Administration.

RATE OF DEVELOPMENT

It is only since the accession to power of the Communist Party that radio has entered into Chinese life as a widely felt force. During the Kuomintang period, there were many small commercial stations in the larger cities, especially Shanghai, but there were comparatively few receivers and there was comparatively little Government radio. The Communist Party's use of radio as an ideological weapon goes back

¹ Mao Tse-tung, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," NCNA, June 18, 1957.

to its Yen-an days when the Hsin-hua Broadcasting Station was established. When the Party came to power in 1949, there were already forty-nine "Red" stations in China. The importance the Party attached to radio can be judged from the fact that thirty-nine stations were set up in the course of that one year alone.² Since then, development has been extremely rapid in an endeavour to implement what was clearly a Party aim of obtaining nation-wide radio coverage as quickly as possible.

Statistics are now as essential an ornament to Government departments in China as literary allusions once were to her poets. Comparative statistics seem to have a particular appeal, perhaps because they sometimes have the advantage of being hypothetical. A particularly handsome comparison with the situation in Kuomintang times has been worked out for radio in China which, although flattering, is most probably basically accurate. China claims that her radio transmitting power is now almost five times greater than the total transmitting power under the Kuomintang in the twenty years from 1928-47. Ergo, the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking proudly claims, "one year of us is equal to a hundred years of the Kuomintang."

The same rapid development is true of China's radio industry as a whole. Naturally the establishment of radio stations and the building up of transmitting power would be pointless without a comparable increase in receivers and receiving systems. The Great Leap Forward of 1958 included in terms of radio equipment the production of more than a million sets. Ten years ago, in contrast, there were scarcely more than a million sets throughout the whole of China. It is now claimed that there are 130 different models on the market, some of them sixteen-valve de luxe models with built in pick-ups and recording apparatus. China has had considerable help and technical assistance in developing broadcasting and her radio industry, not only from the Soviet Union, but also from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Eastern Germany. Now, however, China is capable of producing all receiving and transmitting equipment herself³ and has already begun to aid others, in particular Communist North Vietnam and Cambodia, with expert advice and equipment. All the equipment of the television station now operating in Peking was locally produced. There are now radio research and design institutes, special departments in schools for training radio engineers and technicians and, last summer, a broadcasting institute was opened in Peking.

² The writer was informed by a member of a Western legislature, who visited China in 1956, that it was noticeable that on advanced co-operatives and state farms, for example, a radio receiving system was in evidence even before the administrative buildings were completed.

³ Unfortunately, it is not possible to give any indication of the quality of the equipment. It is also worth noting that China recently ordered a colour television camera from a British firm.

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Contrasting these developments with the past, the Central Peking Broadcasting Station points out that under the Kuomintang even spare parts for radio sets had to be imported.

Particular pride is taken in the four television stations now operating in Peking, Shanghai, Harbin, and Canton, and in the fact that a fifth is in trial operation at Changchun. The Peking Station is on the air three hours daily for six days a week and, by the middle of last year, there were some five thousand receiving sets in Peking. More major cities are said to be testing new television stations and others are preparing to build them. Another essentially modern development was the introduction of F.M. broadcasting in the Peking area at the beginning of 1959.

CHINA'S BROADCASTING SYSTEM

The kernel of the organisation is the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking, supplemented by a large number of provincial stations, which, in turn, are supplemented by even more localised arrangements for remote areas. The importance of the centre, however, is reflected in the fact that, at a Broadcasting Conference in 1955, it was laid down that everyone should be able to hear programmes from the Central People's Broadcasting Station by 1962. It is already claimed that the broadcasting network now penetrates to all parts of the country and, in a loose sense, this would appear to be true.

At the centre, the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking broadcasts two national-type programmes, each of which is on the air for about seventeen hours of the day. It also broadcasts a local programme of a similar duration for Peking and the suburbs. The two national programmes are broadcast on four medium wavelengths and thirty-one short wavelengths with relay stations at six key points throughout the country to give as wide a coverage as possible.

In the provinces there are approximately a hundred local stations in provincial capitals and major cities which both relay parts of the Central output and radiate their own local programmes. Areas which cannot be served by the local stations have been brought within the orbit of radio in a variety of ways. Some have "broadcasting centres" which both relay existing programmes and mount brief, highly localised programmes of their own. There are also a great many "receiving stations" equipped with loudspeakers where radio listening is encouraged from time to time by organised campaigns to receive broadcasts. Radio access to national minorities is clearly of particular importance both because the problem of unification and ideological transformation is at its greatest in national minority areas and because these areas are the most remote from the centre. Figures given last year for broadcasting in these areas showed that they are served by fifteen broadcasting stations, more than

700 closed circuit broadcasting stations and some 180,000 loudspeakers.⁴ Material can be diffused by radio even to the most remote areas. For these, monitors have been trained to receive broadcasts, organise listening parties and publish items monitored for use in lectures and study groups.

The Central People's Broadcasting Station's claim that radio penetrates to all parts of China would therefore seem to be technically substantiated, although it is unlikely that the eventual aim of bringing all within reach of the central output has yet been achieved. Whilst individual radio sets are increasing in urban areas, rediffusion systems would appear to be the pattern of future development in the communes and other more limited concentrations of population. In the first six months of 1959, 7,000 rediffusion stations and receiving posts to the traditional magnitude of "tens of thousands" are said to have been established and thirty per cent. of the communes have been equipped with wired broadcasting systems. From the point of view of the authorities, no doubt such systems are more desirable than the individual set. Collective listening, in addition to giving a theoretical satisfaction, has practical advantages. Not the least amongst them is the fact that mass audiences are naturally more malleable and impressionable than individual listeners and wired systems cannot pick up foreign broadcasts as can the individual set.⁵

FUNCTION OF BROADCASTING

Any consideration of the content of radio in China must spring from an examination of its function. As one might expect in the context of the Chinese situation, it is first and foremost a means of furthering Party and Governmental aims. This naked, instrumental use of radio is implicit in the Central People's Broadcasting Station's own description of it as "a means of strengthening links between the centre and the regions, the Party, Government and the working people." In 1955, for example, when the drive for more agricultural co-operatives was being stepped up, radio

⁴ It is interesting to note the amount of coverage given to national minority areas. The Central People's Broadcasting Station broadcasts in Mongolian, Chuang, Tibetan, Uighur, and Korean. The provincial stations in Szechuan, Chinghai, Kansu, Yunnan and Kweichow also broadcast minority-language programmes. In addition to programmes from these stations in the main minority languages, programmes in sixteen other minority languages are broadcast daily by the various supplementary systems described above.

⁵ Chinese sources now refer to individual radio sets as being "popular" in the urban areas, and it seems likely that short-wave sets are not uncommon in such areas, as regulations on the control of wireless apparatus, published in the *Peking People's Daily* in July 1955, showed that their possession was subject to control. The jamming of Voice of America programmes in Chinese, and, more recently, of B.B.C. programmes in Chinese, does indicate concern on the part of the authorities at listening to foreign broadcasts in Chinese.

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was seen as an integral part of this movement. A basic paper on the "Fundamentals of Agricultural Production" dealt with plans to extend radio facilities to every farm and village and the State Council issued instructions for 10,000 radio sets to be given free to agricultural co-operatives. Last year, after events in Tibet had brought an additional urgency to the national minorities problem, a first-ever meeting of co-operation amongst National Minority Stations was called in July. The Director of the Central Broadcasting Bureau was present at this meeting to stress that the Party's national minority policy must be actively propagated. Currently, radio is playing a full part in the movement to promote intensive study of Mao Tse-tung's ideology. On January 24 this year, the Sunday lecture programme in the national network was a lengthy address by the Vice-President of the China People's University and Secretary of the University C.C.P. Committee on "Mao Tse-tung's ideology glows a hundred-thousand feet high."

PEKING SETS UP A "TELEVISION UNIVERSITY"

A blackboard was put up in the transmitting room of the Peking Television Station this afternoon and on to the platform came a teacher from the chemistry department of the Peking Teachers' University, who then gave her lecture as if in the classroom. Students gathered before television receivers followed the lecture and took notes.

This marked the opening of the Peking "Television University," the first of the type in China.

Jointly sponsored by the Peking Educational Bureau and Peking Television Station, it has a regular course and a preparatory one, with three departments—mathematics, physics and chemistry. Classes will be conducted on television along with correspondence courses. The students study eight hours every week, half of the time attending "television classes" and the other half in self-study. Scientific and educational films will be shown and experiments presented. Home-work as well as tests will be assigned in correspondence form.

The university now has a total enrolment of over 6,000 students. They are mainly workers, technicians, functionaries, teachers and army officers in the Chinese capital.

Its teaching staff comes from Peking University, Peking Teachers' University and Teachers' College.

NCNA March 8.

The large number of local stations permits a most flexible use of radio as a policy instrument. It has been used directly (for example in Shantung in 1950) to direct land reform operations, and in Shanghai a

second local station was built in 1952 to propagate the Party's financial policies. Through these local stations, movements initiated at the Centre can be diffused through the regions. Shortly after the lecture on Mao Tse-tung's ideology, referred to above, had been broadcast in the national programme, the theme was taken up by local stations. Stations at Hefei, Sining, Sian, Foochow, Hanchow and Shenyang were soon reporting on local movements to study Mao's writings, serving as local touchstones of an enthusiasm required by and initially generated at the centre.

Useful though radio is in support and in furtherance of official policies in this way, an even more important task is clearly laid upon it. Another, even more revealing phrase used by the Central People's Broadcasting Station to describe its aims is "to strengthen the patriotic education of the masses." Undoubtedly one of the main reasons why the Communist Party in China has been able to call for and obtain tremendously hard work and many sacrifices from the people of China has been by propagating the fact that the rebuilding of the Motherland was at stake. (It is significant that almost the sole continuing use of the Chinese word for ancestor is in the phrase "Tsu kuo" literally "ancestral country," *i.e.*, Motherland.) A new pride in the present has been substituted for the old shame of the nineteenth century past, and radio has been a major means of building up this pride in Chinese achievement, allied to the concept that it is Communism which has made it possible.

CONTENT OF BROADCASTS

The hard "core" of the output from the centre reflects this fundamentally important role of radio in China. The two national programmes, broadcast by the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking, are built around a basis of news bulletins. A full, fifteen-minute news bulletin can be heard almost every hour of the day. Most of the items in these bulletins deal with internal achievements; later items are on achievements or events in Communist bloc countries and, at the very end, comes news from the non-Communist world and, even then, usually only when the events referred to are advantageous to the Communist position. A fairly typical main evening bulletin at the beginning of February, for example, contained sixteen items. Most of the items, including the leading ones, were economic and other domestic reports; there were four short items on the Moscow meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Powers and the Conference of Socialist Countries to discuss agriculture; greetings to Ceylon by Liu Shao-ch'i and Chou En-lai on the occasion of Ceylon Independence Day were the only other foreign news items in the bulletin. Whilst the news items themselves are reasonably factually presented, the selection of items is sharply angled and news value plays little part in their selection or order of presentation. Mr. Khrushchev's

departure from Moscow on his Asian tour, for example, was the fourteenth item in Peking's main news bulletin of that day. These bulletins are characterised by the predominance of Chinese achievement and the paucity of news about the non-Communist outside world.

At peak listening periods in the evening, the main news bulletin is followed by a current affairs programme which focuses attention on internal developments or external affairs, as required. These "International Life" and "International Affairs" programmes also present only one side of the topic chosen. A recent "International Life" programme, for example, was a talk on the British Prime Minister's African Tour which was devoted to expounding the view that "no new intrigue on the part of British Imperialism can stop the people's liberation movement." Similarly, President Eisenhower's tour of Latin America has been given in these programmes a background of United States "imperialist" aims in Latin America.

It is this news and current affairs core of the Central output, along with the "national hook-up" programme (half an hour of domestic and foreign news including Party and Government statements, foreign agreements, speeches by visiting statesmen, etc.), which the local stations are encouraged to relay, thus giving them nation-wide diffusion.⁶ The constant themes found running through this basic output are the projection of Chinese achievement, stimulating enthusiasm and pride in it; the dissemination of party viewpoints on current national and international issues, engendering the desirable attitudes towards them; and the projection of the increasing strength of the Communist bloc as compared with the increasing weakness—and sometimes even the continuing wickedness—of the capitalist world.

Programmes built around this central core show the same pattern of flexibility already noted in the broadcasting system as a whole with its centralised output side by side with scope for localised exploitation of the radio medium. Such programmes include material directed to specific social groups such as the army, youth, industrial workers, agricultural workers and children. Even in the programmes for children the aim of "strengthening patriotic education" is not forgotten as the following verse, translated from a song taught in a children's programme, "Little Trumpet," shows. The song is entitled "The Long, Long Train":

"The train is busy in reconstruction,
Wang Tang Tang, Wang Tang Tang.
I am going to drive a train when I grow up,
Carrying bricks and carrying steel,

⁶ Regulations on Regional relays of programmes originated by the Central People's Broadcasting Station, issued in April 1959, specified that all stations should relay the national hook-up programme and that other programmes which could be chosen for local relaying were News, Press Reviews, the "International Life" and "International Affairs" programmes.

Going south, west, north and everywhere,
Going to all four quarters to reconstruct the Motherland.
Train, train puff along quickly,
Wang Tang Tang Tang, Wang Tang Tang."⁷

In addition there is a fairly wide variety of programmes which can be broadly described as cultural. Such programmes include both Chinese and Western music, radio plays, story telling—a traditional Chinese art—programmes on literary figures and their work, scientific programmes and talks on a fairly wide range of serious topics. It is interesting to note that the music programmes include many performances of music by artists from the Communist bloc and Russian stories for radio seem to be frequently featured. The greatest radio tribute to Sino-Soviet solidarity, however, is the relaying each evening in the main national programme of a thirty-minute programme in Chinese from Moscow Radio.⁸

In attempting to sum up the role of radio in China, one is inevitably reminded of that of Confucius. Confucius, it will be remembered, was not an innovator but a teacher. Similarly, radio in China is also not an authority in itself but a transmitter of the words of authorities and the attitudes they wish to engender. Confucius always referred to himself as transmitting to others the ways of the sage kings of old; radio in China transmits the ways and words of the sage Party and its sage Press. It is not surprising, in view of China's cultural traditions, to find that authority still rests with the written rather than the spoken word. Indeed, this may be one of the reasons why the Kuomintang appeared to place little faith in the possibilities of radio. The Communist Party in China, in the course of its struggle for power, clearly became more aware of the magic that could be worked with the spoken word as a means to an end.

The Confucian analogy can be pressed even further. The tone of the Chinese classics was usually impersonal and there was often present, too, a tone of exhortation by precept and example. The tone of radio in China is not dissimilar. It is comparatively impersonal—leading figures are rarely brought to the microphone; instead, what they say is reported—and there is, as already noted, constant exhortation. The object of Confucius, like that of most Chinese philosophers, and here an interesting similarity with Marxism arises, was not to inform but to transform. Radio in China, in exactly the same way, appears to have transformation and not information as its prime object.

⁷ Translated from the Central People's Broadcasting Station's *Radio Programme Weekly* of October 19-25, 1959.

⁸ The writer's attention was recently drawn to the interesting fact that the Soviet Union began its broadcasts in Chinese as early as 1929, when a new Soviet radio station was opened at Khabarovsk on the Manchurian frontier (noted in *The Wireless World* of May 15, 1929).

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As an instrument in spreading China's new orthodoxy and in exhorting conformity to it, radio has become a distinct force in the lives of most of China's population. Visitors to China rarely fail to note the constant blare of loudspeakers and conclude that the Chinese people must resent this constant intrusion into privacy. It would seem likely, however, that such a conclusion is erroneous. As indicated above, the Chinese have long been accustomed to exhortation and the sole difference now is that it is received through a comparatively new mechanical device. Again, the Chinese have usually found the noise of humanity around them a desirable accompaniment to activity. Some of the intellectuals, particularly those influenced formerly by the West, may well be aware of both the monotone of radio in China and its propagandistic use. They, however, are few and, as yet, count for little. For the many it must still be a new and, despite the propaganda, an enlivening element in lives filled with labour.

EXTERNAL BROADCASTING

No survey of radio in China would be complete without a glance at the equally rapid development there has been in external broadcasting. Nations, like people, tend to be status seekers. China, who only began significant external broadcasting in 1950, already has the status, along with Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, of one of the Big Four in external broadcasting. In tracing the major features of China's development of external broadcasting since then, her foreign policy and her assessment of the areas in which she feels external broadcasting can be of most influence are clearly reflected.

Transmissions began in 1950 to overseas Chinese, no doubt for prestige reasons and to show that there was now a new China in being and a new object of homeland loyalty, in five Chinese dialects, totalling $17\frac{1}{2}$ hours weekly. Broadcasts in languages other than Chinese were begun for certain near neighbours where conditions may have been regarded as propitiously unstable and to whom China wished to have a direct voice. These countries were Burma, Indonesia, Japan, Thailand and Vietnam. Transmissions in these languages, together with a short English transmission, totalled twenty-one hours weekly. Over the next few years this output was gradually increased in size until 1956 when a marked expansion took place.

The year 1956 was a watershed in Chinese affairs. Since then, the world has seen China flexing her muscles and taking more direct interest in the cause of revolution outside China. It was certainly a year in which China built up her broadcasting biceps considerably. Transmissions to overseas Chinese were increased to $45\frac{1}{2}$ hours weekly and transmissions to Cambodia and Laos, English broadcasts to the Near and Middle East

and English and Spanish to Europe were all added. There was a further expansion in 1957. Broadcasts in Chinese to overseas Chinese rose to over seventy-three hours weekly and now included a transmission for Chinese in North America. Transmissions in Arabic, Persian and Turkish were initiated as well as additional Spanish for Latin America and additional English for North America and the Pacific. The following year marked the beginning of a closer broadcasting interest in the African continent. Overseas broadcasts in Chinese were increased by an additional hour per day in Cantonese merely for the comparatively small group of overseas Chinese in South and South-East Africa. French broadcasts were initiated, no doubt with Africa as well as Europe in mind. Broadcasts to Latin America were extended with the introduction of additional Spanish for Central America.

In 1959 two hours' English a day for South, South-East and West Africa were added and Arabic and Japanese transmissions were increased. The most interesting development of 1959, however, was the fact that Peking began broadcasts in Hindi on March 1 of that year. It seems very likely that China, realising that the developing situation in Tibet was likely to impinge on Indian opinion in the near future, felt the need for a direct voice to India. A new transmission in Malay also began at the same time as the transmission in Hindi. The most recent increase in China's external broadcasting is the addition of an hour in Japanese in January of this year, to which the feeling on the Japanese Security Treaty issue is no doubt the background.

These developments in external broadcasting over the past ten years have brought China's total of external broadcasts (not including transmissions to Formosa) to more than 380 hours per week. The majority of this output is still taken up by broadcasts in foreign languages to South-East Asia, South Asia and the Pacific (over 180 hours per week) and by transmissions in Chinese for overseas Chinese (over 80 hours per week).

There are, of course, special transmissions in Chinese to Formosa. The development of these broadcasts similarly reflects shifts in Chinese policy. In 1955 broadcasts to Formosa, mainly in *Kuo Yü* and the Amoy dialect, were twenty-eight hours weekly. Again the crucial year, 1956, saw them increased to ninety hours weekly and they now total more than a hundred hours weekly. Late in 1958, with the Formosa Strait Crisis reaching its peak, a new station, the Chinese People's Liberation Army Fukien Front Broadcasting Station, began transmissions of 51½ hours per week, mainly in *Kuo Yü* to Quemoy. To adopt China's own predilection for striking statistical statement, after a mere ten years of external broadcasting, China's output is almost equal in quantity to the amount now being broadcast by those in the field some twenty years before her.

Problems of the Film Industry

DOCUMENT

DURING the period from 1949 to 1957, which was the year prior to the big leap forward, our country had only ten motion picture studios (six of which were for feature films), and 19 shooting sheds. Now, there are 33 studios (11 of which produce feature films) and 27 shooting sheds. As to projection units, in 1949 there were only some 600 motion picture theatres and not even one mobile projection team in the whole country; by the end of 1957, the number of projection units had risen to 9,965; and preliminary statistics showed that there were about 14,500 units by the end of 1959. As a result of the development of this projection network, the people have more and more chances to see movies; movie audience jumped from 1,750 million man/times in 1957 to 4,050 million man/times in 1959. . . . During the eight years between 1949 and 1957 we had produced a total of 171 artistic films; but during the past two years since the beginning of the big leap forward, the number of artistic films we have produced is estimated to have reached some 180. . . . Formerly a feature film needed at least four or five months to shoot, and in some cases it needed a whole year or an even longer time. This time has been greatly shortened since the beginning of the big leap forward. Take, for example, the 18 artistic pictures produced last year as a token to celebrate the National Day; most of them were shot within four or five months, and several were completed within three months. With respect to cost, it drops greatly with the increase in the quantity of production and the shortening of the time for shooting. . . . With respect to quality which is a question of capital importance, all the 36 films of various kinds produced in celebration of National Day last year were markedly better ideologically, artistically and technically than films made earlier. Of course, strictly speaking, even these relatively better films still have shortcomings in certain respects and various degrees. . . .

While evaluating and affirming our achievements fully and adequately, we must also face our shortcomings squarely. As the motion picture is one of the most popular arts and one of the Party's most effective weapons of propaganda and education, in our film undertakings we must necessarily put political-ideological work and the question of creative thinking in the leading position, strengthen the Party's leadership over the cinema, resolutely and unyieldingly implement Chairman Mao's principles concerning literature and art, and closely follow the general line for increasing our zeal, going all out and building Socialism with "greater, faster, better and more economical" results.

Due to the fact that certain Party cadres in film circles have not yet completely changed their world outlook and genuinely turned from one class to another, neither in daily work nor in creative thinking can they determinedly implement the Party's class policy and class line, and thus they

cannot satisfactorily follow Chairman Mao's principle of letting literature and art serve the workers, the peasants and the soldiers.

Under the direct guidance of the Party Central Committee, film circles have practically constantly been engaged in a struggle between the two roads with respect to political and artistic ideas during the past decade—from the criticism of the reactionary picture *The Story of Wu Hsun* in 1951, the rectification of literature and art, the criticism of *The Study of the Dream of the Red Chamber*, the struggle against Hu Feng and his counter-revolutionary clique, and particularly the rectification and anti-rightist campaign in 1957 down to the struggle against rightist tendencies in the latter half of last year. Such a struggle has its high tides and low ebbs, its extremely acute periods and periods of relative ease. For instance, in 1955, after the struggle against Hu Feng and his counter-revolutionary clique [a violent struggle against revisionism in literary and artistic thinking] and following the high tide of agricultural co-operativisation and the Socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, film work grew rapidly and film undertakings made considerable progress. In the very next year, however, following the Hungarian Incident, the one who took the lead in attacking the Party's policies in literature and art was Chung Tien-fei, a rightist element in film circles who wrote the article "Drums and Gongs of the Film Circles." Rightist elements outside the Party madly attacked the Party in the spring of 1957, but Chung's attack was in the winter of 1956. Certain of the films we produced in 1957 contained poisonous weeds and erroneous ideas; these films included *The Unfinished Comedy, Who Is the Abandoned?* and *Steps of Youth*. In fact, the scripts of these films were mostly completed at the same time as the article "Drums and Gongs of the Film Circles" was written, and large parts of the above-mentioned pictures were filmed in the last quarter of 1956 and the first half of 1957. It was only by means of the violent anti-rightist struggle in 1957 during which the methods of "contending and blooming" and free debate were adopted that we repelled the attack of the rightists. . . . A new phenomenon which had never been in existence before in the film industry appeared after the anti-rightist struggle. After struggling against extravagance and conservatism and after "surrendering their hearts to the Party," large groups of film workers went to the countryside and to factories to steel themselves by doing manual labour. On the one hand, they warmly supported the call of the Party's Central Committee and produced over 30 excellent pictures as a token to celebrate the 10th anniversary of the nation; on the other hand, they experimented with the filming of a large number of documentaries reflecting the big leap forward in industrial and agricultural production. . . .

Since the problem of the world outlook of the intellectuals and writers has not been completely solved, it is easy for modern revisionism to find its market among workers in literature and art. This is also true with the case of film workers. Although the main reason for this is because many film workers have not yet established a genuinely proletarian world outlook, there are also other reasons. First, since revisionism does not nakedly adopt an anti-Communist attitude but skilfully covers itself with the cloak of Marxism, it greatly deceives people; and secondly, among the ranks of revolutionary literary and artistic workers there are a number of revisionist writers.

We still lack the bearing and style proletarian revolutionaries should

PROBLEMS OF THE FILM INDUSTRY

have. This is partly because we have not paid enough attention to Chairman Mao's literary thinking but have even under-estimated its significance. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has creatively developed Marxist-Leninist theories concerning literature and art, and even solved problems which Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin could not, or did not have time to, solve during their lifetimes. Hence, if only we can really grasp Chairman Mao's thought and always use it as a measure to evaluate things and writings, then we certainly can distinguish genuine Marxism from false Marxist theories and face matters boldly. . . .

In film work there is still another question requiring our attention. The Party has instructed us to produce in 1960 at least eight films to serve the peasants and to the liking of the peasant masses. We must insure the overfulfilment of this mission.

Why is it that a large number of the films we made in the past were not accepted by the peasants? Were those films so profound in meaning that the peasants could not understand them; or were they simply disliked by the peasants? Our excellent, revolutionary literature and art—particularly those excellent works produced after the beginning of the big leap forward—have a very marked characteristic, namely, they are of a national, popular style. This is the characteristic our film workers have to take notice of. The cinema is a very popular art, and the overwhelming majority of cinema audiences are workers and peasants; but certain films we made in the past were neither national nor popular in style. We realise that this is not only due to the fact that the motion picture as an art form was first imported from abroad and that it has only thirty to forty years of history in China; what is still more important is that quite a number of film workers are themselves pro-foreign and alienate themselves from the masses. Compared with the drama which is also an imported art, the cinema has made little effort towards forming a national character and achieving popularity. Our movie workers pay little attention to the question of national style which was explained by Chairman Mao long ago; they often copy foreign styles and dare not free themselves from the patterns laid down by foreign films. Premier Chou En-lai has repeatedly warned us that our pictures must be easily understood by the masses, that their stories must be easy to follow, and that their dialogues must be in clear, everyday language to which the Chinese people are accustomed. In my opinion, some people have turned a deaf ear to these important opinions.

At a certain meeting, I said that it was a wonder that certain film workers could be so reluctant to accept Party instructions, that they could find it so difficult to follow Party principles, and yet they could be so ready and willing to accept so-called new methods and new techniques from foreign pictures. Some time ago, a technique known as "poetic montage" made its appearance. It was avidly accepted by some people and applied to their work, regardless of whether it was necessary or not or whether it could be liked by the masses. . . .

It is unimaginable that we could ever satisfactorily show the content of the proletariat through the literary and artistic style of the bourgeoisie—especially the style of the final period of that class. In my opinion, therefore, if our film workers—particularly our playwrights, directors, actors, musicians and artistic workers—can rid themselves of their superstition about Western pictures and boldly liberate themselves from the framework of Western films on the one hand, and, on the other, continue

to penetrate the life of struggle of the worker and peasant masses, learn things from them, make the thinking and feeling of the worker and peasant masses become their own thinking and feeling, and painstakingly and stubbornly strive to solve the problem of nationalistic character and popularity, then, I sincerely believe, the number of pictures serving . . . and to the liking of the peasant masses will not be eight only but will be eighteen, twenty-eight or even more.

The present situation is very favourable, and conditions of the big leap forward and of the people's communes are all quite satisfactory. . . . With everything ready, all we need now is a still stronger blast of East Wind. By East Wind we mean Mao Tse-tung's thinking. Our comrades in circles of literature and art must take this good opportunity to study hard Marxism-Leninism and Comrade Mao's writings. . . .

["Struggle for a continuing big leap forward in the motion picture industry," by Hsia Yen (Deputy Minister of Culture), *People's Daily*, February 2, 1960. Edited version of the translation in *Survey of China* Mainland Press. (Hong Kong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 2204.]

Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation

1. Foreign Relations

The Warsaw Treaty Meeting

The summoning of the meeting of the Warsaw Treaty powers in Moscow on February 4 was surrounded with much mystery. At first it was stated by Moscow Radio (January 28) that the Communist Party and Government leaders of the European satellites would be coming to Moscow for an agricultural conference on February 2. Delegations of observers from North Korea and Outer Mongolia were to attend "by invitation."

Then on February 3, it was revealed that the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries had been meeting since February 1 in preparation for a conference on February 4. On the same day, Peking Radio made its first announcement about the agricultural conference and simultaneously stated that Chinese observers would be attending the Warsaw Treaty meeting. By now Moscow Radio was saying that the Koreans and Mongolians were attending the agricultural conference "at their own request," presumably to still questions as to why the Chinese and North Viet-Nameese had not been invited.

An agricultural conference did meet, but the innocuous communiqué which it produced did not seem likely to have been sufficient justification for top-level delegations to come to Moscow. Presumably it had been intended all along to hold a Warsaw Treaty Conference to discuss policy towards the West. In view of the documents that emerged from the conference it is legitimate to assume that divergences between Moscow and Peking led the Russians to want until the last minute to hold this second conference in secret.

Be that as it may, the conference brought into sharp focus the contrasting attitudes on policy towards the West that had been evinced by the Soviet Union and China for some months previously. The declaration issued by the Warsaw Treaty powers was mild in tone and clearly framed with Mr. Khrushchev's forthcoming summit negotiations in view. The speech of the Chinese observer, K'ang Sheng (an alternate member of the Politburo), clearly aimed at proving that negotiations with the West were unjustifiable. Needless to say, while the Chinese

Press and Radio published K'ang Sheng's speech immediately after the conclusion of the conference, the publicity organs of the European Communist states did not even mention that he had spoken.

K'ang Sheng's speech (see below) starts off like the Warsaw Treaty states' declaration with the assertion that the international situation shows signs of relaxation. Like the declaration, the speech attributes this relaxation to the increased strength of the Communist bloc. From there the arguments differ.

The declaration asserts that the increased strength of the Warsaw Treaty states has led the Western powers to realise that war could no longer be a means of settling international disputes. The world had therefore entered upon a period of extended negotiation for the settlement of these disputes.

The declaration cites four pieces of evidence to back this conclusion: last year's East-West agreement on the peaceful use of the Antarctic; the creation of a permanent UN committee for the peaceful exploration of outer space; the exchange of top-level visits between East and West; and the cessation of nuclear testing over a considerable period. (This was just before the French test.)

But K'ang Sheng's speech implicitly rejects the suggestion that the time for negotiation has come. It affirms that the United States is only making "peace gestures" behind which arms expenditure is increased, disarmament proposals are sabotaged, and more nuclear tests are prepared—behind which, in effect, war is plotted.

The speech ignores the Antarctic and outer space agreements cited by the Russians as evidence that substantial negotiations are possible. There is no mention of the cessation of nuclear tests as such; one is left to infer it from the allusion to America's announcement that it felt free to resume testing at any time. As for Khrushchev's visit to the United States—this is explained away in terms of the general thesis as a meaningless gesture which Washington was compelled to make.

Some of the reasons lying behind the more intransigent attitude of the Chinese can be inferred from K'ang Sheng's speech. Peking, recalling perhaps the warmth of Vice-President Nixon's reception in Poland, seems genuinely to believe that the West will use an easing of tension to subvert the peoples of Communist countries. The speech's linking of the German and Japanese menaces indicates a feeling that Moscow should not be content with achieving a *modus vivendi* with the West over Germany, but should also attempt to help China by exerting pressure on America to evacuate her troops from Japan. (The Soviet Union protested strongly to Japan about the signing of the new security treaty with America, but made no protest in Washington.)

The key passage in K'ang Sheng's speech was:

"The Chinese Government has never hesitated to commit itself to all international obligations with which it agrees. But United States imperialism, hostile to the Chinese people, has always adopted a discriminatory attitude against our country in international relations. Therefore, the Chinese Government has to declare to the world that any international disarmament agreement and all other international agreements which are arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegate cannot, of course, have any binding force on China."¹

Clearly in the absence of Soviet efforts to aid China in attaining its objective of removing American forces from the Far East in general and the Formosa strait in particular, Peking is determined to pursue its objectives in its own way.

This disagreement over foreign policy did not prevent the leaders of the two countries exchanging the predictable cordial greetings on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance (February 14).

DECLARATION OF MEMBER-STATES OF THE WARSAW TREATY

THE member-states of the Warsaw Treaty note with satisfaction that a definite change for the better has become noticeable in the international situation since the last conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in May 1958. For the first time after many years of the cold war, relations that are normal for peacetime are beginning to be established between the states belonging to the antagonistic groupings, tension has been markedly reduced and prospects are opening up for a strengthening of mutual confidence. The world has now entered on a period of negotiations concerning a settlement of the principal international issues in dispute, with the aim of establishing a lasting peace, and the advocates of the cold war are sustaining a defeat.

The important changes that have taken place in recent years in the correlation of forces in the world arena underlie this improvement in the international situation.

These have been years of rapid expansion of the economic power of the Soviet Union, the Chinese People's Republic and the other Socialist countries and of their further rallying within the framework of a united Socialist camp. These have been years marked by very great achievements of the Soviet Union in science and technology. The putting of the first artificial earth satellite into orbit, the launching of a rocket to the surface of the Moon and the fathoming of the mystery of the reverse side of the Moon, which is never seen from the Earth—such are the magnificent results of these achievements by the world's first Socialist state which have raised mankind to a new level in its struggle to understand and conquer the forces of nature.

¹ China had already made this point clear when it formally supported the Supreme Soviet's disarmament proposal (see *Peking Review*, No. 4, 1960).

And lastly, recent years have been marked by another upsurge in the activity of all countries of the Socialist camp aimed at consolidating peace, and also by the further enhancement of the international role of the peace-loving countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America which have liberated themselves from colonial and semi-colonial dependence.

As a result, the correlation of forces in the world is changing more and more in favour of those who are coming out for the discontinuance of the race in nuclear rockets and other armaments, for the ending of the cold war, and for peaceful co-existence among all states, irrespective of their social systems and ideologies. A situation has taken shape in which any attempt by any aggressive state to resort to arms in order to solve international disputes, to take the road of war, would lead to the immediate and complete routing of the violator of peace.

The opinion is increasingly gaining ground in the minds of the peoples, and in the minds of many political leaders and statesmen, including those in the West, that, given the present level of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their immediate delivery to any point on the Earth, war in general can no longer be a means of solving international disputes, that the only feasible way is to build relations between states on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

The participants in the conference note with profound satisfaction the increasing importance of such a form of contacts between states as meetings and discussions between the leading statesmen of various countries of the East and the West. These contacts, the development of which the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty have always advocated, are, as experience shows, of great positive significance.

The historic visit to the United States of Nikita Krushchov, the Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, and his talks with Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the President of the United States, have played an outstanding role in this respect. As a result of this visit the ice of the cold war was broken in the relations between the two strongest Powers in the world—the U.S.S.R. and the United States—and a new stage was opened in the development of international relations as a whole. An important contribution to the improvement in the international climate was also made, as is well known, by the discussions between the leaders of the Soviet and British Governments that were held at the time of the visit to Moscow by Mr. Harold Macmillan, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

The participants in the conference expressed the hope that Nikita Khrushchov's forthcoming visit to France and the visit to the U.S.S.R. of Signor Gronchi, the President of the Italian Republic, will lead to a further strengthening of the mutual relations between states, and above all between the states of Europe, and will promote the strengthening of world peace.

It is the common and wholehearted desire of the participants in the conference that President Eisenhower's visit to the Soviet Union next summer should lead to a further development of the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States towards friendship and co-operation, which would be an important guarantee of the inviolability of peace throughout the world.

The exchange of visits between statesmen, which has been stepped up in recent years, has become a stable factor making for a *rapprochement* between the states of the Socialist camp and the peace-loving independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The friendly meetings and talks of the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Polish People's Republic, the Czechoslovak Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Rumanian People's Republic and other member-states of the Warsaw Treaty with the leaders of such countries as India, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Afghanistan, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea and others, promote the concrete successful development of peaceful co-existence in vast regions of the world. All participants in the conference express their determination to continue strengthening and developing friendship with the peace-loving states of Asia, Africa and Latin America on the basis of equality and mutual respect, in the interests of peace.

The improvement in the international situation is already bearing fruit in many spheres of international relations.

Late in 1959 an important agreement on the peaceful uses of the Antarctic was concluded between twelve states, including the U.S.S.R., the United States, the United Kingdom and France, under which a vast though still uninhabited continent is completely removed from the sphere of war preparations in any form, including the staging of nuclear tests, and has been endorsed as a zone of peaceful exploration and scientific co-operation between states. Another useful step in the right direction is the decision taken by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1959, to set up a permanent United Nations committee for the peaceful exploration of outer space, among the members of which are seven Warsaw Treaty states: Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, the participants in the conference note that the consolidation of peace is still being stubbornly resisted by influential forces in the Western countries. These are either circles which do not see behind the profits they are receiving from the manufacture of armaments the mortal danger that would threaten them in the event of war, or politicians so stuck in the ice of the cold war that they cannot conceive of normal peaceful relations between states.

The N.A.T.O. countries are not only continuing to maintain inflated armies, but are actually increasing the numerical strength of those armies, paying particular attention to the West German Bundeswehr, which is commanded by former Nazi generals and officers. The Bundeswehr has been equipped with rocket weapons. The Federal Republic of Germany has been enabled to start the manufacture of these weapons. Moreover, measures are being taken towards equipping the Bundeswehr with nuclear weapons. It is a fact that the session of the N.A.T.O. Council, held in December 1959, discussed plans for further increasing the size of the armed forces of the states belonging to that military bloc.

Parallel with the strengthening of West German militarism, there has been a marked revival of the militarist forces in Japan and the further involvement of that country in military preparations, as is shown by the recent signing of a new military treaty between Japan and the United States.

The continuation of the arms race by the members of N.A.T.O., and also S.E.A.T.O., Cento, and their allies, can in no way be justified by considerations of defence. It shows that the opponents of peaceful co-existence have not laid down their arms.

This is also borne out by the systematic propaganda of mistrust and hatred between states with different social systems which is still being conducted by influential political and military leaders in the West and by a

section of the Press. The opponents of the consolidation of peace do not want talks on the settlement of international disputes and are seeking to prevent agreement from being reached even where possibilities for it have become apparent.

But no efforts by the advocates of the cold war can alter the fact that awareness of the need for peaceful co-existence is becoming the decisive factor in the development of international relations in our time. The balance of forces in the world is in favour of the peaceable states, and the forces of peace are greatly superior to the forces of war. All this provides favourable conditions for reaching the goals for which the Warsaw Treaty states have been striving consistently all along: the relaxation of international tension and the development of friendly co-operation between all countries.

Naturally, the greatest importance is attached to the problem of disarmament. This is the main problem of international life in our day. The question of whether it will be possible to rule out completely the possibility of a new war, which in the present conditions would lead to the death of hundreds of millions of people and the annihilation of whole states, depends on its solution.

The interests of mankind require that rocket nuclear weapons, with their tremendous destructive potential, should never be allowed to be used.

And the surest way to achieve this is the destruction of all types of armaments, of all weapons of war, that is to say, the general and complete disarmament of all states. That is why the proposal for such disarmament, submitted by the Soviet Union in the United Nations, is in keeping with the most vital interests of mankind. From this stems the great influence which this proposal of the U.S.S.R. is exerting on the peoples. Very significant is the unanimity with which the United Nations approved the idea of general and complete disarmament at the last, 14th session of the General Assembly. The fact that this decision was adopted on the basis of a draft resolution jointly prepared by two such powers as the U.S.S.R. and the United States is also gratifying.

In order to make agreement on disarmament a reality for the first time in history, it is necessary, above all, to proceed from words to practical deeds. This is the most important historical task of the present generation. The Warsaw Treaty countries, having exchanged views at the present conference concerning the prospects for the impending disarmament talks, have come to the conclusion that the situation at the present time is more favourable than ever before for fruitful disarmament talks between countries of the East and West.

The disarmament proposal submitted by the Soviet Government in the United Nations reflects the common position of the Warsaw Treaty countries, of all the Socialist states. All the countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation declare their desire to become parties to the future agreement on general and complete disarmament.

The states represented at this meeting feel satisfaction that the first country to take practical steps towards implementing this United Nations resolution was a country belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the Soviet Union, which has unilaterally decided to reduce its armed forces by 1,200,000 men. The strength of the Soviet armed forces will now be below the level which the Western Powers themselves suggested in 1956 for the Soviet Union and the United States, and also below the actual strength of

the American armed forces, even though the United States has a much smaller territory and much shorter frontiers than the U.S.S.R. The reduction of the Soviet armed forces by one-third in conditions in which Western military blocs are proceeding with the arms race is an act of good will which should impel the other states to take reciprocal steps in the sphere of disarmament and to reply to trust by trust.

Some people in the West are always ready to misconstrue, to misrepresent any good deed, any good initiative in international relations. This is what the opponents of disarmament are doing now when they allege that the new reduction of the Soviet armed forces is not a step towards disarmament, but rearmament. Only deliberate bad faith can explain such irresponsible contentions in face of practical steps in the sphere of disarmament.

Who does not realise that only states which have no aggressive intentions can unilaterally reduce their armed forces?

In present conditions there is no need for big armies and military bases on foreign soil for the defence of a country. Would a state harbouring predatory plans voluntarily carry out a reduction in its armed forces? It is clear that even if those armed forces were reorganised with the aim of increasing their combat power, it would not be in its interests to cut their numerical strength.

The states represented at the conference regard the Soviet Union's decision on another big reduction of its armed forces, taken in agreement with the other countries of the Socialist camp, as a common contribution by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation to the cause of disarmament, as an initiative facilitating agreement between the states of the East and West on general and complete disarmament.

The states united in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation are consistently and unwaveringly carrying through a policy aimed at ending the arms race. Since its inception, the Warsaw Treaty Organisation has cut the total strength of the armed forces of its member-states by 2,596,500 men, and the present unilateral reduction of the strength of the Soviet armed forces will bring this figure up to 3,796,500 men.

Can the N.A.T.O. states claim the credit for similar measures, the importance of which for strengthening peace is obvious to all? Unfortunately, N.A.T.O. measures up to the present time have been directed towards stepping up war preparations and accumulating armed forces and armaments.

The member-states of the Warsaw Treaty consider it necessary to emphasise the positive example set by the German Democratic Republic, which has voluntarily reduced the strength of its armed forces to 90,000 men and refrained from introducing compulsory military service. This attitude which has been adopted by the German Democratic Republic and is prompted by a desire to do its utmost to facilitate a relaxation of tension, has the full support of all states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Of great importance for the cause of peace and the national future of Germany is the fact that the German Democratic Republic is proving by its policy that Germany, if she renounces nuclear arming and the policy of revenge, revision of frontiers and militarism, can live in peace and prosperity and have a worthy place in the family of nations.

The states represented at the conference call upon the member-states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and especially on those among them who have the greatest military strength, to respond to the unilateral

reduction of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R. by reducing their own armed forces, and to follow the example set by the Soviet Union.

The participants in the conference are proceeding on the basis of the assumption that the Soviet Union's disarmament proposals should be thoroughly examined in the 10-Power committee which is to begin its work on March 15 this year. In this connection they agreed that the Governments of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria, that is to say the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation which belong to the 10-power committee, shall instruct their representatives on that committee to facilitate in every way fruitful work by the committee and press for the early drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Of course, a successful and speedy solution to the problem of general and complete disarmament calls for efforts not only on the part of the member-states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Such efforts are also called for on the part of the Western Powers. The participants in the conference express the hope that the Western Powers will also make their contribution to an early solution of the disarmament problem.

A mutual and honest desire for agreement will make it possible to avoid the repetition of a situation in which efforts to agree on disarmament are drowned in floods of speeches and resolutions.

An effective system of international control over general and complete disarmament is necessary for the successful implementation of such disarmament. Control, divorced from practical steps in the sphere of disarmament, could be used in the present situation for purposes diametrically opposed to disarmament: to search for a breach in the defence systems of other countries and to collect information facilitating the drawing up of plans for an attack on this or that country. That is why the states which have no aggressive intentions show a natural concern for the amount of international control to correspond to the real extent of the disarmament of the states. In conditions of general and complete disarmament the states will have no reason to fear each other. Every possibility will exist there for any check, for any inspection. If disarmament is general and complete, control will also be all-embracing and complete.

The states represented at the conference consider it necessary to re-emphasise their interest in an agreement on disarmament such as would provide complete confidence that no side would violate disarmament commitments or would have the possibility of rearming in secret.

The member-states of the Warsaw Treaty note it as a positive fact that for a long time not a single atomic or hydrogen bomb has been exploded in any part of the world. However, though nuclear explosions are not being staged for the time being, there is no international agreement banning them. The peoples do not want just a truce on the nuclear test front; they expect that such tests will be ended once and for all. Anxiety is also created by certain attempts to go back on the positive practical achievements towards the discontinuance of nuclear tests.

If the tests were really resumed by one of the sides, that might set off a kind of chain reaction as a result of which our planet would again become the arena for competition in holding nuclear weapon tests, with all the hazardous consequences this would entail. It would also be difficult to reconcile this with the resolution of the United Nations, which unanimously urged the parties to the Geneva talks—the U.S.S.R., the United States and

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the United Kingdom—not to resume nuclear weapon tests and to expedite the conclusion of an international agreement on this question.

The Soviet Government's decision not to resume nuclear tests in the future, if only the Western Powers do not resume such test explosions, provides favourable conditions for concluding a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests. The states represented at this conference express the hope that all parties to the Geneva talks will exert the greatest possible efforts to secure in the near future the cessation of all kinds of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, on the surface, underground and under water.

The participants in the conference had a thorough exchange of views on the German question.

The states represented in the Warsaw Treaty Organisation have experienced more than once what German aggression brings to the peoples. It is the common concern of all these states that German militarism should never again imperil the security of Germany's neighbours and world peace, and this makes them determined to come out in favour of signing a peace treaty with Germany. The liquidation of the remnants of the Second World War and the conclusion of a peace treaty are imperative for the peaceful development of the whole of Germany and for making the peoples confident that firm barriers have been set up against the outbreak of another war in Europe.

At a time when the German Democratic Republic is expressing its complete readiness to enter into negotiations and conclude a peace treaty at any moment, the other German state—the Federal Republic of Germany—is opposing the conclusion of such a treaty. An abnormal and unprecedented situation has emerged in which the conclusion of a peace treaty is refused by a state which is a successor of the defeated side—the aggressor who surrendered unconditionally fifteen years ago.

The policy of the Federal Republic of Germany is designed to obstruct successful talks between the powers and a settlement of outstanding international problems. Attempts are also being made to cancel out the results which have already been achieved during the negotiations, for instance, the narrowing of the gap in the views of the sides on some questions which was achieved by the parties to the Geneva Foreign Ministers' conference in 1959.

Why does the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany so stubbornly resist the conclusion of a peace treaty? It does so above all because the peace treaty is called upon to consolidate the situation that has arisen as a result of the war, including the German state frontiers, and the Government of the Federal Republic is against this. Only one conclusion is possible: The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany expects that an opportune moment may arise for altering the frontiers established in Europe as a result of the defeat of Nazi Germany. In the present conditions, however, this means a policy of preparing a new war, for none of the states on whom the Federal Republic is attempting to make territorial claims will ever surrender its lands, as the Government of the Federal Republic should realise. All reasonable people understand that these frontiers are inviolable.

The Warsaw Treaty states declare with the utmost determination that these calculations of the West German Government are doomed to failure. The German Democratic Republic, as an impregnable bastion of peace, is barring to German militarists the road to new aggressive gambles. The Warsaw Treaty states declare that they support the measures taken by the

Government of the German Democratic Republic to safeguard peace against the revenge-seeking policy of the Adenauer government. The joint might of the Socialist camp is a firm guarantee against encroachment on the independence of the German Democratic Republic, or a new seizure of Poland's western lands, or a violation of the integrity of the Czechoslovak frontiers.

The participants in the conference express confidence that the plans of the West German revenge-seekers will not be supported by the present allies of the Federal Republic of Germany either.

It is the deep conviction of the participants in the conference that the population of the Federal Republic, too, thirsting as they are for peace, cannot and will not support the plans of the West German revenge-seekers. The participants in the conference are convinced that the population of Western Germany deserves a better fate than that of being a tool in the hands of the violators of peace. In the past, the Germans were driven repeatedly to this by the greedy imperialist policy of their rulers, and time and time again the German people had to pay a heavy price.

The conclusion of a peace treaty, the renunciation of all ideas of revenge or revision of frontiers, the renunciation of the policy of Germany's remilitarisation and atomic arming—such is the best road towards ensuring the security of all European nations and the peaceful future of the German nation. This road is being consistently followed by the German Democratic Republic. If the Federal Republic of Germany, too, were to take to this road, that would be its most convincing contribution to the cause of strengthening peace and facilitating general and complete disarmament.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is turning down the proposal for a peace treaty because it does not want to allow the question of West Berlin to be settled on the basis of it being transformed into a free city. The Government of the Federal Republic is going so far as to demand that West Berlin, which lies within the territory of the German Democratic Republic, be incorporated in Western Germany, and since this cannot be done, it prefers to preserve there the occupation régime which enables it to use West Berlin as a seat of unrest and military danger.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany opposes a peaceful settlement with Germany because it does not want the question of Germany's unity to be settled peacefully by means of talks between the two German states and the conclusion of a peace treaty.

Going in the face of all common sense, it does not want to see that for over ten years there have existed two German states which have chosen different paths of development. Disregarding the vital interests of the German people, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is rejecting the only possible way to the reunification of the country—that of talks with the G.D.R., which has been repeatedly offered by the Government of the German Democratic Republic. The Government of the Federal Republic is thereby demonstrating its hostility to the cause of German unity.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany does not want to hear of a peace treaty because it is afraid lest the conclusion of that treaty might put an end to the present situation in Western Germany which enables it to bring people to trial merely for having the courage to stand by their progressive convictions and come out in defence of the national rights of the German people and the interests of peace. All the actions of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany show that it is clearing

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the way, step by step, for the establishment in Western Germany of a régime that should look like a democratic régime but which, in actual fact, would be close to the régime which plunged the world into a murderous war and led the German people to an unparalleled national catastrophe. Could the brazen Nazi and anti-Semitic outrages of the Fascist elements in Western Germany, which the world has recently witnessed, have occurred if conditions were different? Recently the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany did not scruple to take under its wing the organisers of those disgraceful demonstrations, and some West German officials, in the best Nazi tradition, have tried to lay the blame for those demonstrations on the Communists.

All this can only increase the people's mistrust of the policy of the Federal Republic. Under these circumstances, an even more active struggle for the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany becomes a necessity.

The countries represented at the present conference stand for peaceful co-operation and good-neighbourly relations with all states, including the Federal Republic of Germany, and they are sparing no efforts to achieve such co-operation in practice.

The Warsaw Treaty states are striving for a peaceful settlement with Germany, together with the other allied and associated Powers which took part in the war against Germany. This means the conclusion of a peace treaty which, in the existing conditions, can only be signed by both German states. At the same time, they cannot agree that the solution of these questions be postponed indefinitely, which can only encourage the militarist and revenge-seeking forces of Western Germany.

If the efforts towards the conclusion of a peace treaty with both German states do not meet with support and if the solution of this question comes up against attempts at procrastination, the states represented at the present conference will have no alternative but to conclude a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic, together with the other states that are ready for this, and solve on this basis the question of West Berlin as well.

The states represented at the present conference reaffirm their inflexible desire for an improvement in the relations between countries of the East and West, for the strengthening of confidence between them, and for the development of all forms of international co-operation.

They continue to stand for the unhampered development of international trade, for the strengthening of contacts between statesmen, public leaders and organisations, and for exchanges of achievements in the fields of culture, science and technology, which enrich the peoples of all countries.

The ending of war propaganda, subversive appeals and attempts to threaten by the use of force would be of great importance for improving the international climate and eliminating suspicion in international relations.

As regards the Warsaw Treaty countries, war propaganda has been outlawed on their territories, and they are ready, for their part, to take further measures to have the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and sharp polemics in the relations between states superseded by good will and trust.

With the present noticeable relaxation of international tension, the proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two groups of states, the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisations, which has still not met with a positive solution, acquires even greater importance than in the past years. Convinced that the task of concluding a non-aggression pact between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation,

far from losing its topicality, is becoming steadily more important, the participants in the conference consider it necessary to declare that this offer still stands and that they are ready at any time to sign a non-aggression pact with the N.A.T.O. states.

The conclusion of bilateral non-aggression pacts between states belonging to different military groupings and the establishment in Europe of zones free from atomic and hydrogen weapons could also play a not inconsiderable part in improving the international situation.

The participants in the conference welcome with great satisfaction the agreement between the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France to hold a summit meeting in Paris in May this year. The governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries have long pressed for such a meeting to be held, regarding it—as was pointed out in their Declaration of May 24, 1958—as “the most important means in the existing situation of safeguarding mankind against a military calamity and turning the course of international developments towards the consolidation of peace.”

The Warsaw Treaty states consider that the forthcoming meeting of the heads of government should discuss such important and urgent questions as the problem of general and complete disarmament; the question of a German peace treaty, including the establishment of a free city of West Berlin; the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests; and East-West relations. Proceeding on the basis of the conviction that any international problem, however complex it may seem, can be settled given reasonable consideration for the interests of the parties and a general desire for peace, the participants in the conference express the hope that the heads of government will succeed in finding the correct ways to a successful solution of the aforementioned questions in the interests of strengthening universal peace, and that the forthcoming summit meeting will be a turning point in East-West relations.

Now, on the eve of crucial talks between statesmen of the East and the West, on the eve of a meeting at the summit, it is especially important, in the opinion of the Warsaw Treaty countries, that all states should do everything in their power to create a situation facilitating the success of the coming talks. The states represented at the present conference declare that they will act precisely in this direction and urge all other countries to promote the success of East-West talks and to refrain from any steps capable of complicating these negotiations.

The governments of the Warsaw Treaty countries note with satisfaction that their untiring efforts aimed at the termination of the arms race, the elimination of dangerous seats of international conflicts, and the ending of the cold war, are meeting with ever wider support from the peoples of the world and are yielding positive results. They are unanimous in believing that in our time the states do not and cannot have any greater or nobler task than that of contributing to the establishment of lasting peace on earth. Moscow, February 4, 1960.

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K'ANG SHENG'S SPEECH TO THE WARSAW TREATY MEETING
Comrade Chairman, Dear Comrades:

In the capacity of an observer of the People's Republic of China, I have the honour to attend this regular conference of the Political Consultative

Committee of member states of the Warsaw Treaty. We are convinced that the convening of this conference will make new contributions to further relaxing the international situation and encouraging the people of the world in their struggle against the expansion of armaments and war preparations and for a lasting peace. We wish the conference success.

The current international situation continues to develop in a direction favourable to peace. There have appeared certain tendencies towards relaxation of the international tension created by imperialism. Comrade Nikita Khrushchov made a successful visit to the United States. Prompted by the Soviet Union's foreign policy of peace and the peace-loving people and countries of the world, an East-West summit conference will soon be convened. As to the disarmament question, a certain measure of agreement has also been reached on procedural matters. The Chinese people and all other peace-loving people and countries the world over rejoice at this. The emergence of such a situation is not accidental. This is the result of repeated struggles waged by the Socialist forces, the national revolutionary forces and the forces of peace and democracy against the imperialist war forces, the result of the East wind prevailing over the West wind.

The incomparable strength and the firm unity of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and its outstanding and effective efforts in the cause of peace are the decisive factors in this tendency towards easing the international situation. We are happy to see that construction in all the Socialist countries is gathering speed and their material strength greatly enhanced. The Soviet Union, particularly, has scored brilliant achievements in carrying out its enormous Seven-Year Plan. The Soviet success in successive launchings of man-made earth satellites and cosmic rockets marks the fact that in the most important fields of science and technology, the Soviet Union has left the United States far behind. The balance of world forces has undergone a further, huge change favourable to peace and Socialism thereby greatly fortifying the will to struggle, and confidence in victory, of the people throughout the world.

The unswerving struggle carried out by the powerful world forces of peace has caused repeated setbacks to the U.S. imperialists' "position of strength" and "brink of war" policies. Not only is the United States becoming increasingly isolated politically as the days go by, but militarily, its forces are dispersed and it is lagging behind in new weapons; economically, too, its situation is becoming increasingly difficult. In these circumstances, and particularly under pressure of the strong desire for peace of the people everywhere, the U.S. ruling circles were obliged to make some peace gestures. Of course it is better to talk peace than to talk war. Nevertheless, even the U.S. ruling circles themselves do not try to hide the fact that the change in their way of doing things is aimed at numbing the fighting spirit of the people of the world by means of the "strategy to win victory by peace," wrecking the unity of the peace forces of the world and disintegrating the Socialist camp; they are even dreaming of a so-called "peaceful evolution" in the Socialist countries. These wild ambitions of the U.S. ruling circles will, of course, not be realised. While being obliged to make certain peace gestures, the U.S. ruling circles are still pushing ahead vigorously with their arms expansion and war preparations, making a strenuous effort to develop inter-continental ballistic missiles, setting up and expanding missile bases in various places, claiming to be ready at any time to resume nuclear weapons tests, and actively trying to strengthen and

patch up military *blocs* in an attempt to gain time to improve their inferior military position.

U.S. President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message recently gave the clearest indication that the new tricks of the United States are designed to gain precisely what it failed to obtain by its old tricks. The actions of the United States prove fully that its imperialist nature will not change. American imperialism still remains the arch enemy of world peace. All those throughout the world who are working sincerely for peace must maintain their vigilance against U.S. double-dealing. If our Socialist camp and the people of all countries in the world continue to strengthen unity, continue to fortify our strength and thoroughly smash all the intrigues and schemes of the enemy of peace, U.S. war plans can be set back even further and even checked, and the cause of defence of peace will certainly win still greater victories.

At the present time universal disarmament is an important question relating to the defence of world peace. Since World War II, the Soviet Union has time and again made positive proposals for disarmament, the banning of atomic weapons and the ending of nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have, on their own initiative, reduced their armed forces. Not long ago, the Soviet Union proposed general and complete disarmament at the U.N. General Assembly. It later adopted a law at the Supreme Soviet session, again slashing its armed forces unilaterally by 1.2 million men. These facts convincingly demonstrate the sincerity of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries for peace and their confidence in their own strength.

Although U.S. imperialism dare not oppose disarmament in so many words, it has always in fact sabotaged universal disarmament. Whenever certain U.S. proposals were accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States always concocted new pretexts for a retreat from its original position, creating all kinds of difficulties and preventing by every means the reaching of agreement on the disarmament question. U.S. actions prove that it will not abandon its policy of the arms race. Therefore, the struggle for universal disarmament is a long-term and complicated struggle between us and imperialism.

The Chinese Government and the Chinese people have always stood for universal disarmament, and actively supported the proposals concerning disarmament made by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. Since 1951, the Chinese Government has on its own initiative again and again reduced its armed forces. The present Chinese armed forces are less than half their original size. We shall continue to work tirelessly for universal disarmament together with the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. We hope that the countries concerned will reach agreement on this question of universal disarmament. The Chinese Government has never hesitated to commit itself to all international obligations with which it agrees. But U.S. imperialism, hostile to the Chinese people, has always adopted a discriminatory attitude against our country in international relations. Therefore, the Chinese Government has to declare to the world that any international disarmament agreement and all other international agreements which are arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegate cannot, of course, have any binding force on China.

The German question has a particularly important place among

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outstanding international issues. Its solution has a bearing not only on the security of Europe but also on the peace of the world. The permanent division of Germany and the speeded-up revival of West German militarism are an important component part of the U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression. The recent frenzied war cries of Adenauer and the rampant anti-semitic activities started by the West German Fascist forces are the outcome of U.S. instigation and support. The Governments of the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic have time and again put forward reasonable proposals for settlement of the German question. But all these proposals have been rejected by the United States and West Germany. In its efforts to come to agreement with the Western Powers on the conclusion of a German peace treaty and on ending the occupation régime in West Berlin, the Soviet Union has made many concessions, whereas the Western Powers have to date made no appropriate response. The Chinese Government and people will steadfastly support the basic stand taken by the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic on the solution of the German question, and the struggle of the German people for the reunification of their motherland on the basis of peace and democracy.

While intensifying its efforts to re-arm West Germany, U.S. imperialism is reviving Japanese militarism in the East, and has signed a Japan-U.S. treaty of military alliance with the Kishi Government, its close follower. The Chinese Government has issued a statement strongly condemning this act of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries which threatens the peace and security of Asia. The Soviet Government, too, has sent a memorandum to the Japanese Government, pointing out that the treaty seriously endangers the interests of the Soviet Union, China and many other countries in the Asian and Pacific regions. The people of all lands, including the Japanese people, are unanimous in their firm opposition to this further step of military collusion between the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries.

The Chinese Government and people hold that West Germany and Japan, which are supported energetically by U.S. imperialism, have become two sources of serious war danger. All peace-loving peoples and countries of the world must maintain a high state of vigilance against this, and exert every effort to prevent the militarism of these two countries from violating world peace.

In other parts of Asia, U.S. imperialism also continues to create international tension. The Chinese People's Volunteers withdrew from Korea on their own initiative long ago, but U.S. forces are still hanging on in South Korea and are trying hard to obstruct Korea's peaceful reunification. The United States, supporting the reactionary forces in Laos, undermined the Geneva agreements and the Vientiane agreements and provoked civil war in Laos. At the Sino-American ambassadorial talks, China has persistently advocated the principle of settling disputes between China and the United States by means of peaceful negotiation and without resort to force or threat of force. But the United States has all along refused to reach agreement with China in accordance with this principle and up till now is occupying our territory of Taiwan. The U.S. navy and air force have been constantly making military provocations against our country despite our repeated warnings. Therefore, the Chinese people and all the people of the world must unite still more closely and resolutely smash U.S. schemes for new wars and aggression in Asia.

The foreign policy of our Socialist countries has always firmly adhered

to the principle of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems. We Socialist countries will never encroach upon others, but neither will we tolerate encroachment by others. Lenin said that to achieve peaceful coexistence, no obstacle would come from the Soviet side. Obstacles could come only from imperialism, from the side of American (as well as any other) capitalists. We will continue to adhere to Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence. Our efforts to carry out this principle have won the support of increasing numbers of people. But if the imperialist reactionaries mistake this for a sign of weakness and dare to impose war on us, then they will only be inviting their own destruction.

The Chinese people have always sympathised with and supported the national and democratic movements of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and striven for long-term, friendly relations with the nationalist countries in Asia and Africa on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly initiated by our country with India and Burma. To realise their ulterior aims, the imperialists have tried by every means to undermine our country's unity with these countries. One of their chief tricks to undermine this unity is to use the border issue and the overseas Chinese issue, which are legacies of history, to sow discord and cook up anti-Chinese plots in a vain attempt to isolate China. The reactionary forces in certain Asian countries also make use of these issues to try to undermine the friendship between the people of their countries and the Chinese people. They attempt to use the anti-Chinese campaign to divert the attention of the people of their countries from domestic issues and to create pretexts for suppressing the democratic, progressive forces in their own countries. In our relations with certain Asian nationalist countries, there once appeared small patches of dark cloud, but the sun cannot be overshadowed for long and friendship between our people and the people of these countries will certainly be maintained and developed.

Recently the Indonesian Government and our Government have exchanged the instruments of ratification of the treaty concerning the question of dual nationality, set up a joint committee to implement the treaty and started talks on questions relating to the return of overseas Chinese to their homeland. A certain period of time is needed for an overall settlement of the overseas Chinese question and there may still be some twists and turns. But, if both sides treasure their friendship, persist in peaceful consultations and seriously carry out the agreements already reached, the overseas Chinese question can be solved justly and reasonably.

China and Burma have always had friendly relations. Recently, the Prime Minister of Burma Ne Win visited our country and signed with the Chinese Premier the Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression and an agreement between the two Governments on the boundary question. This not only signifies that friendly relations of the two countries have entered a new stage, but also sets a new example for friendship and solidarity among the Afro-Asian countries. The Sino-Burmese border question is a complicated one left over by history. The imperialist reactionaries used this question to sow dissension and cause division. But both Chinese and Burmese Governments sincerely desire peace and friendship, so the two parties were able to reach agreement in principle speedily and pave the way for an overall, thorough settlement of this question. The Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression offers striking proof that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have

certainly not "outlived themselves" or "become defunct" as certain reactionary elements and instigators of war allege, but, on the contrary, are showing their great vitality with increasing clarity. These facts thoroughly give the lie to the slanders of the imperialists and all reactionaries about China's "aggression." They amply prove that China's sincerity in abiding by the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence can stand the test of time and history. Those who attempt to isolate China have failed to do so. On the contrary, they have isolated themselves.

Strengthening the unity of the countries of the Socialist camp is a matter of the utmost importance. Our unity is built on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of proletarian internationalism. The Moscow meetings of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist countries held in 1957 ushered in a new historic period in our unity. The Declaration adopted at this meeting is the charter of solidarity of our Socialist camp. The imperialists, the modern revisionists and the reactionaries in all countries are always dreaming that changes in their favour will occur within our countries and splits will occur in the unity between our countries. The greater the difficulties they come up against, the more they hope to save themselves from their doom by sabotage within our countries and by undermining the unity between our countries. However, in face of our great unity, their futile calculations can never be realised. The Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people have always taken the safeguarding of the unity of the Socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union as their sacred international duty. They have always regarded an attack against any Socialist country by the imperialists and all reactionaries as an attack against China. They have always considered that the modern revisionists of Yugoslavia are renegades to the Communist movement, that revisionism is the main danger in the present Communist movement and that it is necessary to wage a resolute struggle against revisionism. This stand of ours is firm and unshakable. Working for the cause of peace and Socialism, we Socialist countries will certainly extend further support and help to each other. As long as the Socialist camp is united, the unity of the peoples of the world has a firm nucleus and the victory of our cause has a reliable guarantee.

The present situation is extremely favourable to us. Let us hold aloft the banner of peace, the banner of Socialism and Communism and march victoriously towards our great goal!

[*Peking Review*, No. 6, 1960.]

Frontier diplomacy

By the beginning of 1960 the Sino-Indian border conflict had reached a deadlock with the Chinese holding their positions on what Delhi claimed as Indian territory, but not advancing any further, and the Indians making no attempt to evict them by force. The Indian Government rejected a Chinese proposal for a withdrawal of armed forces for a distance of twenty kilometres on each side from the line between areas actually held by the respective parties; as no continuous lines existed either in Ladakh or the North-east Frontier Agency, but only scattered outposts, the application of such a measure would in any case have

been a matter of extreme difficulty and would probably have only led to fresh disputes. Mr. Nehru, however, on February 5 invited Mr. Chou to talks on Delhi subject to the condition that there should be no "negotiations," Mr. Nehru's publicly held position being that he refused to negotiate while Chinese troops remained on Indian territory. On February 27 Mr. Chou replied accepting the invitation for an unspecified date; it was later reported that he would arrive in India on April 19.

Meanwhile China sought to prepare the ground diplomatically for pressure on India to agree to frontier revision by concluding boundary agreements with Burma and Nepal, both of which countries had long-standing disputes or uncertainties over their frontiers with their Chinese neighbour. Both Burma and Nepal were glad to take an opportunity of coming to terms with China without being too particular about the details; both were deeply impressed by the power and determination of China and were disinclined to look for aid in a crisis to India, whose lack of will to repel encroachments on her own territory did not inspire confidence in the prospect of her defending anyone else's. The Burmese were the first to make the journey to Peking; the Prime Minister of Burma, General Ne Win, and his Foreign Minister, U Chan Tun Aung, arrived there on January 24 and six days later signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression, to which was appended an Agreement on the Question of the Boundary between the two countries. Article III of the treaty bound each contracting party not to take part in any military alliance directed against the other—a clause which could in future be invoked by China to prevent Burma entering into any defence pact with India. The terms of the boundary agreement involved concessions as well as gains for China, but on several points it did not by any means finally settle the issues, but provided for joint Sino-Burmese commissions to deal with them, so that the possibility of further disputes remained.

The treaty and frontier agreement with Burma were declared in Peking to "have set a new example of harmonious co-existence among the Asian countries." "Why," it was asked with obvious reference to India, "cannot things which have happened between China and Burma also take place between China and other Asian countries?" The moral was further underlined when on March 14 Mr. Koirala, the Prime Minister of Nepal, arrived in Peking and within a week concluded economic and boundary agreements with China. They provided for frontier delimitation on the basis of the traditional border and a grant by China to Nepal to the value of 100 million rupees (about £7.5 million). (NCNA, March 24.) On Mr. Koirala's departure it was announced that Mr. Chou would shortly be visiting Nepal.

The Chinese in Indonesia

The Sino-Indonesian treaty on dual nationality went into effect with the exchange of instruments of ratification in Peking on January 20, in spite of the Chinese failure to induce the Indonesian Government to withdraw its restrictions on Chinese local trade. Marshal Ch'en Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister, stated in a speech on the occasion in Peking that his government had always regarded the holding of dual nationality by overseas Chinese as irrational, and the treaty now ratified provided for those Chinese who wished to become Indonesian citizens to do so, for those who wanted to retain Chinese nationality, but to remain in Indonesia, to "stay on in peace of mind," and for those "who have lost their means of livelihood or who do not wish to remain in Indonesia" to return to China. The number of those who had "lost their means of livelihood" being considerable, large-scale repatriation to China was arranged, and at the receptions in Canton language was used of a very different kind to that employed by the Foreign Minister to celebrate the ratification of the treaty. Liao Ch'eng-chih, Chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, spoke of the repatriates as having suffered "persecution" in Indonesia and said the campaign against the Chinese had been instigated by the imperialists to divert the Indonesians from their proper objective of liberating West New Guinea.

China and the Khrushchev tour in Asia

Whatever secret diplomatic understanding there may have been between Peking and Moscow about the purposes of Mr. Khrushchev's visits to India and Indonesia at a time when Communist China was in strained relations with both these countries, the remarkably meagre reporting of the trip by the Chinese press and radio for home consumption indicated that Peking found it embarrassing to explain to the Chinese people. While Soviet propaganda gave very heavy cover to the whole Khrushchev tour, Peking radio's home service ignored it completely for its first week and afterwards made only a few brief references to it, without comment of any kind. On the other hand, the tenth anniversary of the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty was celebrated with much publicity, so that Chinese citizens were reminded of the Soviet Union's undertakings of military support to China in an emergency and given a minimum of information about the welcome to the Soviet leader in lands unfriendly to China. There was no evidence that Mr. Khrushchev tried to mediate or to intervene in any way in the matters of dispute between China and India or Indonesia. He did, however, undertake an unsuccessful initiative in a direction desired by China even more than by Russia; the Indonesian Government refused to take part

in a joint communiqué denouncing Japan for the revised Security Pact with the United States.

The Campaign against Kishi

The Chinese Communist propaganda campaign against the Japanese Government of Mr. Kishi for its conclusion of the revised Security Pact with the United States (signed in Washington on January 19) was continued with great intensity during the first three months of 1960 and was closely co-ordinated with the activities of various Japanese organisations opposing the ratification of the Pact. A statement of the Foreign Ministry in Peking declared that the treaty contravened solemn international agreements between the allies of the Second World War to prevent the revival of Japanese militarism and was "an extremely grave step" taken by Japanese reactionaries and American imperialists to prepare for a new war. In putting the case to the Japanese people the spokesman for China challenged Mr. Kishi's idea of "separating politics from economics" in dealing with China—meaning the development of trade without diplomatic recognition—by asserting the principle of "inseparability of politics and economics" or no trade without recognition. The anti-Kishi campaign, which in any case had the support of the Japanese Socialist Party, received considerable impetus early in March from a declaration in favour of "normalisation" of relations with China from the former Prime Minister, Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi. Meanwhile there were indications that with or without diplomatic relations Chinese Communist leaders might take advantage of Japanese democratic liberties to appeal directly to the Japanese nation; it was stated in Tokyo that leading Chinese personalities and perhaps Marshal Ch'en Yi himself would attend the Conference for the Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons to be held in Japan in August.

The Case of Bishop Walsh

The Chinese claim that the American imperialists including President Eisenhower were incorrigible (in contrast to the more conciliatory pre-summit attitude of the Soviet Union towards America) was maintained without qualification, and in the middle of March Peking announced a sentence of twenty years' imprisonment on an American Catholic missionary, Bishop James Walsh, on charges of espionage and counter-revolutionary conspiracy. The American Government protested through the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw, declaring that the conviction "showed a disregard of universally accepted standards of international law and behaviour among civilised nations." It was considered by some observers that the sentence on Walsh was deliberately timed to exacerbate

Chinese-American relations in advance of a summit conference at which China would not be represented but could not be forgotten.

China and Latin America

Whether or not the Walsh sentence was a deliberate anti-American provocation, Peking's anti-American attitude was certainly very clearly evinced into its continual propaganda to and about Latin America. President Eisenhower's tour of the area was denounced in the strongest terms. On March 19, a mass meeting in Peking celebrated the establishment of a China-Latin America Friendship Association and the commencement of the "Support-the-Latin-American-Peoples week" in Latin America itself. The speech delivered by Kuo Mo-jo at this meeting typified the kind of tone adopted by Chinese spokesmen on this subject. He accused America of territorial annexation, military aggression and economic imperialism in its dealings with Latin America over the past century. He declared China's great interest in the struggle for "liberation" against America and concluded:

"Onward heroic Latin American peoples! Onward heroic African and Asian peoples! Let us unite, and smash U.S. imperialist enslavement, exploitation and assaults against the peoples of various countries. . . ." [Quoted in *Peking Review*, No. 12, 1960.]

Liu Shao-ch'i, the Communist Chinese head of state, has now accepted invitations to visit all the countries of East Europe. The last acceptance (of the Czechoslovak invitation) was announced in March. He may well be coming to Europe this year; but probably the Russians have prevailed upon their European allies to arrange the visit for after the summit. Mr. Khrushchev would naturally want to avoid having a Chinese leader making strong anti-American speeches in Europe on the eve of his negotiations with President Eisenhower.

2. Internal Political and Economic Developments

The campaign against "right opportunism"

On January 8, an article on party discipline in the *People's Daily* referred to the "struggle against right opportunism which was carried on within the party during 1959." This indicated that the campaign against party officials who had voiced opposition to the policies and methods of the "great leap forward" (see the previous issue of this chronicle) had been concluded or at least taken a new turning.

The word "opportunist" has disappeared from major pronouncements in the central Press organs during the past quarter. The January 1 editorial in the *People's Daily* merely referred to "some people" who had doubts about the "great leap forward" and the

communes. Li Fu-ch'un, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and other spokesmen have warned about the need to combat the "right deviation," but in moderate terms¹; the trenchant denunciations of the "right opportunists," so characteristic of the Press during the last quarter of 1959, have vanished.

No indication has been given as to the reason for this change of line. Nor have three of the missing Politburo members—P'eng Teh-huai, Deputy Prime Minister and former Defence Minister; Li Ching-ch'üan, First Secretary, Szechwan Province; Chang Wen-T'ien, Former Deputy Foreign Minister (see last chronicle)—reappeared in public. Ch'en Yun's name was mentioned once in the *People's Daily* (January 21) as sending a wreath to the funeral of Wei Li-huang, the former Nationalist general who died on January 17 before he finally reappeared at the National People's Congress on March 30 (see below).

Inculcating Mao Tse-tung's ideas

Having abandoned the negative task of criticising the mistaken views of the right opportunists, the Chinese Press has launched a major campaign to promote the study of the writings of Mao Tse-tung—presumably with a view to preventing right opportunists and others from going astray again. For instance, the 30th anniversary of the publication of the article "A Single Spark can Light a Prairie Fire" was marked by comment in the *People's Daily* and provincial papers² which pointed the moral that even when things seemed blackest it was necessary to trust Mao's vision of the future. (This article was written at a time when Communist fortunes were at an extremely low ebb after Chiang Kai-shek's coup of 1927; Mao exhorted his colleagues not to be pessimistic and prophesied that a revolutionary upsurge would soon occur.³) The party's second thoughts on the communes at the end of 1958 coupled with the modification of the "leap forward" that led up to the admission of statistical exaggeration last August have presumably shaken many people's confidence in the wisdom of the leadership and this confidence has to be restored.

In their concern to emphasise the correctness of Mao's predictions and policies, some official spokesmen have made remarkable claims. In an article on the film industry, Hsia Yen, Deputy Minister of Culture, went so far as to aver that Mao had solved problems which Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin had not been able to or had not had the time to solve. (See p. 71.) Another official talked of Mao Tse-tung's ideology glowing a hundred thousand feet high (see p. 63).

¹ Li Fu-ch'un, "Greeting the New Leap Forward of 1960," *Red Flag*, No. 1, 1960.

² Excerpted in *People's Daily*, Jan. 8.

³ The article is reproduced in Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1954), Vol. 1, pp. 116-128.

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Wuhan University has set up a special research institute for the study of Mao's writings headed by the president of the university. This institute directs the whole university's work in this field.⁴ Reports from other provinces indicate that it is not just the intellectuals who are taking part in this new ideological campaign. Workers and peasants in Shansi Province are engaged in emulation campaigns to see who can study more and better. This prescription of theoretical studies for people a majority of whom must be illiterates or near-illiterates has been questioned by some officials, and even a number of the students have felt the task rather above them.⁵ The key works prescribed for the campaign are apparently "On contradiction," "On practice," and "On the correct handling of contradictions among the people."

While his ideas have been propagated, Mao Tse-tung himself has been on a lengthy tour of the provinces. He was not reported as being in Peking from last October until the People's Congress session in March (see below); during the three months of this quarter his whereabouts were otherwise only revealed twice. In January he received an East German delegation in Shanghai⁶; on March 19 he received Mr. B. P. Koirala, the Nepalese Premier, in Hangchow.

Business men

Among those who are devoting more time to the study of Mao's writings are China's former industrialists and merchants. On February 29, the NCNA revealed that their organisations, the China Democratic National Construction Association (CDNCA) and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), after holding preliminary meetings from December 16 to February 18 had held a formal joint congress from February 19 to February 21. At the conclusion of their meeting they sent an effusive message to Chairman Mao (which included the words: "We are proud to be living in the era of Mao Tse-tung") promising to make greater efforts on behalf of the country's economic development and towards remoulding their own thinking.

The length of the session coupled with the facts that it was addressed by Marshal Ch'en Yi, Foreign Minister, and Li Hsien-nien, Finance Minister, and that Liu Shao-ch'i, head of state, and Marshal Chu Teh, had received all the delegates indicated that this was an important event. But the document drawn up by the CDNCA and the ACFIC to sum up the work done gave little indication of the precise reason for the conference.

⁴ *Hupeh Daily*, Jan. 12. Survey of the China Mainland Press (SCMP) (Hongkong: U.S. Consulate-General), No. 2212.

⁵ *Shansi Daily*, Feb. 1 (SCMP No. 2209).

⁶ NCNA Jan. 19.

This document stated that during the previous year or so, Chinese business men had drawn closer to the Communist Party—partly because their suspicions about the Party's intentions had been dispelled, partly because they had been impressed by the achievements of the great leap forward, and partly because of their participation in manual labour. However, quite a few were still wary of the Party and disliked physical labour and political studies. Acceptance of the "Socialist path" was firmer and more widespread; but the majority had not finally solved the question of their "political stand." The document expressed the determination of the ex-capitalists to make greater efforts in this direction (studying Mao's writings being part of their task) and recognised the Party's undertaking to enforce political remoulding by mild methods and not through violent class struggle.

Possibly the meeting represented an attempt by the Party to forge more cordial relations with a class that had suffered severe buffetings during the anti-rightist struggle of 1957; this in turn was presumably motivated by a desire to make greater use of business men's managerial and technical skills, which had probably been neglected during the height of the great leap forward with its emphasis on manual labour.

It was noteworthy that the *People's Daily*, in its March 1 editorial on the meeting, was far less happy about the business men's attitude towards the great leap than the business men themselves. It said: "A majority of industrialists and merchants are, in different degrees, sceptical and wavering in their acceptance of the leadership of the Communist Party and towards the general line, the great leap forward and the people's communes; some of them are dissatisfied and even opposed to these things. . . ."

In these circumstances, the Communist Party has doubtless given some guarantee that despite the continued talk of "leaps forward," a genuine attempt to re-emphasise the use of sound management techniques is now intended.

Catholics

After four and a half years imprisonment, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Shanghai, Kung P'in-mei, was given a public trial on March 16-17 and sentenced to life imprisonment on charges of high treason. The main allegations made against him were subversion of the "patriotic Catholic movement," collusion with imperialist spies, and opposition to land reform and the movement against counter-revolutionaries. Thirteen other Catholics, allegedly members of his "clique" were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to twenty years.⁸

⁸ NCNA March 17.

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There was no indication as to why this particular moment had been chosen to bring Bishop Kung, who was arrested in September 1955, to trial. Possibly it was a justification for the simultaneous sentencing of Bishop Walsh (see p. 92), for there are no signs of a general anti-Catholic drive just now. In 1957, Roman Catholics who had made their peace with the régime formed a "Patriotic Association"; a number who protested were denounced as "rightists."

Last year, reports from Heilungkiang, Kirin, Kiangsu and Hupeh provinces revealed how local chapters of this association were denouncing the Vatican as an agent of American imperialism and electing their own bishops.⁹

Women

The celebration of International Women's Day in Peking was the occasion for the release of some interesting statistics. There were said to be 200 million young and middle-aged (*i.e.*, able-bodied) women out of a total of over 300 million in the country. Some 100 million have started to participate in production since the beginning of the great leap in 1958. During this period the number of women factory and office workers increased from 3.2 million to over eight million. In the countryside, 90 per cent. of all able-bodied women are now doing agricultural tasks. During 1959, 30 million worked on water conservancy projects.

In 1957, able-bodied peasant men put in an average of 249 days work; in 1959 the figure was 300 days. Over the same period the equivalent figure for women increased from 166 days to 250 days.

This increased work on the part of women is permitted by the communal mess halls, nurseries and kindergartens that have been set up in the communes. Hundreds of millions of people are said to be eating in the mess halls; 50 million children, in both town and country, are in nurseries and kindergartens.¹⁰

The Panchen Lama finally returned to Tibet in the middle of February after an absence of five months.

Economic development

On January 22, the State Statistical Bureau issued details on the completion of the 1959 plan.¹¹ The main figures were:

⁹ These reports were collected in Current Background No. 610 published by the U.S. Consulate-General, Hongkong.

¹⁰ See *People's Daily*, March 8, editorial; and "The People's Commune is an excellent form of organisation for the complete emancipation of women," *Red Flag*, No. 5, 1960.

¹¹ Quoted in *Peking Review*, No. 4, 1960.

steel 13.35 million tons (67 per cent. increase over 1958)
 coal 347.8 million tons (29 per cent. increase)
 electricity 41,500 million kwh
 crude oil 3.7 million tons
 cotton cloth 7,500 million metres
 grain 270.05 million tons (8 per cent. increase)
 cotton 2.41 million tons (14.7 per cent. increase).

With the exception of oil, these figures represented the achievement of at least the minimum targets originally set for the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1962. The question mark about the steel figure is the extent to which the "modernised" small and medium scale plants—which account for one-third of the output—are able to turn out what is normally accepted as steel (the admittedly primitive "native-style" steel plants were abandoned at the end of 1958). It is also very doubtful whether the grain figure can be as much as 270 million tons in view of the admittedly serious natural calamities last year.

The industrial reports in the early months of 1960 were generally optimistic and spoke of the overfulfilment of targets; but in the agricultural sphere, spring drought was reported in provinces in the North-West, North and South-West (NCNA February 9).

Pigs

A campaign to increase rapidly the number of pigs in the country which was launched in the latter half of 1959 has resulted so far in the formation of some two million collective "pig farms" owned by communes, production brigades and public dining halls.¹² Together with state-owned pig farms, these pig farms account for 116 million head, about 64 per cent. of the country's 180 million pigs.¹³

To what extent the new pig farms have taken over pigs privately-owned by peasants is not clear; but in the early stages of the campaign some areas were reporting 100–200 per cent. increases in the numbers of pigs. In the country as a whole, the monthly increase was reported as 5.4 per cent. in October and 9 per cent. in November.¹⁴

The declared objectives of the campaign are to increase commune incomes, to increase supplies of hide and bristles for light industry and export, to increase manure supplies, and to increase meat supplies.¹⁵ The latter is perhaps the major one, as Chou En-lai admitted last August that supplies of pork had dropped during the first half of 1959.¹⁶ While great publicity was given in January to the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–62) in two years in many fields, the pig population in

¹² *People's Daily*, Feb. 17. ¹³ *Ibid.* ¹⁴ NCNA, Dec. 23, 1959. SCMP, No. 2204.

¹⁵ *People's Daily*, Dec. 23, 1959, quoted in SCMP 2204.

¹⁶ Speech before Standing Committee, National People's Congress, *Peking Review*, No. 35, 1959.

1959 (180 million) was still well below the 1962 target (250 million).¹⁷ Yet there is now talk of having one pig per head of population by 1962.¹⁸ While the earlier reports pointed out the advantages of collective pig rearing, the *People's Daily* now states that pigs on the new farms are still being reared according to the time-honoured methods of the individual peasant and admits that labour efficiency is low.¹⁹

National People's Congress

The second session of the second National People's Congress has just opened in Peking as this issue is being completed for publication. The proceedings of the first day (March 30) were notable for the following reasons.

Mao Tse-tung reappeared in public in Peking for the first time since last October.

Ch'en Yun made his first public appearance since attending the 10th anniversary celebrations in Shanghai last October. The other missing Deputy Premier, P'eng Teh-huai, did not appear.

Li Fu-ch'un in his speech on the 1959 and 1960 plans revealed that communes are now being set up in the cities "in a big way." Urban communes were formed along with rural communes in the summer of 1958; but the central committee resolution of December that year announced that the idea of city communes would be dropped for the moment. The reasons given were that urban problems were more complex, and that capitalists and intellectuals in the cities had misgivings about urban communes. It now seems likely that the two-month meeting of capitalists (see p. 95) was held partly with the idea of preparing the ground for the renewed drive to establish communes in the cities.

A foretaste of things to come had already been provided by reports from a number of cities of the establishment of "service depots" to take over household chores and cooking to release wives for community factories and workshops (see for instance the NCNA report from Peking in SCMP, No. 2183).

Li Fu-ch'un announced the following targets for 1960:

- steel—18.4 million tons (38 per cent. increase over 1959)
- pig iron—27.5 million tons (34 per cent. increase)
- coal—425 million tons (22 per cent. increase)
- grain—297 million tons (10 per cent. increase)
- cotton—2.65 million tons (10 per cent. increase)

The new policy of mechanising agriculture (see chronicle in last issue)

¹⁷ *Peking Review*, No. 4, 1960.

¹⁸ Li Fu-ch'un, "Greeting the New Leap Forward of 1960," *Red Flag*, No. 1, 1960.

¹⁹ Feb. 17.

was emphasised by Li Fu-ch'un. He stated that the quantity of rolled steel to be assigned for the manufacture of agricultural machinery and implements would be doubled in 1960 and that the acreage cultivated by machinery would reach over 16 million acres, an increase of about 40 per cent. over 1959. (This is still only about 5 per cent. of the total cultivated acreage.)²⁰

²⁰ NCNA, March 30.

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